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My sincere gratitude goes to Leuven University Press for making this book 
available through their Open Access scheme. I also thank Dr Erkan Toğuşlu 
and the Current Issues in Islam series editors for including this discussion of 
Turkish German comedy in their series of scholarly, peer-reviewed publications 
initiated by the Gülen Chair for Intercultural Studies (GCIS). Thanks go to the 
Popular Culture Association of Australia and New Zealand (POPCAANZ) for 
supporting this book with a publication grant. I am grateful to the School of 
Languages and Cultures (SLC), located in The University of Sydney’s Faculty 
of Arts and Social Sciences, for providing financial support for the Open Access 
publication of Turkish German Muslims and Comedy Entertainment: Settling 
into Mainstream Culture in the 21st Century. 
This book is the result of many conversations with colleagues and friends, 
and students, about what funny means in the face of a resurgence of racism 
and ethnic, anti-Muslim bias in German society and across the globe. And how 
Turkish Germans can use cultural comedy practices to counter this bias.1
There has been an ongoing series of events causing majority societies in non-
Muslim countries to question the place of Muslim minority communities in their 
nation states.2 After 9/11 and the rise of ISIS, and fundamentalist terror attacks on 
European capital cities, the discourses of Islamist fanatism and militant Jihadism 
have surged. This has been playing out in newspapers, books, on television and in 
online contexts. The negative stereotyping of Muslimness was highly effective in 
its influence on public opinion. 
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In the 21st century in Germany, right-wing movements like the German 
PEGIDA have formed around the idea of Muslimness as a global threat. 
Supporters of this movement have argued that the Muslim threat would never 
go away. They have said that Muslims could not possibly be integrated into the 
Western model of democratic liberalism. How could they, if those Muslims 
cannot even laugh at Danish cartoons and French caricatures of the Prophet 
or acts of brownfaced comedy sketches? Even Muslim majority communities 
who had lived in their host countries for generations, as is the case with Turkish 
Germans in Germany, were suddenly suspicious if they did not find humour in 
the derision of certain cultural values or community lifestyles. 
This meant that humour associated with an ethnic community and jokes 
about its origins, beliefs and community characteristics turned into a pop 
cultural litmus test. Being on one or the other side of ethnicity-themed humour, 
so held majority opinion, became a clear indicator for liberal attitudes in liberal 
societies. Even with its Holocaust history and working through its separation of 
East and West, German society was not exempt from this reductive thinking. 
Allegedly, laughing at certain jokes or rejecting them measured one’s stance 
on the relationship between Islam and the cultural tolerance discourse of 
modern nation states. Socially speaking, having to laugh at one’s derision to be 
accepted as part of the in-group is problematic. It is an essentialist practice to 
regulate expression of identity. It demands conformity. Most importantly, it is 
undemocratic where it others and excludes members of an ethnic group from 
fully participating as themselves in daily life in their own homeland and country 
of legal and permanent residence with or without German passports.
I have written this book to engage with this discriminatory practice and add 
a new depth and new dimensions to our understanding of the social function 
of comedy entertainment in German culture. I deliver a case study of Turkish 
German Muslims and how some of their funniest, wittiest and somewhat 
provocative community members use comedy entertainment to settle into 
German mainstream culture in the 21st century as who they are, not who they 
should be. These creative minds use comedy in different mass media types to 
entertain all of Germany with a popular culture viewpoint on the issue of 
Turkish Germans’ ability ever truly to belong—while several generations of the 
community have already lived for decades in the country and made it their home 
regardless of their nationality. I acknowledge here the achievement of a diverse 
community in laughing about a mindset that wants to keep Turkish Germans 
and Islam out of Germany, or at least keep Muslimness and Germanness separate.
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Professor Alison Lewis has guided my thinking along the way, and I thank her 
for that. I also extend my gratitude to the reviewers of my manuscript. I owe them 
a great deal of appreciation for their insightful suggestions. 
Most of all, I would like to thank my family and friends for their continuous 
support. And here is to Oma Lennerl, who undoubtedly has the best sense of 
humour one could hope for. It truly makes the world go round.
Dude, Turks here start out young with their jobs.
I was an interpreter at the age of eight.
My dad pushed letters from the German authorities
into my hands, asking me what they said.
At eight, I was still doing my ABC song in school, you know?!
And he goes, “what the hell you, you learn no German in school?”
And I go, no idea what it says in those letters.
When I was ten, I was an interpreter. I was interpreting for my mom at
the doctor’s. And then he blabs for half an hour about patella, labella,
yadda yadda. What do I know what the hell he said?!
And she goes, “what did he say?”’
And I go: all looking good!
Folks, I really had so many jobs when I
was young. Interpreter, barkeeper, doctor, dentist’s assistant;
oh boy, I really worked a lot back then.
—Özcan Coşar, second-generation, Turkish German stand-up comedian 
Excerpt transcribed and translated from his 2017 
comedy tour programme Generation Aldi
________________________________
It’s not easy being an Afghan. You know, because, when I go to Afghanistan,
I’m a German. And when I’m here, I’m a Turk. Can just nobody tell us apart.
A German woman walks up to me. And so she asks me: “Are you a Turk?”
And I go: “Nope, I’m Afghan.” Says her: “Same difference really!”
Or a Turkish guy walks up to me and says: “Why aren’t you a Turk?”
I said: “Well I thought being a Turk is so mainstream.”
But there’s one thing we have in common with the Turks.
 We’re just as hairy as they are. We’re really hairy.
I mean, if you see us naked, you’d believe that we’re wearing black leggings.
—Faisal Kawusi, second-generation, Afghan German stand-up comedian
Excerpt transcribed and translated from his NightWash live 
Finals 2015 performance Being a Turk is Mainstream 
In die Augen, in den Sinn
Der Kopf spuckt alte Speicher hin
In die Augen, in den Sinn
Im geschlossenen System ist kein Platz für alte Fragen
Die dümmsten Ideen kommen durch die Hintertür
Wenn wir Angst haben dann raschelt’s überall
Und das alte Gift fängt an zu wirken
Alle Türken heißen Ali, typisch Zigeuner
Wo ein Bart ist, ist die Bombe nicht weit
Tanzen können die alle gut,
Tanzen können die alle gut,
Aber das Boot ist voll
[8 Euro?
In die Augen, in den Sinn
Der Kopf spuckt alte Speicher hin
In die Augen, in den Sinn
Der Blick wird verbogen durch die Kruste im Hinterkopf
Uralte Knoten sind kaum noch zu lösen
Deutschland, Deutschland, über alles —
gibt’s im braunen Sumpf
Flüssiger Strom der da durch Schläfen pumpt
Alle Türken heißen Ali
Ach ja, alle Polen klauen
Klau ja alle außer uns!…
…unterdrücken ihre Frauen
Tanzen können die alle gut,
Tanzen können die alle gut,
Doch abgesehen von Disco Fox herrscht hier Tanzverbot
In your eyes, in your mind
Your head spews out what’s been stored behind
In your eyes, in your mind
Closed systems don’t have room for old questions
The dumbest ideas get in through the back door
Everything is scary if we are afraid
And the old poison takes effect
All Turks are called Ali, gypsies as usual,
Where there is a beard, a bomb ain’t far off,
They can dance well, all of them,
They can dance well, all of them,
But the boat is full
[8 Euros?
In your eyes, in your mind
Your head spews out what’s been stored behind
In your eyes, in your mind
Your view clouded by what’s sitting deep 
and immobile in your head, 
Ancient knots are so hard to untie
Germany, Germany, above all else —
it’s there in the brown swamp
Liquid current pumping through your brain
All Turks are called Ali
Oh yeah, all Poles are thieves
Steal anything but us!…
…oppress their women
They can dance well, all of them,
They can dance well, all of them,
But there’s no dancing to be done here, save for Disco Fox
—“Alle Türken heißen Ali”/”All Turks are called Ali”, 
song by German band Jupiter Jones, released in 2016
Figure 1: “Dschihad!-Gesundheit!”, Achim Greser and Heribert Lenz, political newspaper 
cartoon, first published in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2005. The perspective of two 
prominent German cartoonists on issues of Muslim integration plays on the denial of the broader 
public and its perception of the Muslim Other. Western fears of Islamic terrorism, which has 
become a well-rehearsed trope in Western media, are lost in translation during a subway ride. This 
mocks the neglect of the Muslim community’s lived realities after years of coexistence in German 
society. Credit: Greser & Lenz/F.A.Z., reprint with permission by the artists. 
Introduction
Finding a Voice of Their Own
Turkish German Muslims and Comedy Entertainment 
If it is not the Jews, it is the Muslims. And if it is not the Muslims, it is the 
Gay, the Lesbian, or the Transsexual community. The list could continue, 
as there is plenty of discrimination in Europe to go around when it comes to 
minority groups. The realities of their lives do not matter. In fact, knowing more 
about them has traditionally made it harder for mainstream audiences to find 
amusement in jokes which come at the minority community’s expense. Muslims 
of Turkish German descent have been prime targets in that sense since male and 
female Turkish migrant labourers arrived in the 1960s to fill the demand for a 
cheap workforce in a booming post-war economy in West Germany (Herbert, 
1990; Chin, 2009). German majority society for decades ignored the spectrum 
of Turkish German migrant identities, relegating their cultural representation 
mainly to reductive myths of sensationalist dramas and tragedy. Screens and 
books were filled with stories about honour killings and domestic abuse (Weber, 
2016). They coded Turkish Germans as incongruent with German social values 
and helped to consolidate certain stereotypes around the physical appearance 
of Turkish Germans, their behaviour, clothing items like the headscarf, and the 
alleged lack of ethno-social diversity in the community. After 9/11 a profound 
sense of Islamophobia came to the fore and Turkish Germans became part of 
the global threat of radical Islamist terror (Ramm, 2010: 183). The essentialist 
conceits, then, all fed back into the imaginative construct of cliché Turkishness: 
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first, it was low-skilled manual labourers taking advantage of the German 
welfare state. They oppressed their Turkish housewives and forced them to wear 
headscarves; later, it became about religious extremism. 
It is emblematic for these developments that the exoticist logic of Oriental 
Otherness around Turkish German culture could endure for so long (Berman, 
2011). Türkenwitze or jokes about Turks as being lazy, uneducated, low-class, 
religious zealots or unable to master the German language are still readily 
available in German society. A popular meme making the rounds online for years 
now reads, “What’s Alice in Wonderland in Turkish?—Ayse in Aldi! [a popular 
German food discount store]”. Another meme shows two men laying out carpets 
neatly next to each other in several rows to ready the prayer room in a mosque for 
worship. The caption atop the image says, “Turkish air force”. However, humour 
has also worked well to address anti-Turkish and, after the events of 11 September 
in 2001, anti-Muslim attitudes in Germany, with a cultural narrative to support 
the social narrative of Turkish German integration. This book describes how 
this happened: how the Turkish German community, grown from thousands 
to millions over half a century, managed to settle into the cultural mainstream 
on its own terms and with its own voices and stories; and how Turkish German 
comedy entertainment came to shape a new conception of inclusive Germanness 
and cultural diversity in society in the 21st century in spite of anti-immigration 
sentiments. 
Over the past two decades, from roughly the late 1990s to today, Turkish 
German filmmakers, screenwriters, book authors and stand-up comedians have 
developed a novel form of funny entertainment culture through a series of 
broad-ranging multimedia and commercially successful productions. This funny 
entertainment culture did not begin at the turn of the new century, but it did 
take on a distinctive form and quality after it, as I explain here and in the main 
chapters. Its swirling aesthetic emphasises variety of identity. Its broad repertoire 
of styles, media types and genre elements reflects an abundance of culture through 
the mixing of languages, belief systems and national heritage. 
Turkish German comedy entertainment in the new millennium is an 
expression of cultural diversity. It is also reflective of a longer history of Turkish 
German migration (Göktürk, 1999). It revisits historical and more current tropes 
of both Germanness and Turkishness. They are connected to notions of societal 
centre and social periphery, and the willingness of communities to embrace 
cultural change. There are elements of majority and minority culture discourse 
which have a role to play in developing intersectional dialogue across communal 
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differences and the discrimination against one’s ethnicity, religion, gender or 
sexuality. The emphasis on social strata and the playful engagement of identity 
politics in this newer kind of Turkish German comedy entertainment is one 
of its defining features. Its innovative formulation functions as a public arena, 
whether the comedy screens in cinemas, gets broadcast on television, is published 
in books, streams online or goes viral on social media. Its narratives illustrate 
multi-layered connections which link the seriousness of Islamophobia and ethnic 
bias against German Others to the lived realities and intergenerational memories 
of Turkish Germans either born in Germany or socialised in the country.1
That this new formulation could crack the entertainment culture code in 
Germany explains in part the lack of mainstream visibility for earlier comedy 
made by Turkish Germans, mainly those of the so-called first generation. This 
is despite Turkish German comedy culture’s rich history and critical acclaim. 
Boran details how Turkish German humour culture begins in the early 1970s. 
There was humorous cartoon art closely related to newspaper lampooning and 
Turkish German Kabarett acts, overtly political satire performances leading up to 
the creation of popular troupes like Şinasi Dikmen’s and Muhsin Omurca’s Knobi 
Bonbon-Garlic Candy in 1985 (Boran, 2004). In 1990, Nursel Köse, who later 
starred in Fatih Akin’s critically acclaimed film, Auf der anderen Seite-The Edge of 
Heaven (2007), and Günay Köse were among the founding members of the first 
female-led Turkish German comedy troupe. Their act, the Putzfrauenkabinett, 
was a play on the German compound noun for cleaning ladies’ supply closet. It 
connoted a political cabinet made up of cleaning ladies. In 1992, the Köses also 
co-founded another Turkish German satire act named Die Bodenkosmetikerinnen-
The floor beauticians. The name was to hint at the economic identity attached to 
Turkish German women in working-class service roles (Boran, 2004). 
Culture critics in Germany praised the heavy political satire of these troupes for 
the political messaging of the comedy and its ingenuity. It attracted both German 
and Turkish German audiences with its niche character and cosmopolitan 
expression. Yet, it failed to gain the same traction in German mainstream 
popular culture as lighter, Anglophonic comedy entertainment genres. Those 
genres got directly imported to Germany from America and Great Britain in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s after German reunification. This prompted younger 
Turkish Germans to build on the imported genres’ mainstream culture appeal 
and to merge them with local content and formats. The new amalgams achieved 
what earlier forms of Turkish German comedy culture could not: they became 
part of popular mainstream culture, attracting millions of viewers domestically 
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and abroad, garnered staggering numbers of likes and clicks, and continuously 
topped German book bestseller charts. 
Approaching Turkish German Narratives: Social Hierarchies 
and Status of Ethnic Comedy
Two crucial pieces of the puzzle that is the success of Turkish German comedy 
culture in the 21st century are the social mechanics of German society and the 
status of humour and ethnic comedy genres.2 The newer Turkish German comedy 
entertainment employs ethnicised, or Turked,3 versions of popular international 
entertainment media and forms of popular mainstream humour. They had 
come to Germany with stories built around Anglo-American multiculturalism 
which German audiences would readily watch or read with a sense of frivolous, 
guilty pleasure (Halle, 2009). Those entertainment items rose to popularity in 
Germany because they were untainted by the unease of German mainstream 
culture in confronting on screens or in books the repercussions of the country’s 
Nazi past. There were also tremendous social problems in reunified Germany. 
One was a surge in xenophobic sentiments against asylum seekers and people 
of colour during the unemployment crisis of the 1990s. The avoidance of these 
issues in real life and in the German mainstream media had German newspaper 
feuilleton columnists declare the 1990s as the decade of German Spaßgesellschaft. 
It meant a hedonistic fun society, driven by shameless embrace of easy consumer 
culture. Its members desired supranational brand identities, especially Americana 
pop culture productions and consumer goods, with which they could substitute 
the burdensome label of Germanness (Biendarra, 2012). By the end of the decade, 
Germany’s so-called literary brat-pack, a group of young pop literature authors, 
had already picked up on this “wilful superficiality and disdain for history and 
politics” (McCarthy, 2015) in bestselling novels by Christian Kracht, Benjamin 
von Stuckrad-Barre, Alexa Hennig von Lange and Florian Illies. 
This context matters because two cultural caesuras in Germany add vital 
cornerstones to my scholarship on the country’s ethnic identity politics and 
its cultural consumption. One is WWII. The other is the post-reunification 
period of the 1990s. Connecting the social history of Turkish Germans to that 
of Jewish Germans and East Germans is a critical intervention to shift attention 
to similarity instead of assumed difference in the history of Germany’s ethnic 
identity discourse. A focus on similarity highlights certain parallels between 
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the cultural prestige of alleged pure Germanness and the ideological striving for 
Western capitalism in the German Heimat or home, and its mediated depictions 
in popular culture. As I explain here and in chapter one, next to 9/11, WWII 
and German Wende or reunification had a tremendous impact on the cultural 
dynamics of inclusion and exclusion around Turkish German identities and other 
forms of Germanness, Jewish German as well as East German. The new Turkish 
German comedy entertainment conquered Germany’s mainstream culture at a 
time of massive change and profound cultural reorientation in the German body 
social.4 The wider public did not necessarily consider its productions as German. 
The different media types through which German and German-speaking 
audiences consumed these Turkish German productions also had a transnational 
flair. To borrow a principle from El-Tayeb’s critical scholarship on ethno-cultural 
discourse in German society, Germans who cannot properly be German cannot 
be makers of German mainstream culture (El-Tayeb, 2011). In the case of Turkish 
German comedy entertainment, this was true before Turkish Germans became 
desirable in the German mainstream for their Otherness and, later ironically, 
were accepted as Germans for their contributions to it. The Turkish German 
works of comedy I have assembled here demonstrate this process. They were the 
beneficiaries of a transnational charisma, which first allowed them entry to and 
later confirmed their place in mainstream culture in Germany.
Herein lies the specificity of the materials I have selected for this book. Their 
origins are international, and their core is hybrid. Yeşilada confirms that “they do 
not operate with traditional binary oppositions, but with transcultural characters 
and storylines. […] Cultural boundaries have been gradually blurred, and the 
former guest worker figure [in more political comedy acts like Garlic Candy] has 
been substituted by protagonists with transnational features” (Yeşilada, 2008: 
74).5 The extended creative vocabulary has enabled Turkish German creatives to 
define a new-fangled form of cultural self-representation in sound (Hilman and 
Silvey, 2012), image (Halle, 2009), and in the plot of literary fictions (Gramling, 
2011). Branded by its makers as cosmopolitan comedy entertainment about 
identity issues, all audience segments can relish in the development of ethno-
social consciousness from a safe distance.6 There is no accusatory tone or blame. 
Instead, the new phase of Turkish German comedy culture thematises social 
tensions between and in certain ethnic communities in Germany, suggesting 
that the same storylines and forms of humour could just as easily take place 
in New York, London or Istanbul. Its productions revolve around the global 
consequences of migration and multi-ethnic coexistence. 
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Without dwelling on the dark side of the social issues they represent, Gueneli 
shows that the affiliation with transnational comedy culture offered Turkish 
German filmmakers such as Fatih Akin an increased repertoire of creative choices 
and styles beyond Turkish and German (Gueneli, 2019). Turkish German 
filmmakers like Akin derived it for films like Im Juli-In July (2000) and Solino 
(2002) from multicultural clash film comedies such as Richard Benjamin’s Made 
in America (1993). The interracial clash comedy romance between Whoopi 
Goldberg’s and Ted Danson’s characters was among the 15 most successful 
cinematic releases in Germany in 1993. The funny plotline of this American 
comedy blockbuster closely resembles the clash comedy film plotlines under 
critical review in chapter two. And like those Turkish German clash comedies, 
Made in America’s entertaining message is not that the idea of diverse, modern 
multiculture is broken. Rather, the playful mix and fusion of identity markers 
indicates that any hostile relationship between clashing ethnic and other identities 
can be salvaged if the underlying prejudiced viewpoint is addressed. Optimistic 
viewpoints abound, probing new ways of co-existing in this world as a diverse 
community. It is a comedy around a cosmopolitan, positive concept of ethnicity 
explicitly designed to compete in the international commercial mainstream. 
The humour at play in all the cultural synergies and skilful adaptations of mass 
entertainment genres and popular media types I write about in this book turns 
on social variables. Who and what gets made fun of or is turned into the butt of a 
joke or the punchline of a humorous scenario implies the potential importance of 
recognising the constructedness of such positions as Self and Other. It is a cultural 
commentary on the unfixedness of Germanness and German society, which we 
should think of as the remedy to the ills alleged by anti-immigrant right-wingers: 
social instability, the loss of German Leitkultur or guiding culture, authentic 
ways of being Turkish or German, and having to decide that one can be only one 
or the other. Turkish German comedy culture in the 21st century offers with its 
variety of genres and media types an arsenal of tools, each exquisitely applied to 
a unique social purpose. It is to reflect on the datedness of certain societal norms 
and their persistence. As the bitter-sweet ending of Almanya-Willkommen in 
Deutschland-Almanya-Welcome to Germany reveals, it is about looking ahead 
with an appreciation for a difficult past.7 However, we should not get lost in the 
latter or deny it. This would only reify the notion that Turkish German migration 
is a failed project and that Islam is and always will be un-German.
Questioning cultural impenetrability and the segregation of ethnic 
communities is the central tenet of the ethnic situation comedy Türkisch für 
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Anfänger-Turkish for Beginners, on which I elaborate in chapter three. It shows 
how Turkish Germans who were steeped in the comedy genres they fused their 
perspectives and issues with could add to these genres’ existing mainstream 
allure. To the lived realities of their Turkishness they added the association of 
being German Other, being international, being cosmopolitical and being non-
white, Turkish or Muslim. In chapter four, I detail how a gender angle adds even 
more potency to Turkish German mainstream comedy’s subversion of reductive 
perceptions of multifaceted identities in Turkish German chick-lit and Turkish 
German dick-lit. To test whether this hopeful outlook on social change has 
endured not only in more traditional media-type formats of film, television and 
literature, I put in dialogue Turkish German stand-up comedians and the social 
media reception of their performances in chapter five. In this respect, Turkish 
German Muslims and Comedy Entertainment answers the question posed by the 
suggestive title of Şinasi Dikmen’s 2002 comedy routine Quo vadis, Türke?-Where 
are you going, Turk? Where indeed have Turkish German comedy producers and 
artists been going, and in what direction has humour taken some of them since 
the turn of the century? I engage with this question with a brief, German-specific 
synthesis of post-migration culture in chapter six, before ending the book with a 
perspective on Muslim issues in a European comedy context.
A Word on Ethnic Humour and Its Social Pragmatics
I apply the social pragmatics of humour through close readings to the 
narratives of Turkish German entertainment comedy, contextualised by a short 
explanation of specific production styles or genre conventions and distinct 
historical developments. One may think of it as a way to explain how Turkish 
German culture has mastered the change from ventriloquised object of German 
entertainment to designing active voices with real influence on German 
mainstream culture in little more than half a century. Turkish German comedians, 
filmmakers, authors and screenwriters have brokered significant cultural standing 
for themselves by infusing mainstream comedy with alleged ethnic or minority 
issues. My aim, though, is to expand the field of Turkish German culture and 
comedy studies rather than to arrive at a definitive account of Turkish German 
comedy entertainment and its roles in the new century. This is partly because the 
study of humour with its many forms and functions in different societies and 
among and within groups is complex and contextual. Above all, it is perennial. 
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Moreover, interpretative analyses of humour and a cultural critique of its uses 
in mass-culture entertainment demand a narrow lens to illustrate the fine line 
between humour to divide and to include people who live in certain social and 
cultural frameworks. And since these two distinct uses of humour, pro-social 
and anti-social, are inextricably linked to the lived realities of Turkish German 
individuals, Turkishness, Germanness and mainstream comedy as discussed in 
this book, I address them with very specific historical reference and in light of 
certain media types and particular themes and methodology. The limitations 
of this strategy are as much acknowledged and present as they are specifically 
situated. So is my scholarly and personal identity as a white cultural studies 
researcher who is not Turkish German and received his postgraduate training 
mainly in America and Australia. 
Humour is “an umbrella term to cover all categories of the funny” (Lippitt, 
1994: 147), including comedy, wit, satire and jokes. It embraces many structures 
and types of funny material. There are, in fact, too many to list here for a 
purposeful overview. Directly relevant to the study of Turkish German comedy 
entertainment are such types as scripted jokes and dialogues, quick-witted 
repartees, wordplays or puns, and humorous modalities as described by Jorgensen 
(1996: 614-615) and Martin (2007: 5-10). Then there are the cardinal forms of 
mainstream comedy entertainment: sketches, parodies, long-prose fiction novels 
and comedy performances, both live-staged and recorded (Holmes, 2000: 165-
166). 
It is important to acknowledge the difficulty in using humour in the context 
of ethnic comedy as a critical approach to reflect on Turkish German issues and 
identities in contemporary Europe. Humour relating to community clashes and 
the co-existence of different ethnic groups in Germany presents a terrific challenge. 
When is it okay to laugh at a joke about religious bias? What marks the fine line 
between self-deprecation and sarcasm and a form of internalised Islamophobia 
and racist speech? When does comedy reproduce what it aims to subvert? Are 
the punchlines of mainstream comedy hefty enough to deliver critical messages 
about Turkish German women’s experiences of misogyny? Or about Turkish 
German men’s experiences of being labelled terrorists, religious fanatics, or camel 
fuckers? Precise correlations between forms, functions and effects of humour 
in mass mediated comedy entertainment can be hard to identify. They are even 
harder yet to discuss by attributing social messaging to them. Interpretations of 
comedy writing, dialogues or performances and audience reactions, as Roach and 
Milner Davis note, “are often culturally specific, subjective, context-dependent 
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and variable” (Roach and Milner Davis, 2019: 2-3). Humour comes in many 
forms and its functions and effects are both intended and unintended. I am not 
going to claim otherwise in this book. 
There is agreement though about a specific use of humour in ethnic contexts, 
which is based on ideas, assumptions or widely held stereotypes and clichés about 
national, racial or religious groups. The conflation of the latter two applies to the 
Turkish German community. As I discuss further in chapter one, ethnic humour, 
here in mass-cultural application to mainstream entertainment referred to as 
ethnic comedy, comes in two forms. One is derogative in nature and intended 
to vilify and to ridicule certain ethnic groups and/or communities. Its purpose 
is to segregate and to create a hierarchical distancing between Self and Other. 
This function reflects a politicisation of ethnic comedy in popular culture, which 
also goes back to a racialised worldview. The historical development of ethnic 
comedy is reflected in the systemic bio-politics of modern racism as borne out 
in American blackfaced minstrelcy (Mahar, 1999) and in Nazi Germany in anti-
Jewish propaganda dressed up as funny newspapers cartoons (Luckert et al., 
2009) and conveyed through film comedy (Weinstein, 2019). 
The second form is the direct opposite. In a related manner of politicised usage, 
it subverts the former’s intention to assign the ridiculed a lower place in society 
or to exclude them from the majority. It is governed by a sense of multicultural 
togetherness which undoes the fear of Others imposed on all members of society 
by cosmopolitan anxieties (Mandel, 2008: 14). One can liken those anxieties 
to a competition for ethno-cultural supremacy and the fear of losing out on 
power in society as if it were a limited good. It is an agenda which harks back to 
a neo-liberal doctrine in Western capitalism of resource scarcity and ideological 
dominance. The Cold War’s stand-off between America and the Soviet Bloc has 
foregrounded the underlying scare tactics of this development globally since the 
early 1980s. Both forms of ethnic comedy, however, need to be acknowledged 
as a duality of action and reaction. One is successful if it triumphs over its twin 
adversary.
Studying ethnic comedy requires consideration of what is funny and at whose 
expense, “firstly from the [imagined] audience or perceiver’s cognitive experience 
of ‘getting’ the humour and secondly from the affective response—which may 
or may not be one of enjoyment and pleasure” (Roach and Milner Davis: 3). 
Ethnic comedy in favour of creating homogeneity in modern multicultures may 
be unsuccessful if it amounts to little more than a personal attack on proponents 
of derogatory ethnic comedy. It fails where it is used as a tool to retaliate. The 
turkish german muslims and comedy entertainment22
imagined audience or actual observers or readers may not comprehend pro-
multicultural criticism as a critique of systemic racism if they feel directly 
attacked. The inherent danger is to turn pro-multiculturalism into a social wedge 
issue (Gillota, 2013: 6). This assessment is consistent with Sollors’ provision 
that “laughing at others is a form of boundary construction” (Sollors, 1986: 
132). This book sets out to present the undoing of these boundaries through the 
kind of ethnic comedy which punches up against a system of boundaries. When 
ethnicity-generated humour blurs the out-group/in-group line, it becomes an 
intentional site for intercultural dialogue taking place in the public arena of 
popular culture (Lowe, 1986: 440). Forms of ethnic comedy which deconstruct 
boundaries and foster debate about the mixing of cultures are effectively aligned 
with the “enlightened and egalitarian values of Western liberal democracies” 
(Berghahn, 2014: 2). Any discussion of what I refer to here as pro-social ethnic 
comedy should help to illuminate this aspect.8 
The pragmatic theorisation of humour in ethnic comedy to reflect on its 
intended functions in factual reality is another delicate matter. I present a more 
detailed discussion of this approach linked to Germany’s long history with ethnic 
denigration of German minority identities during the Holocaust and around the 
time of reunification in the next chapter. 
Politics of Religion and Muslim Representation
The right of Muslims to be represented in mass-culture narratives about 
Germany as an enrichment of rather than a burden on the country underpins 
all the ethnic comedies assembled in this book. It is the most prolific issue in a 
conversation about fears that “Germany does away with itself ” (Sarrazin, 2010). 
This catchphrase, which was the much-cited title of Thilo Sarrazin’s 2010 book 
on integration and immigration from Muslim majority countries to Germany, 
sparked a heated debate. Sarrazin’s theses were overtly polemic. They held that 
immigration had adverse effects on German culture, economy, demographics 
and crime rates. However, to allege the failure of Muslim migrants to integrate 
stood out in the best-selling screed as a xenophobic rallying cry against Islam. 
Sarrazin indistinctly lumped together hundreds of thousands of individuals 
who identified with one of the many forms of Islam. He associated them with 
a certain genetic pool because of their non-Christian countries of origin and 
their migratory displacements from Muslim-majority societies outside Europe 
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(Gilman, 212: 48). Sarrazin’s claims about this gene pool stipulated that it 
presented a concrete threat to social cohesion as Muslim birth rates in Germany 
were overtaking native-German rates. One threat to German society, as followed 
from this misconstrued logic and haphazard assemblage of decontextualised facts, 
was the tainting of the national genome. Another one was cultural colonisation. 
Sarrazin described in detail his refusal to have his grandchildren’s daily routine 
determined by the Salat, the Muslim call to prayer five times per day. All this 
would lead to less economic productivity and a steady decline in German quality 
of life, he insisted. 
Official statistics of Germans with a migration background tell a different and 
much less alarmist story. Of the 10.6 million people who have immigrated to 
Germany since 1950 70.6 per cent are from other European countries, including 
32.3 per cent of intra-European migrants with European citizenship. 16.4 per 
cent come from Asia or Oceania. Only one quarter of German residents with a 
migration background are Muslim. Their largest group, 2.9 million, is of Turkish 
descent. Individuals of Arab origin, who gained worldwide attention in 2015 and 
2016 during the European refugee crisis in their daily media portrayal both in and 
outside Germany, amount to barely more than 800,000 residents; this is less than 
one per cent of the total population (Foroutan, 2013: 4; Holmes and Castaneda, 
2016: 159). In European comparisons, Germany comes second to France in 
Muslim population size. It comes in fifth in the Muslim to total population 
ratio after France, Belgium, Austria and the Netherlands. Many more examples 
exist to point out the gap between imagined crisis and factual reality. The ones 
cited here, though, show in illuminating essence that transnational mobility, 
both forced and voluntary, and ethnic diversity are at the centre of public and 
political debates about the future of Germanness in the new century. It is no 
coincidence that Sarrazin entitled the follow-ups to Germany Does Away with 
Itself in an equally provocative manner. The New Terror on Virtue: On the Limits 
of Free Speech in Germany and Hostile Takeover: How Islam Hinders Progress and 
Threatens Society. The two books came out in 2014 and 2018, respectively. The 
latest book, one may find hardly surprising, has been used by German right-wing 
parties such as the Alternative for Germany, the AfD, as reference material for 
their nationalist party platforms. 
In its broader sense, Muslimness is a term now used in German public and 
scholarly discourse to mean cultural difference. With Islam, Muslim identities are 
the subject of considerable academic inquiry and empirical research, particularly 
in cultural studies of everyday-life communication and identities. The fear of being 
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swamped or outnumbered by Muslims is of course not entirely new in German 
society. For instance, abundant flows of Iranian refugees to West Germany in the 
1970s and 1980s were met with the stigma of being incongruent with German 
liberal values. Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s much-decorated melodrama from 1974, 
Ali: Fear Eats Soul, for which an earlier working title was All Turks are Called Ali, 
centres on this social context. Being a danger while Muslim in German society 
resurfaced as an omnipresent talking point in 2001 in the wake of 9/11. German 
media reports revealed that some of the religious terrorists involved in the attacks 
on the Twin Towers and other sites in the United States had lived undercover for 
many years in Germany. The fallout of these circumstances was enough to create 
public reaction against Muslim Germans as irrevocably different and Other. 
Now, two decades into the 21st century, current thinking about violence against 
Muslim women again impedes circumspect intellectual discussion about Islam in 
the West (Berghahn, 2014: 2; Weber, 2013: 2-5). As Weber, an expert on Islam and 
gender in Germany and Europe, notes, “modern humanity has been constructed 
as both European and as universal; the racialized ‘Other’ against whom the 
‘modern human’ [is pitted] disturbs this construction by laying claim to human 
rights from the very heart of Europe” (Weber, 2016: 68). 
Muslims in German society find themselves in a complex dilemma in the new 
millennium. They risk appearing averse to majority society’s dominant values 
if they proudly emphasise their minority culture. Other minority members or 
groups call them spineless assimilationists if Muslims open their mosques or 
appear frequently on popular television chat shows and on radio to talk about 
everyday Muslimness. The ways in which cultural representations of an alleged 
liberal multiculturalism are implicated in this dilemma are more expansive than 
one would like to admit. It is, after all, in no small measure that popular culture 
and majority culture texts about Germanness and Otherness have contributed 
to the circulation and replication of the Muslim Other in Germany and Islam 
in Western Europe (Matthes, 2007). How these texts have fictionalised or 
tried to imitate reality is documented in many works on the poetics of German 
culture and thought, as described in influential studies by Cheesman (2007) or 
newer, transnational discussions by Gezen (2018). However, those texts are less 
frequently questioned for being complicit in replacing actual lived reality with 
virtual lives or fictitious experiences and memories.
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Tragedy versus Comedy 
The fictional representation of reality in literature has spawned productive 
theories for readings of texts as codes of social reality. These theories, some 
of which are more and some less equipped to handle the extraction of social 
meanings from fictional entanglements, are of course not definitive. I say 
so specifically as I go here beyond the meaning of literary texts to include an 
armoury of popular culture fictions about Turkish German identities in several 
mass media types: literature as well as film, television, digital online video and 
recorded live-stage performance. Within this constitutive limit though, one 
can claim that literary-based criticism does not usually dictate any particular 
adherence to form. It is also fitting to argue that the idea of textual reception 
of different cultural entertainment formats is widely accepted today. Much of 
this development owes its success to the politics of feminism. Second-wave 
feminism was a driving force in the readings of texts across media types and 
genres predicated on their popularity (Radway, 2006: 4). Feminist theorems 
about feminine values and behaviour have shaped the study of popular culture 
narratives. Two intersecting tenets in feminist and popular culture studies are 
that the personal is political and that valid knowledge about social inequality 
can come from any cultural object or practice (Hollows, 2000: 20-21). Feminist 
cultural analysis, informed by wider debates about culture studies such as work 
at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham, is therefore 
invaluable. It has freed contemporary narrative analysis from the firm grip of 
traditional historical criticism and rear-guard structuralism, and even the hard-
nosed claim of new criticism’s academic disciplinarity in the 1960s and 1970s in 
Northern America and Western Europe. 
Yet, gender is only one of many crucial dimensions in considerations of mass 
culture representation. Both the nation and the national are another. Research 
into the political economy of culture, cultural policy and lived realities of Turkish 
German communities suggests that Germany’s cultural canon systematically 
marginalised their Muslim Otherness (Mani, 2007: 33; Berman, 2011: 1-4). 
This process has become more understandable following the publication of 
Edward Said’s seminal work, Orientalism, in 1978, which has been productively 
challenged and critically reworked for German cultural studies scholarship 
(Murti, 2001; Jenkins, 2004; Marchand, 2009). Most researchers in transnational 
German cultural studies have already absorbed a central claim associated with 
post-colonial theory, which underpinned Adelson’s study, The Turkish Turn in 
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Contemporary German Literature, published in 2005. It is the belief that literary 
and other cultural fictions are not divorced from reality. 
Fictional representations exert a direct influence on readers and viewers. 
Hence, fictions deeply immersed in the national and meant to convey a nation’s 
imagined identity contribute to oppressive structures such as colonialism and 
ethnic bias. The resulting displacement from actual reality through fictions about 
allegedly real Germans and supposedly authentic Germanness was the bane of 
Turkish Germans claiming Germany as their home with or without German 
passports. Adelson’s assessment of Turkish German cultural production alludes 
to this issue in light of German reunification in 1989, when political and imagined 
worlds clashed in the new Germany. Once the political East-West binary had 
disappeared with the iron curtain, German culture had to confront the complex 
entanglements of its own national, and formerly divided, cultures in myriad 
ways. The realisation, as the makers of Turkish German culture had suggested all 
along, was that the simplistic “between-two-worlds” paradigm no longer sufficed 
to explain similar entanglements of Turkish German culture beyond the German 
national archive. Adelson’s summary is poignant: Germany as “the center of 
Europe [was and] is no longer Eurocentric” (Adelson, 2005: 13). All this is not to 
suggest that any and all fiction about Turkish Germans living in Germany should 
be read as historical corrective owing to majority society’s ideological prejudice. 
Collectively though these earlier Turkish German fictions, and those discussed 
in this book, participate in grounding Turkishness and Muslimness in Germany 
as a permanent home, not a transient “host country” (Mushaben, 2008: 3) for 
Germans of migrant descent. 
Turkish German identities have contributed to an evolution. They have forced 
key figures and industry giants in Germany’s cultural establishment to find a 
new meaning for the national between the traditionally nationalist affiliation 
with German soil and German “Heimat” or home, and new ways of diasporic 
attachments to multiple communities in different places and non-Western 
countries. It was a laborious effort. The creative labour entailed in this arduous 
project and the work of inclusive community formation are far from complete, 
as Gezen’s work on the reception of Bertolt Brecht in Turkish theatre reveals 
(Gezen, 2018: 10-14). In this respect, Turkish German comedy confirms the close 
link between humour and transnational sociability, as it “serves to enhance group 
cohesion and solidarity and reduce social distance” (Roach Anleu and Milner 
Davis, 2018: 11). 
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One important fact, though long disregarded, is that German culture norms 
counteracted the positive attraction to comedy and to new forms of transnational 
Germanness expressed through it. Like the attitude and intended outcome of anti-
social ethnic humour I elaborate on further in chapter one, the status of tragedy 
as German culture’s preferred representational mode has been instrumental 
when ousting Muslim characters and identities from the national imaginary. 
Why attend to this point? The conflation of tragedy and national Germanness, 
and comedy and the transnational ethnic Other, sheds light on problematic 
notions of inclusive thinking in German society related to Turkish Germans. It 
dates back centuries. Many works in the German canon are connected to the 
mode of tragedy as the only acceptable form in which to represent the nation 
truthfully. This link is how Germanness, based on a uniform native culture and 
the resulting national character of highbrow tragedies, informed the exclusive 
ethno-cultural architecture of “Kulturstaat” (see Eckart and Rohe, 1999, on 
the German culture nation; Pautz, 2005: 40). It is no coincidence that the 
German nation state endured for so long on principles of cultural uniformity, 
which would later inform a concept of ethnic purity by referring to Bismarck’s 
successful drive towards national unification in the 19th century. It was based on 
the rallying of German-speaking communities around the idea of excluding non-
Germanness and the economic and social benefits of the unification of German 
states. German-speaking communities had caught a glimpse of this mechanism 
through their economic and military collaboration during the Napoleonic Wars 
from 1803 to 1815. 
German-speaking communities realised that there was tangible power in 
uniformity at the same time as Goethe’s Faust. A Tragedy elevated the tragic 
mode to a national German artform, a uniform value in German culture. The 
text, written in standardised German, catapulted tragic German literature onto 
the world literature stage, adding to its desirability. Although “cultural hybridity 
and cross-cultural exchange were always the norm” (Kontje, 2018: 2) in Germany, 
the most celebrated works are tragedies by authors, poets and playwrights such as 
Goethe and Schiller. Why? Because these German-language texts revolve around 
a cohesive, German monoculture. This monoculture was desired internally 
by Germans and validated externally by non-German communities around 
them. As Pirro suggests, the stronghold of tragedy in German culture has also 
dominated academic thinking and critical scholarship: “[e]pisodes of radical 
political discontinuity, of which Germany has experienced its share, have often 
led German intellectuals to generate theories of works of tragedy as a means for 
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rethinking the nature of German and identity and community” (Pirro, 2011: 
148). By considering tragedy’s twin pole, I suggest here that comedy is equally 
effective in rethinking the nature of German multiculture in the 21st century.9 
The concept of tragic Germanness as national narrative has an uneasy 
relationship with the ideal of multicultural inclusion. Skolnik explains that 
classical literature in pre-modern Germany inscribed minority cultures in the 
margins and not the centre. The “historical drama above all” (Skolnik, 2014: 79), 
according to Skolnik, fused minorities like the German Jews through its status 
as intertext with an emerging national culture of the German canon. Yet, this 
fusion served mainly to write Jews superficially into the German culture nation 
rather than fully integrating them in real life. It was so that Jewishness could 
harmonise on paper with “a liberal conception of a universal bourgeois culture” 
(Skolnik, 2014: 78). In real life, however, the price of Jewish German minority 
integration into German majority society was often conversion. The reception 
history of works such as Lessing’s historical drama, Nathan der Weise-Nathan 
the Wise (1779), and its famed ring parable points to this development. The 
historical drama forged a connection between popular German majority society 
and the enlightened Jew, which fused Enlightenment and Judaism to create a 
German-Jewish fantasy. Nathan upheld his Jewish identity on stage while Jews 
in everyday life struggled for what Moses Mendelssohn called civic acceptance or 
civic incorporation of German Jews as full citizens (Meir, 2001: 251).
The tragic mode did lead to similar token inclusions and de facto exclusions 
of Turkish German identities in fictions and actual reality. Books, articles and 
conference papers on Turkish German comedy have abounded in recent years 
to study humour as a strategy of counter-discursive inclusion (Bower, 2011: 
2014; Berghahn, 2012; Androutsopoulos, 2012; Spielhaus, 2013). This did not 
happen unexpectedly. As the mode of comedy is overwhelmingly set in the 
representation of social realities of society, the comedic is well equipped to 
disrupt imagined national cultural traditions, especially where the tragic mode 
of artistic expression is tied up with ideology, ethnicity and nation building. Of 
course, sometimes, there is a deliberate blurring of the line between highbrow 
tragedy and lowbrow comedy to keep the readers or viewers interested. There are 
twists and turns to remind audiences that they are the arbiters of unconventional 
plot actions or sudden turns in the depiction of stock characters. For instance, 
the television sitcom, Türkisch für Anfänger-Turkish for Beginners, regularly plays 
on the fourth-wall illusion of viewers as silent observers of what is happening 
on screen. At other times, Turkish German filmmakers tease genre conventions 
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to display a creative transnational originality free from Germany’s established 
tragic or comedic habitus. Comedy films such as Almanya: Willkommen in 
Deutschland-Almanya: Welcome to Germany depend upon obviously tragic 
elements to precipitate a mid-film tragedy; but at heart they are a comedic works 
about social realities. 
One persistent point I make in this book is that German majority culture is 
easily weaponised if, as in its canonised tragedies, it idealises a cultural ideal of 
uniform Germanness and assimilationist inclusivity which simply never existed. 
For Zambon, transnational Turkish German identities and ethnic comedy 
necessarily contradict the use of any exclusionary representational mode as 
control mechanism for the image of German culture (Zambon, 2017: 552). I, too, 
argue here that pro-social ethnic comedy, unlike tragedy, supports communal 
interchange with its positive attitude towards inter-ethnic interactions.
Close Reading Comedy: The Proof Is in the Plot
Emplotment and narrative are important variables in this discussion. 
Contemporary accounts of understanding and misunderstanding comedy, 
particularly those from scholars and practitioners of ethnic comedy, have 
learned to treat them as if style and substance were not always the most convivial 
bedfellows (Brummet, 2010; Gray, 2004: Haggins, 1995; Hall, 1997). Comedy 
texts with their plots based on race or ethnicity ceaselessly invite nuanced 
explication. They explore complex issues of community and allegiance in 
society. Mainstream comedy entertainment does so most famously, according 
to Mather, by starting to draw during the 1990s upon some of the culturally 
contentious comic paradigms and attitudes associated with that era, like 
stereotyping of ethnic identities and larger-than-life plot development (Mather, 
2005). It was commonplace for the so-called “easy multi-culture” comedies of 
the 1990s to feature more extensive representations of race, gender and ethnicity 
with regard to issues of nationality and cultural nuances within minorities’ own 
communities. The American sitcom’s privileging of black women characters in 
its narratives (e.g. Family Matters, 1989-1998) and the export of those formats 
globally were also something of a riposte to the television dominion of family-
friendly comedy featuring male desires, social roles and aspirations (e.g. Happy 
Days, 1974-1984). In Great Britain mainstream comedy films set in diverse 
neighbourhoods showed first- and second-generation Asian female figures in 
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a mosaic pattern of intertwined stories. Even popular British film dramas like 
My Son the Fanatic (1997), written by Hanif Kureishi, based their plots around 
comic clashes of generations and cultures, “exploring the lack of common 
ground between Muslim fundamentalism and liberal Western values” (Mather, 
2005: 86). This kind of ethnic comedy is one defined by recurring themes: the 
multi-faceted nature of home for first-, second- and third-generation immigrant 
families; the complex structures between one’s roots, origins and visions of the 
future; the immense difficulty of reconciling inherited cultural traditions with 
personal choices in life; the positioning of the Other as outsider in the national 
culture or in one’s own community. Continuously, though, it left audiences with 
feelings of mixed emotions when they could not decide whether a situation 
or series of events was dramatic or comedic in aesthetic potency of form and 
intent. At whose expense did the laughter come? And what, if any, was the social 
function of this comedy?
Consumers of comedy have their work cut out for them when encountering 
ethnicity-based humour. Its practices at once solicit and endlessly rephrase 
contexts for understanding and interpreting what a comedy text or a comedian 
means by funny or setting up something or someone as the butt of a joke. In 
this way the dominant strategies of modern ethnic mainstream comedy have 
themselves become iconic for legitimating the reading practice which “[now] 
throws into relief [text-immanent] genealogies and analytical opportunities 
against the backdrop of transnational expansion, postcritial self-reflexivity, and 
interdisciplinary collaboration” ( James, 2020: 2): close reading. No matter how 
much new and nuanced forms of comedy entertainment based on ethnicity or 
race seem to thwart and evade the job of interpretation; they re-energise in the 
process humour scholars’ critical attention to form for understanding comedy’s 
social, philosophical, ethnic and geopolitical work. And while close reading and 
formalism are in no way identical, nor do they always engender each other, the 
surge of debates about what is funny and what is politically correct sustains a 
formal analysis which in turn confirms close reading’s persistence, adaptability 
and suitability in comedy research—even if this discussion has been getting 
somewhat lost in recent debates about so-called cancel culture outrage to comedy 
and comedy artists. 
To determine the critical currency of this approach is to determine the 
questions which are key to interrogating a comedy genre. How does its plot 
engage the generic expectations for a certain kind of text? What sort of situation, 
wording or action or textual world is created by a filmmaker, author, screenwriter 
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or stand-up comedian to deliver their comedy with its intended purpose, be it 
pro-social or anti-social?10 A close reading can answer these questions. 
The Turkish German Comedy Wave: Screen, Stage and 
Page Power
This leaves the matter of aesthetic taste in relation to ethnic enfranchisement. 
Besides differences in use of mode of representation, there is a distinct appreciation 
of mainstream entertainment in Turkish German comedy texts, films, videos and 
performances. The highbrow, lowbrow, middlebrow debate in cultural studies 
is long-lasting and ongoing. One would be ill advised to claim that even a short 
summary here could do it justice. However, these categories mean something 
specific in relation to Turkish German comedy entertainment because they stand 
for access to majority society through accessible art and lucrative entertainment 
forms on the minority’s own creative terms. 
For Turkish German entertainment culture in the 1990s, as described by 
Yeşilada, cinematic lowbrows became a platform which reached millions of 
Germans without migration background (Yeşilada, 2008: 75). More precisely, 
it was the politically incorrect satire in certain films luring audiences to the box 
office. These films, though varying in visual styles and formats, were informed 
by an easy overcoming of transnational boundaries and transcultural awareness, 
thematic features otherwise known as “Turkish Light or Lite-as in light-weight” 
(Yeşilada, 2008: 75). The significance of this refocussing stands out for earning 
Turkish German filmmakers unprecedented profits and for consolidating 
aesthetic purpose around social goals. Ownership of image was one watchword. 
Not being the ethnic drag costume for “Bio-Deutsche”, that means organically 
grown Germans (Taberner, 2017: 330; Nouripour, 2014) or German-born citi-
zens, by a ius sanguis, lineage of blood, was another. Bio-Deutsche entertainment 
culture from the 1960s to the mid-1980s in the main either produced highbrow 
tragedies of first-generation migrants from Turkey or mocked their plight as low-
skilled labourers (e.g. Shirins Hochzeit-Shirin’s Wedding, 1976; 40 Quadratmeter 
Deutschland-40 Square Metres of Germany, 1986). Günter Wallraff ’s ludicrous 
brownfaced undercover stories suffice as contemporaneous proof of a 
sensationalist taste in gutter-press productions about Turkish German Alis. That 
his clichéd performance as Ali was as ill-informed as his choice of a floppy-haired 
wig and glue-on moustache in Ganz Unten-Lowest of the Low (1985) turned into 
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a running gag among more serious journalists and scholars (Fachinger, 2001). 
General audiences and the wider majority society still embraced this skewed 
image of Turkish Germans despite Wallraff ’s wild collage of disparate cultural 
meanings and visual cues of Muslim Otherness as well as Turkishness. Turkish 
Light, essentially, had to meet the stereotypes at least to some degree at this level. 
It was the second generation of Turkish German film artists with migration 
background who engaged the architecture of knowledge about Turkish Germans 
in mainstream culture like a brand. These artists had grown up in Germany or 
were born in the country; hence, they had full command of German and knew 
how to navigate the country’s cultural landscape. An empowered Turkish German 
cinema was the first locus for Turkish German films about modern urban life. They 
were telling neither “’tales of poor guestworkers’, nor the story of how ‘Leyla gets 
liberated by Hans’” (Yeşilada, 2008: 77). Turkish Light, despite its alleged taint 
by Hollywood commercialism, was the breakout star of an internationalising 
entertainment culture in Germany during the 1990s. It took only a couple of years 
for the genre’s producers to turn their work into mainstream staples of German 
entertainment on the big screen and on television. Out of all these artists, Hussi 
Kutlucan made the biggest comedic name for himself, merging popular styles of 
the US lowbrow comedy wave of the 1990s with multicultural storylines (Hake 
and Mennel, 2012: 6).
The early success of Turkish German comedy film and later also other forms of 
Turkish German comedy later falls in line with the minority’s increasing power 
to say no to its spectatorial objectification. Göktürk has written at length about 
this turn in humorous entertainment culture. Her work tells of the role Turkish 
German identities played in a pseudo-liberal discourse around Germans’ pop 
cultural pleasures and how that began to change when Turkish Germans wrote 
their own scripts (Göktürk, 1999: 1). Lischke confirms that the close link between 
Turkish German comedy, Anglophone mainstream humour and America’s self-
purported melting-pot multiculturalism in the 1990s also supported the rise 
of Turkish German comedy culture (Lischke, 2014: 97). Moreover, Turkish 
German comedy was a highly desirable escapism for Germans during most of the 
1990s. The country experienced a rapid rise in xenophobia after reunification, 
with newspapers feeding almost daily into the fear of “Überfremdung“ or over-
foreignisation. In the 21st century, as discussed in the main chapters, all this 
evolved into a form of middlebrow comedy entertainment now considered part 
of German mainstream culture (Burns, 2007; Hake and Mennel, 2012). 
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Previous Scholarship
In the larger context of Turkish German cultural production, my work builds 
on critical scholarship about cultural compatibility: Turkey and Germany, East 
and West, niche and mainstream culture, and Islam and secular Europe. Without 
the contributions of scholars in the field of Turkish German studies and other 
essential scholarship on lived realities of diverse identities in German society, 
minority communities and ethnic or religious bias against Muslims, this book 
would not be possible. Cited frequently in this book for their pivotal contribution 
are the works by researchers such as Adelson. Her analytical thinking makes 
evident how much German society relied on representations of Turkish German 
culture to define its own identity in the 1990s, “a dizzying decade of structural 
transformations affecting Germany, Europe, and what many might call the world 
at large” (Adelson, 2005, 1). Her rejection of the “between-two-worlds” paradigm 
in The Turkish Turn situates Turkish German culture in a position of cultural 
authenticity instead of a minor German culture which was neither German nor 
Turkish. It addressed the status of Turkish German identities as the plaything of 
German elites’ debates about socio-cultural progress in Germany as a migration 
nation. 
This intervention emerged in line with Mani’s (2007) and Brunow’s (2011) 
calls to mind the gap left by German historians’ refusal to write Turkish German 
history into the national memory of German society. They also showed that 
German studies scholars’ practice of thinking of Turkish German squarely 
within the national dimensions of German culture widened the perceived rift 
between Germanness and Muslimness. Meanwhile, Burns (2013: 1) stressed that 
neither the majority nor the minority community wanted to gloss over cultural 
difference and see only bland forms of Turkish German assimilation in German 
mainstream entertainment. In this vein, it is useful to refer outside the realm of 
scholarship to audiences’ consumption of mainstream culture entertainment. 
Halle’s study of transnational film scholarship on European film in the 1990s 
found that its programming left younger audiences across the European Union 
with a feeling of dissatisfaction when faced with an array of “Euro-pudding” 
productions—a phrase to denounce often well-intentioned yet artificially sweet 
and harmonious film productions. Their multicultural casting choices and stilted 
scripts replaced the foregrounding of national conflicts in Europe with sucrose 
and overly bland narratives “that can only appeal to a least common denominator 
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of culture” (Halle, 2008: 48). In this case Turkish German comedy also delivers 
more substantial “Turkish delights” (Göktürk, 1999). 
Responding to the calls for thinking about Turkish German culture in 
transnational networks and with a resistance to assimilationist rhetoric, or 
discounting it as non-German Other as pointed out by El-Tayeb’s (2016) 
discussion of the so-called “historic Turk” problem I discuss in chapter one, I turn 
to Turkish German comedy entertainment in the 21st century. It is itself defined 
by stories about Muslimness in Germany as a site of productive conflict, to be 
represented as lived realities in relatable contexts rather than sugar-coated or 
disproportionally dramatised. In the past decade, scholars like Bower (2011; 2011; 
2014) and Bilici (2010) have already turned to newer Turkish German comedy 
to discuss political satirists like Serdar Somuncu or define the social functions 
of Muslim ethnic comedy in general.11 They draw attention to a comedy which 
complicates Turkishness in Germany beyond its active construction as perpetual 
migrant Otherness and retrieves Muslimness in alleged Judeo-Christian 
societies from the perceived margins. Indicative of the potential to reformulate 
Turkish German Muslimness, by removing it from the stronghold of dramatic 
aesthetics, comedy performers such as Somuncu have added their own aesthetic 
influence and tradition. Affirming such notions of cultural empowerment and 
transformation, I bundle in this book several of these preceding scholars’ distinct 
strands of critical thinking. This book extends their interventions to the field 
of comparative inter-media comedy and the social dimensions of mainstream 
entertainment in Germany in the 21st century. 
Engaging the Terminology: Why the Problem is Bigger than 
“Just” Islamophobia 
“German” Christianity, “Turkish” Islam— 
Connected Histories, Parallel Societies
Ickstadt points out that Germany now has its third generation of immigrants 
with Turkish heritage and that Berlin is the largest Turkish city outside Turkey. 
The consequences of the Turkish German population’s growth are signs of 
cultural assimilation, re-ethnicisation and the confrontation of Germans with 
social change across their country (Ickstadt, 1999: 573). Yet, it took decades 
before the German and Turkish German community did more to foster an 
acceptance of Muslimness as a permanent part of German society. The federal 
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government’s refusal to reform Germany’s strict passport regulations until late 
into the 1990s fed into xenophobic attitudes of the majority population. And 
in most of the country’s public schools educational administrators refused to 
accommodate Turkish German children with bilingual programmes offered 
nowadays in most of Berlin’s primary and secondary schools (Ickstadt: 572-
577). In particular the Christian Conservatives, who governed most of the 
federal states in the west, north and south of Germany, refused to acknowledge 
that the so-called Turkish German guest workers were in the country to stay. 
This was after the immediate need for blue-collar labour had waned during 
the recession of 1966 and with Germany formally ending its labour migration 
agreement with Turkey in 1973. Faas posits that the lack of governmental 
efforts to integrate Turks in Germany created uncertainty about the future in 
the Turkish German community. It also raised questions about the migrants’ 
eventual return to Turkey (Faas, 2010: 59). 
Indeed, parts of the Turkish German community, as well as members of the 
German Left, were dissatisfied with the Christian Conservatives’ persistent 
refusal to acknowledge a diverse society. The frustration of non-natives and 
German liberals may help to explain the formation of political interest groups 
with a focus on Muslim integration. Sizeable communities of Muslims in Berlin, 
Munich and Cologne set out in the 1990s to form local organisations with a 
shared interest in incorporating Muslims better in German society. It was also 
then that the term “integration” quickly became the “new buzzword in political 
and education debates amidst a reform of the country’s citizenship law (2000) 
which showed a new willingness of [rattled] German politicians, at least in 
principle, to grant citizenship” (Faas, 2010: 60) to Muslims in the country.
The efforts to rally Germany’s Muslims around shared interests translated 
into six larger organisations. They are the Central Council of Muslims in 
Germany, the Association of Islamic Cultural Centres, the Council on Islam 
for the Federal Republic of Germany, the Islamic Community Milli Görüş, the 
Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs and the Alevi Movement. However, 
these organisations represent just a small part of the community as they cover 
the activities of only 800,000 Muslims in Germany (Faas, 2010: 59). The wider 
public’s interest in their representative power is limited. This was exemplified 
by the disappointing reactions of Germans and Turkish Germans regarding the 
outcomes of the so-called integration summit series. The coalition government 
under German Chancellor Angela Merkel hosted the summits. The first one took 
place in July 2006, the second in July 2007 and the third in November 2008. The 
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focus of the three events was the discussion of migration issues such as mandatory 
German language learning, higher education access, bilingual schooling and 
better job prospects (Gesemann and Roth, 2008: 11-14). Later summits also 
addressed the point of religious conflict. It soon became clear, though, that the 
larger public was not supportive of these summits and paid little, if any, attention 
to their outcomes. Crucial to the criticisms around Turkish German and Muslim 
integration was the assumption that Germanness would become unstable if the 
different ethnic communities remained isolated, a fear most commonly related 
in German and global media coverage to Angela Merkel’s statement at the 
CSU/CDU’s Berlin integration summit in 2010: “Der Ansatz für Multikulti ist 
gescheitert, absolut gescheitert [The idea of multiculturalism has failed, totally 
failed]” (Bizeul 2013, 1-2).
Public engagement had to emerge from a larger, cultural intersection. Kaya 
points out that the turning point came about for a growing number of both 
German and Turkish German filmmakers, television screenwriters and authors 
when they realised that additional actions were needed to involve the broader 
society in the debate about redefining Germanness in support of Muslim culture 
(Kaya, 2013: 5-6). This drew highly visible actions at the cultural level, covered 
by the national and international press, into the spotlight. Events such as the 
premier of Almanya-Welcome to Germany at the Berlinale Film Festival in 2011 
have remained the largest force in pushing forward the debate about Muslim 
Germanness in modern German society (Emeis and Boog, 2011: 166). 
Wessi, Ossi, Turk, and Jew—(Re)Integrated “Germans”, Uneasy Alterity 
“In looking at the ways migrants have appropriated multiple spaces [in Germany], 
it becomes evident that Turkish Germans continually reposition themselves 
as part of increasingly transnational networks” (Mandel, 2008: 9). So claims 
Mandel, a political anthropologist, by reflecting on Turkish German writer 
Emine Sevgi Özdamar’s literary accounts of how Turkish Germans in Germany 
had to work through an emergent subjectivity, namely as Turks, German-Turks, 
Almancı or Turkish German. The Turkish German diaspora’s coming of age, 
Mandel adds further, has not meant for it, “as many would have preferred, the 
peaceful ‘bridging’ of two distinct cultures. Rather, [integration meant] a coming 
to terms with both the consequences of deracination and the refashioning of 
assumptions about ‘our German culture’” (Mandel, 2008: 1). The rejection of 
the ubiquitous leitmotif of the “bridge”, engaged by prominent Turkish German 
culture theorists like Özdamar and Zafer Şenocak, reveals irreconcilable notions 
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of different forms of Germanness at many levels of German social and historical 
discourse. This became even more apparent when the “bridge” was replaced by the 
notion of German “guiding culture”. Though it cannot be reduced to just claims 
of ethnicity and authenticity, the dominant German narrative, that is, that of the 
West German or Wessi, has often homogenised and othered Jewish Germans, 
East Germans and Turkish Germans. It turned complex and diverse identities, 
regardless of shared national origins or language or even citizenship status, into 
a monolithic and mono-semantic epithet as Jews, Ossis and Turks. While Wessi 
denotes a more stable, linear and solidified progression in historical identity from 
post-WWII to modern German Federal Republic aligned with liberal politics 
of the Global North, Jew, Ossi and Turk are shown to have become signifiers 
of instability. They conjure up dichotomising views of Germanness through the 
lens of the Holocaust, the division of Germany, East German socialism and the 
continued denial of Islam’s status as statutory body congruent with German law. 
This makes them “uneasy” monikers of German alterity, for they reject a neat 
tradition of homogenic German cosmopolitanism (Cheesman, 2007: 40-42; 
Twist, 2018). 
All this, as I discuss in chapter one and the other main chapters in this book, 
is rooted in a normative identity politics in Germany. It is a pervasive, historical 
problem for many minority cultures in Germany, not just the Turkish German 
community. And it impacts on those who are not accepted as West, white and 
ethnically pure Germans. Also, it serves to reduce the fear of the Other by 
suggesting that its identity is easy to know and easier yet to fix, to “standardise” 
or West Germanise (Twist, 2018: 6). In this regard, Turkish German comedy 
entertainment represents in its fictions strategies to fear Muslim Others, and 
Otherness in Germany in general, less. It is possible by knowing more about 
the Self, asking why there is the obsessive need to fix the Other, and suggesting 
that understanding hybrid identities beyond readily available clichés offers 
freedom from thinking strictly in binary terms. In an excerpt from his prize-
winning essay collection, Wer ist Wir?: Deutschland und seine Muslim-Who is 
We?: Germany and its Muslims, Navid Kermany argues that this complication 
of identity is necessary in contemporary Germany, as Germanness turns on 
a Western “we” and a Muslim “they”. He points to the bounded notions of 
Muslimness in Germany, which were confirmed repeatedly by German culture’s 
identitarian oppositions. These may encompass the conventional identity 
dichotomies: rural, urban; working class, elite; or, as I discuss in my work, 
German and Muslim: 
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And how many times have I heard in Germany that “we” don’t have any 
issues with Muslims. Or all kinds of talk shows that bring up Islam: How 
can “we” deal with Islam, do “we” have to be afraid of Muslims? That this 
“We” also includes Muslims seems to be almost unthinkable for the talk 
show guests. It’s not even meant to be offensive, at least not always. “We” 
Germans have to have a dialogue with the Muslims say those who mean 
well. While this is to be commended, it means that about 3 million people 
in this country would have to have that dialogue with themselves. (Kermani, 
2009: 27) 
“Turkish German”, “Muslim”—Perennial Others in Germany
Germans as well as Turkish Germans have realised that Muslimness has become 
an integral part of German culture in the new century. That German society 
has changed profoundly is the central message of contemporary Turkish 
German comedy. However, the continued reference to Turkish Germans as 
non-Westerners has not stopped in the country’s mainstream news media. The 
inherent dilemma is that a Muslim-German consciousness had already been 
established well before the 1960s. Berman argues that Germans have forgotten 
that Muslimness and Islamic culture had already been exposed to them in 
society long before the first labour migrants arrived from Turkey. She points to 
a general disregard for the impact of Muslim culture in Germany, and hence to 
its perception as foreign, which is simply wrong. Supported by the scholarship of 
the past two decades on German Orientalism, Berman illustrates that migratory 
relations between German-speaking countries and the Muslim Middle East date 
back as far as the Ottoman Empire (1350-1683). They continued into the imperial 
German state (1792-1930), the Third Reich (1931-1944) and into the first decades 
(1945-1989) after WWII (Berman, 2011: 12-13). 
The extensive links between Germany and Muslim majority countries are 
largely unknown in the present day. This may have to do with Germany’s majority 
population who tended to perceive Muslim identities as a threat to redefining its 
national identity as a Western one after WWII. Also, Germans have had a close 
interaction and frequent exchange with the Eastern world for centuries through 
trade and individual contact. But where there should today be a historical sense 
of European-Arab and European-Ottoman coexistence and contact with Islam 
there is only a “lack of knowledge about the history of contact [which] impedes 
a more nuanced comprehension of the [Muslim German] literary [and cultural] 
material” (Berman, 2011: 14).
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The idea that Germans have refused to accept Muslims and the religion of 
Islam as part of their culture is not entirely new. Mani describes how the terms 
“Gastarbeiter”-guest worker, “Fremder”-stranger, “Ausländer”-foreigner, or 
“Inländer ausländischer Herkunft”-citizen of foreign origin, were common 
phrases used to refer to Turkish Germans during the 1960s, 1970s and for the 
most part of the 1980s until reunification. Mani’s study of labour migration from 
Turkey to Germany provides further evidence that particularly West Germans 
lacked an intercultural awareness when they recruited the workers. He also 
concludes that West Germans tried to downplay their ties to Muslim culture when 
they were confronted with the integration of a community which they hardly 
knew after decades of neglect (Mani, 2007: 12). A widespread acceptance of the 
influence of Muslim culture on areas of German literary and cultural production, 
as the circumstances of contemporary Turkish German online comedy suggest in 
chapter four, thus feeds into a larger debate about what has changed since then.
Aims in the Study of Turkish German Comedy Entertainment
One could turn to many disciplines to identify the reasons for mainstream 
Germany’s embrace of a transnational and cosmopolitan comedy culture 
aesthetic created by the country’s largest Muslim community. Halle suggests 
an anthropological explanation. Turkish Light, and Turkish German comedy 
entertainment at large, sold so well because teens and young adolescents in 
reunified Germany could not be bothered with old separatist hats about East 
Germany and West Germany and neo-conservative Christianism (Halle, 
2008: 13-16). Indeed, the monetary success of Turkish German comedy films 
such as Kebab Connection and Kaya Yanar’s television sketch show, Was guckst 
Du?!- Whatcha Looking At?! (2001-2005), makes for terrific studies in cultural 
economics about the marketing of Muslim Otherness around the turn of the 
century. Though the transnational styles of Turkish German culture or stylistics 
of transnational comedy entertainment mean something different in areas of 
sociology or economics. They mean again something different altogether in 
historiographic terminology and media studies.
For those who study the transnational circulation of popular culture and 
comedy across the borders of nation states and the boundaries of certain 
communities, those stylistics are a matter of voice, of being heard, read and 
seen. This voice varies from Turkish German comedy artists like Somuncu being 
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fiercely sarcastic on stage to culture creatives making light fun of shoes, shopping 
and dating, like Hatice Akyün in her chick-lit novels. Or, perhaps, it can be 
characterised by Sinan Akkus’ circumspect use of American romcom cinema and 
elements of 1990s wedding comedies in the script for Evet, ich will!-Evet, I do.
Turkish German Muslims and Comedy Entertainment: Settling into 
Mainstream Culture in the 21st Century falls squarely in this diverse framework 
of interdisciplinary comedy, transnational media culture and Turkish German 
cultural studies. The aim of this book is to draw attention to many voices from 
many backgrounds, to what informs their comedy content and to the connection 
between Otherness and everyday life in German society in the 21st century. 
Research into Turkish German comedy has been flourishing for a little while 
now, especially in the context of film. Less attention has gone to television and 
stand-up, and less again to online media and user comments on re-published live 
content on digital video streaming platforms. An academic dialogue between all 
these different types of mass media is virtually non-existent. It is another aspect 
which this study seeks to remedy. 
Muslims and Muslim identities, sadly because of their stigmatisation and 
appropriation by majority communities in the West, are going to stay a visible 
minority issue. In Europe, this issue has played out in stories about headscarves, 
burkas and more recently burkinis, veiled faces and domestic abuse. There is 
the persistent narrative of honour killings, of inhumane customs and rituals 
of a generalised Muslim world and a dangerously reductive perception of the 
religion of Islam, as Celik demonstrates (Celik, 2015). One hears of the Caliphate 
and the Islamist terrorist, the beheading of Christian infidels and the dangers 
of ISIS. Muslim refugees, more recently in Germany, are especially known for 
endangering the welfare state model. The scope of this book cannot encompass 
all these issues and how they feature in popular comedy entertainment in the new 
century. More studies, some of which have already started to appear and attract 
German comedy, humour and transnational culture studies scholars’ attention, 
are needed to do this. While addressing how they play out in the Turkish German 
discourse, Turkish German Muslims and Comedy Entertainment can further the 
scope for contributions from other disciplines where lived realities of Muslim 




Germanness, Othering and Ethnic Comedy 
“I was aware, of course, that Turkish and Arab pupils in German schools cause more (and 
other) problems than Italians, Russians, or Poles.”
—Thilo Sarrazin (in Hostile Takeover: How Islam Impedes Progress and Threatens 
Society, 2018, English language edition, original title: Feindliche Übernahme: 
Wie der Islam den Fortschritt behindert und die Gesellschaft bedroht)
Summary
Ethnic comedy in Germany has a long and complex history. One can tell it in many 
ways. I give an account of it in this chapter in direct relationship to Germany’s historical 
identity as a shrinking nation after WWII, and as a country in identity turmoil after 
1989. Divisive ethnic humour, or more specifically anti-multicultural propaganda, has 
lent itself to German nationalism and cultural politics of Othering. It has allowed bio-
Germans to expand and to keep united their imagined sphere of ethnically and racially 
pure Germanness while factually losing German territory after defeat in armed combat 
or struggling to redefine German national identity after reunification. Pro-social ethnic 
comedy, in turn, has enabled Turkish German comedy artists and producers of Turkish 
German comedy culture to carve out and widen a space for the depiction of their presence 
in this segregated and nationalist German imaginary.
In and Out of “Heimat” and Germanness: Historical Contexts 
of Turkish German Living
The history of Turkish German integration is testimony to a push-and-pull 
dynamic around the acceptance of ethnic Otherness in Germany. This has to 
do, as I have explained in the introduction, with German mainstream culture’s 
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preoccupation with German space as “Heimat”, a home to belong to locally 
and at the same time nationally. It is inherently imbued with trans-historical 
Germanness and expansionist desires (Eigler and Kugele, 2012: 1-4; Blickle, 
2004).1 It is crucial to understand that “Heimat” links the definition of what 
is German to who can be German and hence may be allowed to reside in the 
country and call it their home. For this, Joseph Goebbels’ invocation of “Heimat” 
through Nazi-sanctioned films in the late 1930s and Hermann Goering’s 
propagandist call to arms to protect the German “Heim” as the last refuge of 
all German-speaking individuals are instructive. As Von Moltke has found, the 
Nazis’ persistent uses of “Heimat”, the German Home, on screen and in the 
mass media are revealing for their modern bio-politics. Nevertheless, they also 
relied heavily on anti-modernist sentiments around German homeland (Von 
Moltke, 2005: 58-62). The Third Reich’s national-socialist agenda depended on 
proto-Fascist ideologies of national inclusion and expulsion, which were already 
deeply engrained in Germany’s literary canon and mainstream culture (see 
the introduction). Turkish German comedy had and still has to go up against 
precisely this specific feature of German national culture. That is why Turkish 
German comedy makers and writers frequently employ the German Home as a 
shorthand. Whether it is a German neighbourhood, a German family home or 
the country’s cultural institutions, landscapes and major cities, Turkish German 
comedy frequently starts out by showing Germany on film, in books and on the 
small screen or on stage as a restrictive and, ultimately, anti-Muslim space. 
Nowhere has the German Home moved into greater prominence than in 
discussions about the suitability of non-traditional German Others to live in it as a 
national community. Islam, which offers an identity deeply embedded in religious 
beliefs and social practices and the language of the Quran, is therefore seen as a 
disturbance because it offers another, worldwide community of belonging: that 
is ummah, or Muslim community, a fundamental concept in Islam expressing 
the essential unity and theoretical equality of Muslims from diverse cultural and 
geographical settings (Roy, 2013). A vast diaspora of Muslim communities knows 
what it means to be part of Islam, which fosters an identity beyond a specific space 
or place or national culture. It is for this reason that German anti-immigration 
voices like that of Thilo Sarrazin try to frame Islam as anti-“Heimat” and anti-
German. This segregationist identity discourse implies that the German Home 
and Islam cannot coexist or make for congruent, Muslim-German identities. 
The PEGIDA movement, which is short for Patriotic Europeans against the 
Islamisation of the Occident, made this thinly veiled form of anti-ethnic and 
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anti-Muslim hate speech its mission when the organisation formed mob-like in 
October 2014 on the streets of Dresden in East Germany. Head of PEGIDA at 
the time, Lutz Bachmann, declared that Muslimness could not be separated from 
local regions in the Middle East or certain political domains, languages and ways 
of life diametrically opposed to “Heimat”. Berman has proven that this divisive 
rhetoric is not new and in fact has a long history (Berman, 2014). “Heimat” in 
Germany can mean inclusive of difference, though it has consistently functioned 
as a perfidious identity marker in recent years (Vieten, 2016: 110). The German 
Home remains ridden with much polarising trepidation about being an ethnically 
open civil society. It is “one of the main elements in contemporary German 
renegotiations of what it means to be German and to live in a German-speaking 
environment” (Blickle, 2004: 154).
One implication of the regressive qualities of the German Home is that 
attitudes towards non-ethnic Germanness are fickle. The embrace of diasporic 
Muslimness, of ummah, can dissipate quickly if it is seen as a subversive, disruptive 
element outside the control of Germany’s ethnocentric nationalism. The German 
and Austrian mainstream press and news media, for instance, were quick to talk 
about the fairy tale of September 2015. It relates to an immense wave of sympathy 
towards Syrian refugees arriving to the cheers of locals at Vienna and Munich 
central stations. A few months later, Vieten and Valentine note, management 
of those Muslim Others who came to Germany as refuges and asylum seekers 
in the new century took on quite a different tone. “Problems arise where 
structural asymmetry with respect to power and resources is underestimated. 
[…] Resentments—and even arson attacks—in some of the more rural areas of 
Germany, both in the east and west, remind us that cosmopolitanism(s) means 
plurality and complexity” (Vieten and Valentine, 2016: 2). Turkish German 
labour migrants found themselves in the same situation some few decades earlier. 
Coming to the country from several areas and different ethnic communities 
of Turkey to rebuild war-ravaged West Germany, many faced indiscriminate 
harassment in cross-cultural contexts and negative treatments at the workplace 
(Chin, 2009). However, the notion of working guest rather than permanent 
resident was even more consequential for the Turkish German community. 
Turkish Germans encountered a defensiveness after most of them chose to stay 
instead of returning to Turkey. In 1973, the number of Turkish Germans had 
risen to 605,000 in West Germany. It was at that time that the West German 
government introduced a total halt to all foreign labour recruitment. In 1974, 
the Turkish German community consisted of 60 per cent of working individuals 
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and 20 per cent of non-working spouses, while another 20 per cent were second-
generation children. German mainstream culture looked at these numbers 
with concern, as they meant that Turkish German families had replaced single 
labour migrant households. Turkish German population growth had become 
sustainable. The community would not leave.
In both these situations, the skewed fairy tale and the permanent guests’ 
rejection point to the dilemma of the German Home. Otherness is welcomed 
until it threatens the established population’s material, cultural and social 
interests. Political movements, or at least public demands, to oust Turkish and 
Muslim Others from Germany have grown in number and visibility over the past 
couple of years. This development suggests that the post-cosmopolitan narrative 
of “Heimat” is still as poorly understood in 2020 as it was 60 years ago when 
Turkish labourers were invited to come. As part of the efforts to understand, I 
discuss the discriminatory aspect of xenophobic thought in, and through, German 
“Heimat” around WWII and German reunification. Anti-immigration thinking 
and xenophobia were cultivated during the aftermath of one war and leading up 
to another, and after a split country was reunited. Whether essentialising ideas 
about Turkishness sit on the excessively racist or the subtle end of the spectrum, 
Turkish German comedy entertainment engages them through filmic, literary, 
performance-based or televised representations. It is bound up with the local and 
the national German Home, the present and the past, Self and Other, and so 
links to the specific as well as the general realities of life in multi-ethnic German 
society. 
Ethnic Bias in Jewish German and Turkish German Lives: 
WWII and “Wende”
An Important Historical Continuity
It is essential to understand that the discrimination against Turkish Germans 
is no isolated phenomenon in German culture’s historical dealings with ethno-
nationalism. WWII (1939-1945) and the immediate reunification period 
(1989-mid 1990s) in Germany demarcate two intellectual battlegrounds in 
German history, which illustrate an ongoing connection between Germanness, 
ethnicity and religion. Though for different reasons, the two periods overlap in 
their hostility against non-Christian and non-ethnic German cultures. WWII 
and “Wende” map the contours of the function of ethnic bias, which German 
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majority culture used to deflect responsibility for its warmongering and the 
cost of its capitalist restructuring. Yet again, those were not entirely new or 
modern occurrences of racism and religious bias in German culture, nor should 
they be considered in geo-political isolation, as I expand on in chapter six and 
the conclusion. Like anti-Semitism, anti-Turkism is one of Germany’s oldest 
institutionalised hatreds. Both discriminatory practices date back in much of 
Europe to the early Middle Ages. One can trace the theoretical and doctrinal 
context for these phobic developments while finding that, compared side by 
side, it took anti-Semitism and anti-Turkism at their height only decades to 
penetrate the general stock of political thinking and undermine liberal values 
in the German public. There are also similar patterns of continuity between the 
cultural and intellectual rooting of anti-Jewish depictions in public discourse in 
the lead-up to WWII and Islamophobic representations of Turkish identities 
in reunified Germany. It is important in this respect to stress that the killing of 
millions of Jewish people across Europe stands in no comparison to localised 
attacks at Turkish German communities. What matters here though is the 
aggressive propulsion of hate against alleged non-Germanness and that hate’s 
continuation over such a long period of time. The discrimination against Jews 
and Turks, or those perceived as Jewish and Turkish, is marked by denigration, 
dehumanisation, subjugation and definition of racial lineage; most notably, this 
form of bigotry has usually been sanctioned by the state or national elites. It has 
also been characterised by readily available ethnic derision as a means of public 
ridicule of the supposedly wrong kind of Germanness in newspaper comics and 
in propaganda posters (Pratt Ewing, 2008). 
Another factor in the repeat cycles of public hatred against Jewishness and 
Turkishness is the nation. A cataclysmic development in the narrative of hate 
against Jews and Turks came about when Germany turned to modern nationalism. 
Incidents against Jewish communities in German-speaking territories were in the 
main sporadic outbreaks of anti-Jewish hate up to the 18th century (Mack, 2003). 
The conditions enabling a systematic grouping of political ideologies around 
anti-Semitism had not existed before the late 1870s (see the introduction). 
However, with a sense of homogenous Germanness upon which to build the 
national German identity at the turn of the 19th century came the suggestion that 
Jewishness could not blend in with Germanness. Then, shortly before the height 
of the Nazi Holocaust, Jewish German people were denied their citizenship 
rights and forced to live in ghettos. “Indeed”, Pulzer points out that “the word 
anti-Semitism itself - with its attempt to draw on the support of science - made 
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its first appearance [only] in 1879” (Pulzer, 1988: ix). Equally contemporaneous 
was the idea that Jewish Germans had a transnational and diasporic subjectivity 
similar to Muslim ummah and that it was seen by the secular establishment as a 
non-homeland-related source of identity (Geller and Morris, 2016: 3-8). Due to 
the difference in its social and religious organisation, Jewishness was characterised 
increasingly in Germany by political and community leaders as the opposite of 
what the members of a modern nation should desire; a Self, which was primarily 
linked to the new political image of a self-contained nationalism and an ethno-
centric Germanness. German elites projected it as a national vanguard. They 
regarded themselves as members of a European society, who believed that non-
Christian religions would necessarily lead to flawed forms of state governance. 
The construction of Turkish alterity in reunified Germany thus occurred by the 
same means of ethno-cultural dichotomy as Jewish Othering in the early 20th 
century. That is, according to Schneider, as oppositional structures and binary 
central terms: German and Other (Schneider, 2002: 14-16). There was accepted 
Germanness and German sociality on one side, and there were Jews and Turks 
with their allegedly anti-national identity attachments beyond the German 
“Kulturstaat” or culture, religion and language as definition of statehood on 
the other. That boundary was and is to this day more efficient than any physical 
border to separate majority from minority communities in Germany, as the 
resurfacing right-wing rhetoric of AfD and PEGIDA suggests. 
Expulsion from Mainstream Culture
The modern age of the German nation state and two of its most crucial events in 
recent history have worked fundamentally against ethnic minorities. Jewishness 
was presented as incompatible with Germanness for allegedly having cost 
Germans a loss of territory after WWI. Later, in the early 1990s, Turkishness was 
blamed for Germany’s loss of economic dominance despite regaining the GDR 
as Federal Germany’s national territory. Also echoing the Jewish German case 
during WWII, the German majority society collapsed varied Turkish groups into 
a Muslim Other after 1989. And they did so decidedly rapidly (Kaya, 2007: 483). 
The reduction of different forms of Turkish identities to a clichéd image of The 
Turk revolved around a functional discourse of anti-Ottoman hostility. It goes 
back to the allegedly despotic Sultans of the Orient, who were transforming their 
subjects into lazy and anti-intellectual slaves on the back of an Islamic doctrine. 
Such negative images of Turkish forms of governance helped to create the ethno-
cultural trope of the so-called Turkish menace. Along with the trope of the lazy 
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dumb Turk, it had served Latin Christianity to define itself as a pan-European 
Christianity since the First Crusade, during which Jerusalem was conquered 
in 1099 (Berman, 2011). The 14th century saw an effort to strengthen Europe by 
proclaiming Muslims as an external threat to European countries. The process 
aided in the construction of European Christendom and an ethno-German, 
Christian Self. That kind of Christian would work hard so that the nation could 
thrive as a stand-in for a collective body of Germanness and Christianity and 
its interior be safe because it was homogenous. This ethnic and religious bias 
planted the seeds of an exclusionary identity practice. From the mid-15th century 
onwards it became the custom in German-language texts to equate Muslims 
with Turks. When early modern German texts mention a person having turned 
Turk, the meaning is that they have converted to Islam, hence making the ethnic 
category Turk identical with the religious category of Muslimness. Consequently, 
with Germany’s economic downturn after German reunification, the prejudice 
of the anti-European, non-Christian and lazy Turk returned. Dissatisfied 
Germans, especially in cities and regions with high unemployment numbers 
and little previous contact with Muslimness and Turkish German communities, 
reproduced a well-rehearsed bias against Turkishness. In East German cities and 
areas where socio-economic trauma and the fear of instability in the country 
were especially high, communities developed an even more heightened sense of 
anti-Muslimness by projecting the German East’s frustrations on The Turk.2 
However, the exclusion discourse around Turkish Germans did not stop there. 
If a new national German identity was to be created, a new political order to 
be legitimised after the fall of the Berlin wall, it could happen only by ethnic 
“boundary maintenance” (White, 1997: 754-769) of some kind. Dissatisfied 
right-wingers sought to externalise and essentialise, and thus de-territorialise, 
the Turkish German community within the re-drawn borders of Germany. All 
the while, Germany’s new federal government axed many of its infrastructure 
projects while the country bled manufacturing jobs. This meant that thousands 
of Turkish German blue-collar workers, especially those located in the reunified 
city of Berlin and the suburban areas around it, lost their employment in the 
short few months following official reunification in October 1990. “When the 
wall fell, it fell on us”, was a common wisdom circulating among the Turkish 
German community at the time. The “Dolchstoßlegende“, or stab-in-the-back 
legend, attributing insidious internal betrayal to Germany’s defeat in WWI, 
had similarly put blame on Jewish Germans as the ethnic Others in Germany 
responsible for the majority society’s problems. Entirely untrue, of course, and 
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impossible because of their miniscule proportions of the general population, 
both groups still drew hate and fault for the consequences of German majority 
society’s policies (Schneider, 2008). Jewish German and Turkish German Others 
instantly became less German, whether they had fought alongside German 
troops or were working on the same assembly lines. 
The Janus Face of Ethnic Humour in Germany
“Oppressed groups often use humor as a form of attack on the value of a 
dominant society or social” (Charney, 2005: 3-4), writes Charney. I have laid 
out the reasons for and subjects of attack by Turkish German comedy in the 
new century, though an exhaustive overview of all contemporary forms of 
that comedy would require several books. Following on from here, this book 
establishes the general function of contemporary Turkish German comedy in 
several mass media types, which is impressive because a wider variety of comedic 
fictions by Turkish Germans exists. The popularity of these cultural products 
is also exciting, as the following chapters are going to detail. However, there is 
that history of “Türkenwitze“ or anti-Turkish German humour which denigrates 
the Turkish minority for the amusement of the majority culture. To know more 
about it and to understand it better means an improved understanding of the 
pro-social agenda of contemporary Turkish German comedy entertainment and 
from where its makers draw inspiration. 
Ethnic humour has several important qualities. One is that the story of its 
social functions opens a unique window into societal dynamics such as those 
laid out in the first part of this chapter. In Germany, the way ethnic humour 
worked was to separate, to hierarchise and to deride ethnic minorities, seemingly 
validating claims about their inferior identities. It helped German elites, the 
government and the wider public to turn a blind eye when ethnic minorities 
were mistreated, hurt or even killed. This divisive humour is a precursor to the 
narrative of how communities like the Turkish Germans fought back. They were 
the target of anti-social ethnic humour before re-appropriating its hostility, 
aggression and degradation. Islamophobic humour was widely consumed in 
German mainstream media, which illustrates the pervasiveness of certain negative 
stereotypes about Turkish German people. That Turkish Germans could take on 
centuries of demeaning jokes and racist slurs with their pro-social ethnic comedy 
is astonishing. Even more impressive, however, is the fact that they could use this 
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comedy to facilitate a widening of ethnic identity discourse in Germany via the 
arena of popular culture entertainment. 
Islamophobic humour in Germany, which one can just as well call racist 
propaganda, is well documented. Studies of it connect the fear of the transnational 
to the fear of the non-German Other, first to divisive ethnic humour and later 
to racialising ethnic comedy sketches and ethnic drag skits (Sieg, 2009). Those 
racist entertainment performances are very similar to American Vaudeville and 
blackfaced or brownfaced stock characters in unscripted plays in the tradition 
of Italian commedia dell’arte. Long-running jokes about Turks, appearing as 
visual propaganda artefacts in daily German newspapers and on television and 
in the cinema, go back to popular print-press comics. They were co-opted as an 
essential means of disseminating race-based humour by the German yellow press 
after the first wave of Turkish German labour migration in the 1960s and after 
reunification in the early 1990s. Again, none of this was entirely new and applied 
before to anti-Jewish German and antisemitic humour in Germany. A dearth 
of research studies on anti-Jewish stereotyping in racist WWII comic strips, 
funny stage plays and nightclub skits confirms as much for readers interested 
in historical ethnic comedy racism in Germany (Chapman, 2000; Dundes and 
Hausschild, 1988). 
What was new in the case of Turkish Germans, or at least contradictory on 
the face of it, was that the two post-war Germanies had carefully constructed 
their narratives of national de-Nazification around multi-ethnic diversity. West 
Germany had done so by aligning itself with a pro-capitalist market economy 
under the leadership of the USA’s so-called melting-pot multiculture. The wider 
public in West Germany embraced symbols of that melting-pot US culture, 
for example by buying American brand products and consuming American 
entertainment culture on German television and in German cinemas. All the 
while, the GDR regime was eager to construct a national story of East Germany 
as a utopian socialist home for and by all state workers regardless of skin colour or 
religious beliefs (Habermas, 1988: 3; Müller, 2000: 124). The return of seemingly 
racist imagery and comedy in East German and West German entertainment 
emphasises how short-lived the ideals of racial tolerance were within German 
culture. Several of the political cartoons about Turks living in Germany for 
the last 50 years point this out. Some of them were collected for a travelling 
exhibition (“50 Years, 20 Cartoons: Turkish People from the Perspective of 
German Cartoonists”) and first put on display in 2012 at Ankara’s German 
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Cultural Centre. Viewing them gives one an idea of how German cartoonists 
critiqued the pseudo-liberal perception of Turkish migrants.
Figure 2: “Döner-Centre”, Heiko Sakurei, political newspaper cartoon, first published 
in Berliner Zeitung, 2004, part of “50 Years, 50 Cartoons: Turkish People from the 
Perspective of German Cartoonists” (Erdogan, 2009). The text in the speech bubble 
reads: “Ok, so then please recite for me the first 20 Articles of the German Basic Law 
charter!”. Credit: Berliner Zeitung/Heiko Sakurai, reprint with permission by artist. 
Anti-social and Pro-social Ethnic Comedy: “Sword” and “Shield”
Racialising comedy and ethnicity-based humour have long been a part of 
German culture. Their potential for varied interpretation has led to a wide range 
of interpretations of their effects on society, which have only recently become an 
area of investigation in psycho-social research into humour (Saucier and O’Dea 
and Strain, 2016). There are several competing opinions on the finer nuances 
of the subject. Existing literature on ethno-racist humour, and particularly its 
conceptualisation according to the “sword and shield metaphor” (Rappoport, 
2005), though, suggests two primary outcomes associated with racial and 
ethnic humour. When ethnic comedy, that is ethnicity-based humour used in 
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mainstream entertainment, is anti-social in intention it is used as a sword or 
means of attack and interpreted as such. This means that it may reinforce existing 
social hierarchies and divisions between certain groups along lines of ethnicity 
tropes and ethnic identity bias. Stereotypes about the target or targets of the 
humour may be reproduced, potentially giving the impression that it is socially 
acceptable to articulate racist prejudice and ethnic bias openly for amusement. 
When ethnic comedy is pro-social in intent, used as a shield and understood 
as such, it may serve to challenge and protect against prejudice and connect 
members of communities within and across group boundaries. It moves people 
closer together instead of separating them further. 
Davies makes the point that almost all humorous approaches to ethnicity and 
national identities, fictional as well as in real life, inevitably involve communication 
about a notion of social mobility (Davies, 2002: 148-149). For example, with 
ethnic jokes in nation states there is always an allusion to a sense of change within 
and between ethnic communities and their assumed places in society: societal, 
occupational, cultural, educational and political. It is the very notion of the 
possibility of social change, upward and downward movement, Davies argues, 
which provides the springboard for ridicule between and even within ethnic 
communities. Therefore, he writes, “ethnic humor in general [and regardless of 
its social intent] is a relevant and important part of our modern popular culture” 
(Davies, 2002: 136). But it would be inaccurate to overemphasise here just two 
categories of ethnic humour to restrict or mobilise cultural identities in the social 
imaginary of a country’s mainstream culture. There is a possibility that some pro-
socially motivated ethnic comedy may be perceived as anti-social, presenting the 
possibility of unintentional reproduction of the status quo rather than subverting 
it. Rappoport also warns that supposedly clear-cut taxonomies and overly narrow 
definitions in humour theory often do not equip scholars of ethnic humour to 
deal with the many finer nuances of it and that which is still unclear about it: “[c]
onventional analyses often just brush over the subject by referring to the humour 
theories summarized earlier and emphasizing the superiority theme—that by 
ridiculing others, people enhance themselves. Freud’s psychoanalytic concepts 
are also frequently cited, since so much of racial, ethnic, and gender humor 
involves sex and aggression. This is not wrong, and much of it is useful, but the 
aim [should be] to show there is a great deal more to be said about humor based 
on stereotypes” (Rappoport, 2005: 31). 
Researchers in ethnic humour studies argued until the late 1980s that ethnic 
humour functioned primarily to describe only the relationship between ethnic 
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communities. Yet theorists like Giselinde Kuipers, who examine stereotype 
humour in the specific cultural contexts of Canada and America, argue that 
humour based on the identity of ethnic communities has more important 
functions within rather than between groups of people, as I suggest in chapter 
four (Kuipers, 2006: 140-142). Conspicuous examples of this can be found in 
most, if not all, societies around the world. Kuipers makes the point that in some 
societies older migrant communities or older inhabitants refuse to acknowledge 
and accept the values of the current mainstream culture, as indicated in chapter 
three (Kuipers, 2006: 144). Poking fun at themselves as perceived minorities 
outside the dominant community allows, for example, so-called rednecks in the 
United States or French Canadians in Canada confidently to mark their lifestyles 
as different from those of the majority, yet not as somehow lesser. The minorities 
can take pride through ethnic humour in forming a particularistic narrative of 
their cultural identity at the periphery of a multicultural society. As a reverse form 
of cultural assimilation, outsiders need to accept the qualities of this identity as 
superior to theirs in order to gain access to it (Kuipers, 2006: 145).
Is Turkish German comedy entertainment in the new century driven by 
similar anti-social or pro-social mechanisms? Does it present an opportunity 
to embed prejudice and ethnicity in self-aware discussions of contemporary 
Germanness? In this book I claim that it does and that Turkish German 
comedy productions also foreground the issue of tokenism in the representation 
of ethnic diversity in Germany. Neither the alt righter nor the liberal lefty, 
nor the comfortably neutral middle-of-the-roader, is safe from the critique 
of Turkish German comedy artists. They all question the identity politics of 
Germanness as a discrete culture complex, whose opening towards a decidedly 
transnational, hybrid aesthetic is at the centre of my analysis. Moreover, one can 
see the different mass media types of Turkish German comedy as a collective 
platform. It is widely accessible across multiple creative channels to interrogate 
normative assumptions of a white, Christian Germany. Turkish German 
comedy filmmakers, screenwriters, performers and authors work off it by sharing 
“experiences of diasporic subjects and by telling stories about the dynamics of 
cross-cultural encounters and postmodern multi-culturalism” (Berghahn, 2013: 
6). The attentive reader will thus notice in subsequent chapters that I privilege 
in this book the social functions of Turkish German comedy fictions instead of 
reading them as representations of factual reality. It is not just about “getting” 
the humour which may or may not lead to a positive or negative affective 
response. Instead, I talk about how Turkish German comedy participates in the 
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dissemination of ethnic communities’ internal workings and how they deal with 
other ethnic groups. 
In related aspects of modern usage, Kuipers has shown that ethnic humour 
functions primarily to clue in audiences on the position of ethnic identities in 
relation to each other. Conspicuous examples of this function appear in ethnic 
humour based on prevalent tropes of national, religious or regional and gendered 
identities. Kuipers puts forward the argument that one can read jokes about the 
lazy rednecks in America mentioned before as a distillation of the essence of all 
social interactions, namely hierarchy and ordering (Kuipers, 2006: 140-142). 
Proceeding on this basis, Kuipers considers this joke by US redneck comedian 
Jeff Foxworthy: “You might be a redneck if the stock market crashes and it won’t 
affect you one bit.” This example cites several possible ingredients of ethnic 
humour and its function to understand the social order through stereotyping 
of group identities (Kuipers: 144). In such examples identities and social 
mobility are inherently linked. Jackson develops the point further by arguing 
that humour theorists have made productive use of humour to touch on taboos 
or sensitive topics in society. The link between identity and mobility expresses 
the relationship between who we are and where we can go in life. Because of 
this, jokes about ethnic stereotypes show us where certain communities sit in 
the greater context of a society’s social imaginary ( Jackson, 2012: 2). Similarly, 
a comedic reading of popular fictions about minority characters, for instance 
Turkish Germans in Germany, can deliver new perspectives on the complex 
relationship between ethnicity, marginalisation and the novel definition of 
identities in German society. 
Another implication of this is to place Turkish German comedy in wider 
research  environs. Formulating a new approach to Turkish German comedy 
means being part of the formulation of a burgeoning field of transnational 
popular culture studies in the new century. Much of the scholarship in this 
academic project relies on established theoretical terrain. There is immigrant 
transnationalism (Schiller et al., 1995), which looks at the act of transfer between 
source and destination points and the inherent social actions and reactions 
migration networks generate. In the age of globalisation, diasporic and other 
types of trans-ethnic culture have formed new power structures (Gupta and 
Ferguson, 1997), cross-pollinated by anthropological sensibilities of space and 
the politics of representing difference (Banerjee, 2005). Between transnationally 
produced and consumed comedy fictions lies the centrality of mainstream 
entertainment, whose study has been approached from the perspectives of 
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audience taste, commercialisation and intercultural values (Göktürk, 2004; 
Higbee and Song Hwee, 2010). By now, too, the recurrent crisis of German 
nationhood in transnational Europe has attained canonical status (Risse, 2015; 
Brubaker, 1996).
Studying humour, as one has seen by now, is a challenge in any domain. 
Interpreting the way humour emerges, which contexts it references, how its 
many structures and uses play out in specific settings, can be a daunting task. 
Comedy research is “complex and demanding—even unlimited” (Roach Anleu 
and Milner Davis, 2018: 6). This reality of doing humour studies may help to 
explain why scholars working on Turkish German culture have largely avoided a 
confrontation of humour styles or styles of humour with frameworks of applied 
social pragmatics. Even those who study the funny in Turkish German works of 
film, television, literature and performance have found that the things which are 
in and of themselves comedic or humorous are difficult to judge as inherently 
funny. The flavour or tone of a comedy film or a video piece can vary from being 
utterly sarcastic to light-heartedly warm and playful. Knock-about slapstick 
actions in a romantic comedy may be drawing on complex and multi-faceted, 
multi-dimensional notions of humour. Physical gags in online sketch reels 
can contain subjective, situational, multi-ethnic and plural markers for ethnic 
humour about multiple ethnic communities. Some think it is hilarious, some find 
it lowbrow garbage. It could be the reason why even Göktürk, who was the first 
to take on Turkish German comedy, has come to think it impractical to discuss 
comedy fictions just on the subjective grounds of audience perception. She has 
concluded as much in her numerous discussions of humorous representations 
of hybrid cultures in Turkish German cinema. Göktürk suggests that it is more 
useful to determine which aspects of identity a comedy fiction presents; and 
which it presents in more ways than one to propose that there are different ways 
of being authentically German or Turkish (Göktürk, 2000: 4-5). 
But what remains absent, first and foremost still, is a systemic investigation 
method to merge scholarly discourse on popular entertainment culture with 
transnational migrant comedy. The social pragmatics of humour play a key role 
in responding to this gap. To question when and how humour works, where it 
is applied and to what end produces complex and multi-faceted examinations 
of subjects, situations, shared realities of living and social meanings. There are 
multi-dimensional strategies to the authorship of funny fictions and scripted 
performances. They reveal how certain cultures differ while retaining a sense of 
commonality, which is essential in understanding why specific jokes and puns 
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are funny without being anti-social. In discussing Turkish German identities 
and Turkish German comedy, research must include a discussion of linguistic 
elements, verbal structures, situational elements, physical actions, a dissection 
of wit, and how scripted comedy in general elicits specific meanings on the 
textual level. This approach can be categorised as an established form of social 
contextualisation within the classical structure of pragmatic humour research. I 
would note, however, that this approach is new to analyses of Turkish German 
culture and Turkish German comedy. Scholars of humour, though, will recognise 
that I employ the classical tripartite formation of humour theory. I use it to 
speculate in the next chapters on how humour creates intended messages in 
support of Turkish German comedy’s overarching agenda: pro-social, affective 
meanings which model positive interventions between Turkish German and 
other German communities in the context of everyday living and the actual 
reality of living in German society. 
Aspects of social control as well as unbridled freedom of expression 
will underpin  all critical thinking about Turkish German comedy as social 
commentary. The wealth of ethnic comedy entertainment in genres and media 
types is evidence enough of both a need and an opportunity to understand a 
hybrid form of Turkishness and Germanness as creative power, a form of new 
artistic labour. It questions whether the burden of uniting Islam with Western 
majority societies falls squarely on Muslim minority communities or groups 
re-Muslimised after decades of living in Germany in the wake of 9/11. I develop 
this  point further in my analysis of inter-communal and intra-communal 
exchanges of Turkish Germans and other Germans in fictionalised German 
society through the lens of three types of humour: superiority, incongruity and 
relief. 
Superiority, Incongruity and Relief Humour
Kuipers (2008: 388), Meyer (2000), Olin (2016) and Scheel and Gockel 
(2017) all agree on three broad “categories of theory or classical approaches to 
explaining the phenomena of humour and laughter” (Roach Anleu and Milner 
Davis, 2018: 6). These are the theories of superiority, incongruity and relief. With 
superiority one finds humour in the lowering of another’s social station through 
momentary misfortune or intentional actions and speech acts. Examples of this 
can be found in situational comedy scripts for television sitcoms, the physical 
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comedy of slapstick in action-driven goofball or romantic comedy films, and the 
quick-witted dialogue of chick-lit and dick-lit novels. Incongruity turns on the 
perceived difference between expected outcomes of specific situations or assumed 
knowledge about reality and the actual state of things or behavioural patterns 
of people. This mismatch is perceived by the brain as a positive stimulus of a 
learning experience. Incongruity generates laughter in sudden identity reversal 
scenes of screwball comedy and is increasingly popular with punchline pundits 
to elicit laughter in their stand-up routines. Finally, relief means that humour and 
laughter allow the sudden release of pent-up emotions or re-routing of nervous 
energy, thereby producing pleasure from negative sentiments and anti-social 
predispositions. This type of humour occurs during confrontations and stand-
offs between characters, thus offering alternatives to the physical escalation of 
conflict and resolving contrasting viewpoints without violence. Of course, these 
theories overlap and intersect. They are not clear-cut paradigms. Frequently, any 
given instance of scripted comedy fiction and scripted comedy performance “will 
contain elements of incongruity, superiority and relief as well as other factors” 
(Roach Anleu and Milner Davis, 2018: 6).
Superiority
Superiority, incongruity and relief each have their own histories of usage and 
theoretical criticism in the areas of philosophy, sociology, linguistics and 
literary studies. Prominent supporters have repeatedly attempted to use them 
in different disciplines to explain laughter from the viewpoint of an intentional 
stimulus and a desired response to it. In the 17th century, philosopher Thomas 
Hobbes advocated superiority as the dominant model to explain how laugher 
was an individual’s response to feeling superior to others. He defines laughter in 
Human Nature (1640) as a “sudden glory arising from some sudden conception 
of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or 
with our own formerly” (Hobbes, 1905: chapter 9, sec. 13). More recently, Arthur 
Asa Berger sees it as an important theory on “how humor involves some sense of 
superiority that people feel about those (people, animals, objects) they laugh at” 
(Berger, 2010: 105). 
Different scholars have produced different interpretations of what the humour 
theories about superiority, incongruity and relief mean. Berger writes with a 
greater emphasis on everyday social contexts than Hobbes, “A person slips on 
a banana peel and we laugh because, for a moment, we who have not lost our 
balance feel superior to him” (Berger, 2010: 105). In contrast to incongruity 
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theory and relief theory, laughter in the context of superiority humour is overtly 
directed at someone or something and looks down at the position of perceived 
inferiority. Berger explains this point further with a critical look at the general 
aspect of superiority humour defined by Hobbes. He argues that “[from] a 
cultural theory perspective we can extend [Thomas] Hobbes’s notion of humor 
involving a sudden recognition of some kind of eminency in ourselves relative 
to others and say we may find this eminency not only in our persons but in our 
cultures” (Berger: 105-106). 
Despite their different interpretations, Hobbes and Berger highlight several 
features of the same tendency of superiority humour, which is to obtain authority 
over certain aspects of a person’s identity or a culture through ridicule. The general 
idea is that the emphasis of difference can position one’s social status higher than 
that of another person. But while Hobbes remains vague about the ambivalent 
social mechanism of superiority humour, Berger describes it as a way of actively 
fighting for societal primacy. He argues that the act of reproducing perceived 
differences between two socio-culturally determined positions and highlighting 
them with humour is nothing short of an act of social aggression (Berger: 106). 
Berger claims further that it is undeniably also a form of aggression if the entity 
in the allegedly inferior social position relishes in turn the fall of a person or 
object from its supposedly higher place in society. 
Exploring the aspect of social ordering through humour in greater detail, 
Sullivan makes the point that superiority humour can be perceived as a negative 
as well as a positive form of cultural identity politics. Superiority humour can 
be interpreted as a negative strategy if a majority mocks a minority, or as a 
struggle for social equality if the minority fights back with it. In the second case, 
it encourages people to fight for a better place than the one awarded to them by 
those in power (Sullivan, 2004: 87-88). Sullivan writes, “[A] belief in superiority 
produces a type of equality, albeit a particularly noxious type [because] the 
pervasive belief in superiority encourages violence” (Sullivan: 88). 
It is the message about identities in relation to social change and society which 
challenges theorists not to dismiss superiority as a retaliatory practice or the one-
sided form of humour defined by Davies as ethnic ridicule. But Berger argues 
that the ridicule in superiority humour is part of a recognition process of social 
contexts and subject positions, which he reads as a test of alleged differences 
(Berger: 107). I have described above that cultural differences are the main 
themes of Turkish German comedy, which suggests that superiority humour can 
shed new light on them as a theoretical approach. The stories I analyse start out 
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by reproducing social differences and reifying them as potential dividers between 
communities. Yet, as their plots unfold, the narratives examine and comment on 
those dividers, they interrogate and sometimes destabilise them, and in some 
cases even dis-locate and re-place them to stress their artifice as makers of ethno-
cultural superiority.
Incongruity 
Put forward by Francis Hutcheson’s writings about aesthetic diversity in the 
mid-18th century, incongruity is now the most accepted transcultural model 
of explaining laughter as an expression of positive surprise in the face of an 
unexpected situation or the experience of mismatch ( Jackson, 2012: 9). Similarly, 
Arthur Berger defines incongruity humour as “based on some kind of a difference 
between what people expect and what they get. We can also look at incongruity 
in more specific terms as far as culture theory is concerned and say it suggests 
some kind of difference between what is and what is not normative” (Berger, 
2012: 105). In other words, incongruity occurs where there is a mismatch, by 
evoking it either willingly through some semiotic stimulus or unwillingly through 
some other means. The stimulus activates knowledge about two diverging, 
incompatible frames of reference and thereby evokes an element of opposition. 
Laughter indicates here the realisation of an incompatibility between a concept 
and certain assumptions involved in a situation or thought process and the real 
objects thought to be related in some way to the concept or assumption (Berger: 
108). 
Despite its common acceptance, theorists lament the inherent lack of precision 
in this definition. Berger for instance finds incongruity problematic when it 
comes to determining in greater detail the cultural positions which are involved 
in the act of laughing about a perceived clash. He says: “Although incongruity 
theories tell us that incongruous differences in humorous texts elicit laughter, 
[…] usually in the form of polar opposition, forcing them into unspecified models 
of binary opposition is too vague as a research approach for informed inquiry” 
(Berger: 106). Vandaele makes a similar point. He argues that the analysis of 
referential conflict alone does not yield contextual results about the critical study 
of clashing meanings. One must rather ask how, for instance, the shock value of 
clashes between stereotypical knowledge and completely unexpected meanings 
plays out in a specific narrative (Vandaele, 2002: 223-224).
Berger and Vandaele draw explicit parallels between incongruity humour and 
fictions about migrant identities. Laughter emerges as the result of someone 
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learning something new from an otherwise common situation or context in the 
theory of incongruity humour. The reconfiguration of the expected can happen 
either by people behaving suddenly differently from how they would normally 
or by meanings which are contradictory to their usual communicative purpose. 
Moreover, John Morreal points out that “expectation is a key word here” (Morreal, 
2009: 60), in that what any given person may find incongruous depends largely 
on his or her individual knowledge about and experiences in a cultural context 
(Morreal: 60-61). 
Ultimately, in humorous fictions about migrants and natives where the 
context is one in which immigration has resulted in a variety of meanings 
and cultural identities, the concept of incongruity becomes a question of 
how competently members of different groups deal with the unexpected. The 
comedic focus on a specific society can also indicate whether the social setting 
has imposed boundaries on the members of different ethnic backgrounds so that 
they do not share enough cultural meanings or knowledge to avoid unexpected 
misunderstandings. The limited knowledge and experience of their own group 
might not allow community members to avoid incongruent situations within 
the culture, much less so between cultures. If this aspect of incompetence is the 
humorous focus of the narrative in a film, a television show or a novel or a digital 
skit, the fact that both minority as well as majority members are faced with the 
same feeling of unexpectedness may become central to understanding difference 
as a shared quality in a society.
Relief 
The most recent explanation of what provokes laughter is relief theory. The 
theory emerged in the mid-19th century and was later informed by Freud’s 
psychoanalytical understanding of the human psyche and most recently updated 
by scholars in the field of neuro-medical science. The basic premise of relief is that 
“humor is tied to psychic economies and to aggression, often of a sexual nature” 
(Berger, 2012: 106-107). Berger writes that it is also “described as a rerouting or 
suspense theory of suppressed and suddenly released energies of the psyche” 
(Berger: 107-108) in the larger body of literature on humour research.
Berger’s description indicates that relief theory shares several features with 
incongruity as well as superiority humour. Focusing on social functions of 
humour, Morreal notes that the homeostatic mechanism of relief humour serves 
much like a safety valve to release built-up pressure. It ensures that humour as 
a positive feeling and laughter as a non-violent reaction replace an otherwise 
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anti-social and volatile outcome when a person is put under significant pressure 
(Morreal, 2009: 115). Morreal adds that the humorous outcome is “not only 
more enjoyable to human beings than the dissonance caused by the aggressive 
alternative or actual physical violence; it also presents the socio-cultural benefit 
of laughter” (Morreal: 115) to share in the fun as a group. 
The concept of humorous relief is vital to this study because it suggests that 
humour is conducive to inter-communal as well as intra-communal relations by 
connecting people socially through their laugher. Although relief appears less 
frequently than superiority and incongruity in contemporary humour studies, 
it can be considered very useful, in that an individual constantly experiences 
identity pressures within a group. The role of affinities and affiliations which 
ethnic communities develop to foster a notion of cohesion are crucial in 
multicultural societies. This is particularly relevant for people who are required 
to indicate their social belonging through language or a certain behaviour despite 
a dislike of either or both. 
The notion of a sudden discharge of accumulated tensions of the psyche also 
plays a central role as far as repressed groups in society develop an acute sense of 
belonging, which humour helps them to advocate. According to Russian literary 
critic Mikhail Bakhtin, who published most of his work under a repressive 
authoritarian regime, the social ritual of carnival demonstrates this vividly. 
Bakhtin writes in his study of the medieval European novel, “during no other time 
more than at carnival, and even though only for a short while, the carnevalesque 
parody and self-parody of one’s outwardly-projected and/or internalized identity 
display to the world that folk laughter is knowing resistance to oppression from 
above” (Bakhtin, 1965: 2). He explains that the oppression is exercised by elites, 
who impose their dominant views and values on the oppressed under their rule 
(Bakhtin: 3-5). 
What can be inferred from Bakhtin’s connection between fictional carnival 
and a form of relief in actual reality is that cultural insiders need to adhere to the 
normative ways of their groups to benefit from the community’s social status or to 
signal loyalty. Any departure from the norms means a rejection of the authority 
over a cultural identity and is usually penalised. Yet, if a rejection of authority 
is not feared but instead intended because it elicits laughter temporally in the 
fictional realm as the expression of a constantly changed actual reality, then relief 
is the sign not of social suppression but of social progress. The different instances 




“Hast du schon mal einen Türken einen Kinderwagen schieben sehen?”
“Have you ever seen a Turk push around a pram?” 1
—Marion Martienzen to her daughter Patritzia “Titzi” (in Kebab Connection, 2005)
Summary
Culture clash cinema originates from fish-out-of-water comedies, which go straight to 
the heart of perceptions of Turkish German Muslims as Other. Clash comedy films 
usually depict a disenfranchised or disaffected individual whose rebellious stance against 
the rich and the powerful goes back to the American screwball comedies of the 1930s. 
Rebel and counter-culture protagonists of 1960s and mid-1970s comedy films in Western 
societies continued the refusal to assimilate into the majority society. They would not 
easily let go of their original identity. Only with the onset of the 1980s did a continuous 
line of films about the clash itself establish the genre of culture clash as a mass-cultural 
audience favourite. Workers and middle-class people in British cinema clashed over 
socio-economic differences while young women refused to conform to gender norms in 
the United States. Race issues featured prominently in the 1990s as non-white Americans 
and newcomer migrants to the US sought to normalise their marginalised identities.2 
It would take ten more years for Turkish German cinema to present its version of 
culture clash comedy in the new century with Anno Saul’s Kebab Connection (2005), 
which based the clash between first-generation immigrant Ibo and his girlfriend Titzi 
on Turkish and German gender models. This chapter suggests that Turkish German 
culture clash comedies have followed the structure of Anglophone precursors of the 
genre. Yet, filmmakers have added with great success political issues such as same-sex 
marriage (Evet, ich will!-Evet, I do, 2008) and aspects like urbanisation in Berlin (Meine 
verrückte türkische Hochzeit-Kiss me Kismet) to the clash genre and experimented with 
non-linear narratives and even elements of augmented realism (Almanya: Willkommen 
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in Deutschland-Almanya-Welcome to Germany, 2011). Turkish German culture clash 
comedies have evolved, and in only a short period they have become synonymous around 
the world with a new brand of transnational German cinema.
Ethnic Clash Films as Social Commentary
Culture clash comedies are most potent if they dramatise the theme of cultural 
tension pleasingly yet offer enough scope for the plot to work through the 
social context of why people and their values clash. The clash comedies in this 
chapter do this, too, to question and challenge essentialist notions of a migrant 
community’s perceived difference in its Germanness. Based on the generic 
structures of clash comedy film to turn that which makes us different into the 
joke itself, they giddily subsume Germans’ obsession with the boundaries of 
cultures and a preoccupation with difference in culture, sexuality, language or 
religion. This means that I will concern myself here mostly with examples of 
incongruity and superiority humour. Culture clash comedy appeals to a large 
audience, both majority and minority communities, by appropriating elements 
of foreignness and Otherness and developing new ones, such as hybrid, 
in-between, familiar, relatable or fusion. Those audiences who watch them and 
the filmmakers who produce clash comedy films find pleasure in the avoidance 
of being contained within a stereotype attached to a certain place in society 
or social status, as Halle (Halle, 2010) and Naiboglu (Naiboglu, 2018) have 
found. This makes Turkish German culture clash cinema doubly relevant, as 
the culture clash punchline is a delicate line to walk on for both the viewers and 
the producers. The makers of these films must consider that some audiences 
may consume the material at face value while other viewers may misunderstand 
what is supposed to be funny and at whose expense (Benbow, 2015). To portray 
colliding cultures through superiority, incongruity and relief humour generates 
plots and characters. They appear in the pairing of lovers, families and ethnic 
communities during romances, family celebrations or community rituals. 
The clash comedy which ensues offers an opportunity for social commentary 
and satire of societal issues. Though emphasising the “odd” identity versus 
the identity of the allegedly “normal community” has a precarious place in 
German ethnic humour. Culture clash comedy can play for cheap laughs while 
perpetuating racist attitudes and religious bias. Jewish Germans and Turkish 
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Germans have paid dearly for this flipside of anti-social ethnic humour, as I 
explained in the last chapter. 
The characteristics of the four films discussed in this chapter suggest that 
Muslimness is not a punchline pun. Neither is it a barrier. Just like non-Muslim 
Germanness, it is a platform to think about the feeling of being misunderstood. 
It is an opportunity to imagine multi-ethnic coexistence in the same country 
without the need for total assimilation. Within the arena of the popular culture 
industry, ethnic identity is not a joke unto itself if played for nuance. It is an 
opportunity to explore when and why culture clash occurs. Kebab Connection, 
Kiss me, Kismet, Evet, I do, and Almanya-Welcome to Germany use humour to 
critical comedic effect. Their range of topics shows how helpful popular culture 
cinema can be in fostering and sustaining a debate around a nation’s cultural 
identity. The communities contributing to it reflect through their representation 
on screen that there is joy in Otherness; that the positioning as Other and a clear-
cut identity per nationality is reductive; and that difference and diversity always 
rest in the eye of the beholder. 
Anglophone Precursors to Culture Clash in 
Turkish German Film 
Culture clash comedies are not mimetic representations of social realities. Hake 
argues that verisimilitude is also not the point of the genre. That the figure of 
the cultural outsider and insider follows a trajectory of confrontation and 
disillusionment is more important (Hake, 2013: 167). The collision between two 
communities creates a tension which invariably tests and confirms the limits of 
social change and progress. Clash comedies in Germany like Wolfgang Becker’s 
Goodbye Lenin-Good Bye, Lenin! (2003) have a history of framing the clashing 
characters’ self-images through German-specific events like labour migration and 
reunification (Hake, 2013: 168). Thus, it is important to situate the genre in a 
broader historical and functional context to address the specific form in which 
contemporary clash fictions make sense of specifically German affinities. German 
film directors such as Wim Wenders have already explored the Germanness of 
German national cinema in numerous feature productions since 1989 in “the 
search for authenticity, immediacy, and belonging and the desire for freedom and 
movement [which have led] to the feared disappearance of the real” (Hake: 168). 
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The Turkish German culture clash comedy films in this chapter act in service of 
the same agenda. 
The most important precursor to the clash motif in contemporary Turkish 
German comedy is a spate of 1970s and 1980s American films. Those works 
thematically involve “conflicting and clashing cultures or subcultural attitudes, 
perceptions and lifestyles” (Fuller and Loukides, 1991: 171). The majority of 
cinematic clash comedies in Germany’s cultural mainstream which have emerged 
since the 1990s have been following the popular American model of adopting 
and occupying existing stereotypes about certain groups or identities and 
exaggerating them to the point of absurdity (King, 2002: 152). Multicultural 
comedy in German cinema of the 1990s, as described in the introduction, is 
largely congruent with the mass-market norms of Hollywood-produced fictions. 
But Turkish German comedy has perhaps more than any other genre embraced 
America’s comedy antics of excessive and stylised caricatures of racial and ethnic 
essentialisation, as Halle’s study maintains in the context of German film after 
1989 (Halle, 2009: 40).
Some film scholars claim that the “line between exaggeration, parody, and a 
simple re-enactment of stereotypes is often hard to draw” (King, 2002: 153), which 
makes it difficult to determine the influence of earlier clash comedy formats on later 
ones. Here, however, the motivation of Turkish German culture clash comedy to 
subvert reductive perceptions of an identity as a woman, as a non-Westerner or as 
a Muslim does go back to America’s multiculture and clash comedy cinema. There 
is a fine line between pro-social and anti-social comedy, and its function as sword 
and shield, as I described in chapter one. In the heyday of culture clash cinema 
in the United States, this became apparent in the underlying self-consciousness 
of the Other as someone who lives outside the dominant community. In most 
instances the Other’s awareness of cultural difference is explicitly marked as a self-
parodic routine, as illustrated by the black American comedian and actor Eddy 
Murphy. Murphy adopts a clumsy “dumb black” behaviour to outsmart racist 
white criminals as Axel Foley in the Beverly Hills Cops film series (1984-1994). 
Then there is Chicano celebrity Richard “Cheech” Marin, who undermines any 
realism in the Mexican-American image of the “lazy Latino” in his Cheech and 
Chong stoner comedies (1978-1984). Or we have Jewish-American comedy star 
Mel Brooks, who reaffirms his permanent displacement from America’s cultural 
“WASP” (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) mainstream as a Jewish-Indian chief in 
Blazing Saddles (1974) (King: 152). All this reverberates in the comedy aesthetics 
of Turkish German culture clash comedies. 
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The hostility between characters with different cultural identities living in the 
same country is the main focus of culture clash comedies, though there are some 
variations.3 Comedy provides the genre with a safety net to explore, for example, 
antagonisms based on religious bias and ethnic difference without controversy 
or violation of public norms when material or language is used which might 
otherwise be impossible, or at least highly controversial, to include. The scandal 
surrounding Sarrazin’s books vividly illustrates the difference between fictional 
discourse and reality. The audience of culture clash, however, expects a prejudiced 
viewpoint and permits it under the premise that the trading of insults, fights and 
controversies will help to improve the initially hostile relationship between the 
clashing identities with the possibility of a redemptive experience (Kopp, 2014: 
61). Despite the unwillingness of culture clash “to develop and dwell on the dark 
side of comedy” (Fuller and Loukides: 171), the clash treatment makes it possible 
to read even the most insulting rant or ethnic slur as an entertaining commentary 
on societal tensions between groups. Culture clash, with some exceptions, also 
usually emphasises family-friendly comedy and focuses less on graphic images 
and explicitly sexual or violent themes due to censorship concerns (Fuller and 
Loukides: 176). As I show in chapter five, this is radically different with social 
media and streaming platforms like YouTube. 
Culture clash comedy films are a representation of social consciousness. The 
format has become centred on forms of cultural self-defence and on resistance to 
being placed in a social position rather than placing oneself in it. It turns on the 
unwillingness to being reduced to a cliché and the awareness of identity typing. 
Gurinder Chadha’s British culture clash blockbuster, Bend It Like Beckham 
(2002), proved at the beginning of the new century that the tried and tested clash 
comedy formula has remained popular with audiences. While Benbow rightly 
suggests that not all culture clash films are able to convey a critical message 
to the audience if viewers consume the material at face value (Benbow, 2007: 
519), the development of culture clash has always included the undermining 
of social inequality and a support of social change (Fuller and Loukides: 170). 
The interaction of disenfranchised and disaffected figures, who butt heads with 
antagonistic characters of higher social rank, is an exemplary feature central to 
a strain of regional-themed satire and black humour films in the Hollywood 
cinema of the 1980s. These films in turn refer to the US screwball and romance 
comedies of the 1930s and the social rebel and counter-culture films of the 1960s 
and early 1970s (Fuller and Loukides: 170). There is an element of social progress 
in every one of them. 
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Not all comedy clash films are the same, but all share the genre’s most 
fundamental plot element. There is the chance encounter and conversation 
between allegedly polar opposites such as conservative males and eccentric 
women, blacks and whites, criminals and cops, Jews and Christians, the fringe 
of society and the core, rigid conservatives and cultural progressives, the poor 
and the affluent, and the domestically encultured and the societal newcomers. 
Germany is now experiencing a heyday trend similar to the American one with 
the culture clash comedies of Turkish German cinema, which “[far] from merely 
‘aiming’ to please,’ […] challenge even smug progressives, consumers of ethnic 
difference who fail to recognize their own perpetuation of racist traditions” 
(Benbow: 519).
Kebab Connection as Cultural Re-Mixing
Cultural conventions are a central element in culture clash comedy. They are 
highly revealing of power relations and of dominant values in society (Fuller 
and Loukides, 1991). Anno Saul’s Kebab Connection (2005) explores their 
subversion by mixing a diverse set of characters across cultural boundaries in 
German society. This exploration of undoing cultural homogeny and the film’s 
multicultural imagery make Kebab Connection an important opportunity to 
“examine the place of the Turkish diaspora […] within a transnational rather 
than a national context” (Cooke and Homewood, 2011: 4). The film’s young 
hero is an aspiring filmmaker and screenwriter named Ibrahim “Ibo” Secmez. 
He was born in Germany as the second child to Turkish guest worker parents. 
He is in love with a native German woman called Patritzia “Titzi” Martienzen. 
Titzi is an aspiring young actor who studies for her entry exam to a prestigious 
acting school in Hamburg where both characters live. It is Ibo’s quest to make 
the first German Kung-Fu film. Meanwhile, Titzi is obsessed with acting and 
religiously memorises the German translation of Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet 
as her audition monologue. They are already in a romantic relationship at the 
beginning of the film. Their different cultural backgrounds could not hinder 
their bonding and developing affection for each other over a shared passion for 
the arts. They frequently meet in one of Hamburg’s outer districts, the so-called 
Schanzenviertel, to discuss their dreams.4 Tizi wants to have a career as an actress, 
whereas Ibo sees his future in directing transnational fusion films. 
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Kebab Connection opens with one of the cinema commercials Ibo produces 
for his Turkish German uncle. The uncle owns a small Turkish takeaway called 
“King of Kebab” in the heart of the “Schanze”. Despite the popularity of Ibo’s 
commercials with local audiences and although he can cast his lover Titzi as the 
female lead in most of the short productions, he aspires to more than making 
money with advertisements. The 21-year-old cinephile wants to fuse the aesthetics 
of East Asian film classics, more precisely the Kung-Fu feature films starring his 
idol Bruce Lee, with the realities of migrant life in Hamburg. Ibo thinks he can 
establish himself internationally as a global filmmaker that way. His dream of film 
auteurism rests largely on his ability to mix elements from different cultures in a 
funny and cool way without turning the East-West fusion into a farce for cheap 
laughs. This premise captures the basic attitude of Turkish German comedy clash 
films. It suggests that a mixing of identities should be open to reinterpretations 
and creative experiments grounded in pop culture.5 Kebab Connection’s opening 
scene illustrates this with a fierce Kung-Fu fight between an AfroGerman man 
and a Turkish German man over the last delicious Döner at “King of Kebab”.6 
The Kung-Fu scene immediately references the notion of multiculturalism as 
a form of unexpected incongruity. Two non-white characters inhabiting roles 
common to popular Asian cinema have the humour in the introductory scene 
tread a fine line between tradition and innovation. However, the lack of what 
is presumed to be ethnically correct casting for this commercial styled as Asian 
Kung-Fu is no coincidence. Identities in Kebab Connection constantly bring up 
questions about politically correct or appropriate behaviour while they clash 
in contexts of cultural re-remixing. Ibo’s fusion identity as a Turkish German 
man is scrutinised the most. Other characters who represent culturally diverse 
Germanness are also critical of the norms around ethnic identities, much more so 
than any Germans who think of themselves as historically “native”. Some of those 
German characters who think of themselves as native German are happy to stick 
to racist clichés as established knowledge about German society. Titzi’s German 
mother, Marion, is eager to reduce Ibo to the stereotype of the Turkish male 
chauvinist referred to in the quotation at the beginning of this chapter. Yet, some 
Turkish Germans are also equally reluctant to accept Ibo’s lifestyle choices. His 
parents repeatedly push him to take up an allegedly traditional Turkish German 
blue-collar trade, like being a mechanic in a garage or working as a butcher in a 
halal meat processing plant. When it comes to gender, some Turkish German 
men find it hard to deal with Ibo as an artist. Some refuse to accept that he is 
dating a non-Turkish woman. His “King of Kebab” advertisements however fly in 
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the face of all these restrictions on Turkish German hybridity outside the alleged 
norm. A wide range of cinemagoers enjoy Ibo’s innovative take on cultural fusion 
as it reverberates with their truth of living as Other yet not lesser German in 
multicultural Germany’s “Schanze” neighbourhoods. The wild mix of cultures in 
the Kebab ads encapsulates a critical comment on the creative labour of migrant 
filmmakers for which scholars have lauded the film’s scriptwriters, Fatih Akin 
and Anno Saul.
More elements of social critique have been recognised by now in Kebab 
Connection. Some researchers emphasise the clash comedy hit’s connections to 
other German films about hybridity with allegedly more highbrow substance. 
Hake sees striking similarities between Saul’s film and Dani Levy’s Jewish German 
comedy Alles auf Zucker!-Go for Zucker (2004). She points out that both films 
pursue a complex investigation of contemporary hybridities in German society 
(Hake, 2008: 218). Because it makes a powerful statement about the difficulty 
of translating other cultures and languages into German contexts, Cooke and 
Homewood find conceptual parallels (Cooke and Homewood: 4) between 
Kebab Connection and Hans-Christian Schmid’s Polish German drama Lichter-
Distant Lights (2003). And, as in Distant Lights and Go for Zucker, both hybridity 
and border crossing between cultural communities feature prominently as the 
main themes in Saul’s film. Sometimes, though, the effect of the incongruity and 
superiority humour in Kebab Connection exaggerates the cultural clash framing 
in a way that only a light-hearted film comedy can. Kebab Connection’s younger 
target audience may be a reason for this. For example, the Kung-Fu fighters in 
the opening scene are evidently Afro-German and Asian German and speak 
perfect German. One fighter, though, even keeps on speaking after his head has 
been severed from his neck. He cannot stop praising the snack foods at “King of 
Kebab” for their glorious taste. 
Ibo’s filmmaking is an eclectic mix of different cinematic styles. This makes it 
harder for the older generation of Turkish Germans in Germany to understand 
his vision of a transnational cinema where ethnic difference borders on ethnic 
travesty. Ibo’s uncle and father still think of German and Turkish culture in discrete 
national and not hybrid transnational categories. Hence, they prefer tradition 
and expect Ibo to reproduce a Turkish cinematic culture which is plausible to 
them. Ibo’s uncle expresses this after watching a preview version of the Kung-Fu-
styled “King of Kebab: Two-for-One Döner” commercial with Ibo and Titzi. 
He dismisses the ad’s artistic value for its unusual aesthetics and is enraged by its 
production cost. As soon as the lights come back on in the shoddy surroundings 
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of a run-down cinema hall, he screams at the top of his voice at Ibo: “All my money 
went up on the screen?! All my money went up on the screen! This…! This is some 
of the worst stuff I have ever seen! And believe me, I’ve seen plenty of shit in 
my time!!! The 74/75 [football] season of Galatasaray, for instance!” The viewer 
sees Ibo cluelessly shrug off the reference to Turkish premier-league football, not 
least because the film fanatic has only the outward signs of a stock type, Turkish 
identity. While his name and his physical appearance reference Turkishness, Ibo 
lacks the knowledge about Turkey’s favourite national sport, command of the 
Turkish language and Turkish cinema. He would need all that to be accepted as 
a real Turk, a real man, and arguably as an artist, by Turkish Germans like his 
older uncle. It is telling for the clash between Ibo’s and his uncle’s Turkishness and 
knowledge about Turkish culture that Ibo was not even born in 1974. 
There are more demands for an impossible allegiance to authentic Turkishness 
and loyalty to one’s cultural traditions throughout the film. Ibo’s reactions to 
them stress the importance of the transnational mindset with which the makers 
of Turkish German culture clash approach the mixing of ethnic identities and 
national cultures. For instance, Ibo calms Titzi down after she angrily labels the 
outburst of Ibo’s uncle as “total crap, because [Ibo] worked on this commercial for 
three months like a madman and it is genius”. “And the thing is, I don’t even like 
Döner”, he responds with a smirk and thanks Titzi later with a kiss for coming 
to his defence. As Ibo’s uncle storms off, the lovers assure each other of their 
creative and artistic talents as director and actor, respectively. Their transnational 
artistry bridges the alleged culture gap between Germans and Turkish Germans 
and forms the basis for the titular “Kebab Connection”. This represents the core 
of my work here, showing that all cultures residing in the country are equally 
representative of Germany’s diversity in the 21st century. 
Of course, this is only the first ten minutes of the film. Saul waits to bring on 
the real clash test for the romantic link between the couple. As the plot moves 
on, Titzi finds out that she is pregnant. The responsibilities of parenthood force 
her and Ibo to reflect on their identities in more complex and less romanticised 
terms. This places Kebab Connection in the broader tradition of the so-called 
New German Comedies, because the film provides an amusing but at the same 
time very informative window onto “the changing norms for gender and mixed 
families in Germany [which] we could first see in Doris Dörrie’s groundbreaking 
comedy [Männer-]Men (1985)” (Ferree, 2012: 13).
Ibo’s and Titzi’s romantic relationship is based on a love for cinema. This premise 
suggests that migrant identities in Germany are flexible and that it should be easy 
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for everybody to live together if they have a shared goal. However, the reality 
of an unplanned pregnancy means that the couple must suddenly agree on life-
altering decisions, testing the idea of easy multicultural differences while arriving 
at that shared goal. The plot twist reminds the viewer that much work and many 
clashes still lie ahead for German society.7 That message plays out in various ways. 
One is the presentation of non-German culture commodities the “Schanze” 
offers to its residents like a multicultural buffet. There is food (Turkish kebab), 
fashion (Albanian headgear), dance and music (Sirtaki at the Greek Tavern) and, 
of course, language (Italian, Turkish and Greek). In line with Sieg’s analysis of 
ethnic Others as “the fetishized objects of profitable multicultural industries” 
(Sieg, 2002: 254), one could say that Germans were premature in claiming a 
multicultural success story. The constant rivalry between the Turkish eatery of 
Ibo’s uncle and the Greek restaurant across the street can be read as a projection 
of how the Germans’ naïve vision of “multi-culti” clashes with the sober reality of 
ethnic coexistence. The diversity in German society is not necessarily integrated 
on a deeper level in the country’s public spaces or in the private sphere. 
It is a problem for multicultural societies to sustain social cohesion. The 
relationship of Ibo and Tizi demonstrates this vividly. The two lovebirds regard 
their intercultural romance as perfect. That is until the prospect of having a 
baby requires them to negotiate their cultural belonging through profound 
introspection. Kebab Connection constructs the need for its characters to confront 
their own identities. They achieve this by immersing themselves in cultural 
references, the building blocks of who they are at their core. The process suggests 
to viewers that long-term reconciliation between clashing cultures depends 
more on the critical thinking of individuals than on multicultural platitudes, 
as observed by Ebert and Beck (Ebert and Beck, 2007: 92). Ibo’s drug-induced 
nightmare after breaking up with Titzi, triggered also by a fight with his father 
over Turkish tradition, bears this out. It warns the audience against consuming 
interculturality only at a superficial level, which is the stereotypical knowledge 
one receives without critically interrogating it. 
Ibo’s vision has him running away from his role as a Turkish father and Turkish 
manhood. A previous flashback scene reveals that his father had instilled both 
concepts into him since early childhood. A generous amount of pot immobilises 
Ibo, so he cannot move and is forced to confront the different expectations and 
cultural roles pulling at him. Finally, he ends up crashing from the marijuana 
high and sees Titzi on the street with a baby’s pram. Another scene has already 
shown men pushing prams as the symbol of Ibo’s idea of emasculation. He calls 
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after Titzi and begs her to her stay as she walks away. The pram is important. 
The viewer will see it again at the end of the film after Ibo has refashioned it 
in his cinema prop shop. Ibo’s version of a baby’s pram is uniquely his, neither 
conventional nor afraid to draw attention to the person pushing it. It features 
a bronzed dragonhead, welded-on metal wings and a dragon tail made of steel. 
“A sick ride! It’s cool and comes with an extra diaper bag”, he explains excitedly 
as he presents it to Titzi. As Ibo describes his creation, the joy he finds in the 
redesign of the pram eventually invokes relief humour like the other clash films I 
discuss. Ibo finds amusement in the redefinition of his identity as a father instead 
of being frustrated and acting out aggressively like the clichéd character of a 
Turkish German man. 
Saul suggests to the viewer that the process of self-reflection is crucial and 
needs to be profound to achieve a happy end. After the image of Titzi leaves Ibo’s 
drug hallucination, he thinks he has come to but is still hallucinating. The figure 
of Bruce Lee suddenly appears to teach the Turkish German a life lesson and to 
bring him enlightenment—though one might be surprised that Lee fits into Ibo’s 
bar fridge. After the transition to a dark environment, there is only a spotlight to 
shine brightly in the centre. It looks like the theatre stage Titzi performs a Juliet 
monologue on in preparation for drama school. Lee, the Kung-Fu icon, explains 
to Ibo, “Every step on a steep path reduces the journey. Stepping onto the top of 
the mountain makes the mountain disappear”. Ibo does not understand how this 
Kung-Fu wisdom applies to his situation, prompting the Asian sage to simplify 
the proverb for his Turkish German disciple: “Show her that you are a man. Go 
to a Lamaze class!”. 
That Bruce Lee and not the Prophet Mohammed guides Ibo refers again to 
an incongruous transnational imaginary in the context of modern Turkishness 
in Germany. The advice of the Asian icon, whose role as a messenger and wise 
man one could liken to that of the friar in Romeo and Juliet, motivates Ibo to 
overcome the cliché of the Turkish macho. Ibo follows Lee’s instruction and 
enrols in a pre-natal parenting course. The Lamaze classes signal to the viewer 
a turn of events and that the happy end is near. For now, though, as another 
instance of incongruity humour, Ibo’s best male friend takes Titzi’s place. He is 
another male, second-generation migrant born to parents from Albania. The 
unusual Turkish-Albanian couple, two young men who pretend to be expecting 
a baby, raises eyebrows in the antenatal class. It also aligns Ibo’s initial view on 
stereotypical Turkishness with the German audience’s preconceived ideas about 
two Schanzenviertel migrants. But Ibo’s drug vision, along with the ironic nod 
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to Bruce Lee as a “racial noble Other like Karl May’s Winnetou” (Sieg, 2009: 
223), wipes the slate clean. The young Turkish German man can finally accept 
that identity formation is a complex process and that he needs to find his own 
way. Similarly, German viewers without the lived experience of migration can 
understand that they also should consume ethnicity more critically.
One could argue that the word connection in the title encapsulates the film’s 
central message about the acceptance of different identities as well as their 
complex fusion. As I have described, the re-connection of characters despite 
incongruities is a central feature of culture clash. Saul uses it effectively. While 
older Turkish and German characters have difficulty accepting a mixing of 
Turkish and German identities, younger characters are more likely to think of 
their identity as a diverse construction. Social innovation is something Kebab 
Connection’s clash plot foregrounds and on which its comedy trades. The down-
side of being stuck in one’s ways when it comes to an imagined authenticity of 
being Turkish or German or another nationality is made explicitly clear as the 
target of ridicule in Saul’s film. Characters like Ibo’s uncle and his father are 
suspicious of his liminal identity as a Turkish German Kung-Fu filmmaker. They 
try to instil in him a sense of Turkish belonging as the husband of a “nice Turkish 
girl” and refuse to accept that he will have “a child with a German, an infidel”. 
Kebab Connection suggests that people can change and that taking on board 
other cultures is okay. How Ibo’s uncle and father change their minds illustrates 
the integrationist idea of culture clash comedy. They end up wanting him to be 
a hybrid filmmaker and father to a child whose mother has no Turkish identity. 
Though, while the uncle changes his mind only because Ibo’s commercials earn 
him money, the father changes his attitude because he is genuinely impressed 
with Titzi. She educates the first-generation migrant passionately about the 
equality principle of multicultures and thereby proves her Turkish qualities: “[a] 
love that knows no borders and no differences”—and she asks him, “How could 
this be wrong?” “Turkish fire like girls from Anatolia”, Ibo’s father mumbles to 
himself long after the young woman is gone. Here, Titzi quotes lines similar to 
Juliet’s plea for borderless love in the fifth scene of the first act of Romeo and Julie. 
The irony of this is not lost on viewers familiar with the Shakespeare classic. 
Saul’s film makes a statement about the transnational development of art. One 
can see that the fading of boundaries leads to productive mixing of highbrow and 
lowbrow in the cultural context in which the transformation of other characters 
around the protagonists appears. There is a proliferation of ethnic diversity. There 
is also an acknowledgement that one can be authentically Turkish or German, 
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a valid artist or a good parent in many ways. This addresses all the characters’ 
affinity for stereotyping themselves and others. The clash narrative emphasises 
that people can do away with clichés just as easily as they accept them. For 
instance, in a scene after Ibo’s drug high before the finale, Ibo is sceptical of his 
father, who wants him to reconcile with Titzi after first rejecting her: “I get in a 
fight with Titzi because she is a German and she is pregnant with my child, and 
you kicked me out because of that. And now you tell me I did the wrong thing 
and that I let her down?” “Yes”—the father responds smugly with a grin on his 
face. Ibo replies, utterly perplexed yet with visible relief, “Those Turks are barking 
mad!” 
Kebab Connection’s cultural remixing does not fully resolve all culture-clash 
problems. Some of the social tensions between Turkish Germans and Germans 
remain. Cultural hybridity and Turkish German liminality happen only within 
the boundaries of the multi-ethnic “Schanze” despite the happy end. Titzi’s and 
Ibo’s union emerges from the union of the fictional couple in Ibo’s last Kung-Fu 
commercial, and it blurs the boundaries between film and reality. That act of 
crossing borders is celebrated only in the context of the hybrid space of “King 
of Kebab” and Hamburg’s migrant district. This suggests to the viewer that 
the acceptance of alternative identities is still only tenuous. The alternative 
identities represented in the form of interethnic relationships and their fictional 
representations, as indicated by Ibo’s transnational film aesthetics, are innovative 
connections in German multiculture. However, not everybody is ready to 
embrace them. 
Reversed Roles in Meine verrückte türkische  
Hochzeit-Kiss me Kismet
The theme of modelling cultural diversity continues in Stefan Holtz’ Kiss me 
Kismet (2006). The story of the culture clash comedy centres on Götz Schinkel, 
who is the last of two native Germans in Berlin Kreuzberg. At least, that is 
what his  best friend, who also narrates the story through voiceover, tells the 
viewer at the beginning of the film: “Berlin Kreuzberg-Little Istanbul. You’re a 
minority here as a German. We two are the last ones, and we’ll keep the flag 
flying”, he gravels in his deep baritone as if he were narrating the introduction 
to one of Sergio Leone’s cliché-laden Spaghetti Westerns. Götz is the owner of 
a small speciality store for vinyl records. He is obsessed with music and lives for 
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his nights as a club DJ. The backdrop to the story of Götz, the hip young man 
with a trendy haircut and skinny jeans, is a culturally diverse neighbourhood. 
Turkish and Arabic are the dominant languages here. Streets are populated with 
exotic fruit stalls, spice vendors and all kinds of culinary takeaways. The jury who 
awarded the film the 43rd Adolf Grimme Award for outstanding German film 
and television in 2007 wrote this about that feature of the film: 
German film can also be different. “Kiss me Kismet” does away with a couple 
of dozen prejudices which Germans and Turks in Berlin-Kreuzberg and in 
other places have. […] It is so funny, fast-paced, full of comedy and gags, it 
can easily keep up with your big American cinema blockbusters, from “My 
Big Fat Greek Wedding” to ‘High Fidelity” to “Notting Hill”. Others may 
try to avoid cultural clichés: “Kiss me Kismet” emphasises them instead in 
order to find pleasure in poking fun at them with nuanced irony or hard-
handed gags.8
The first scene of Holtz’ film includes wide-angled shots of Berlin’s skyline. The 
director uses a split-frame technique to suggest that German high-rises, glass 
and steel constructions, can blend in seamlessly with Muslim mosques and the 
towers of small minarets. The panning movement of the camera then focuses 
on the gritty urban grounds of Kreuzberg’s concrete towers in Berlin’s migrant 
housing estate. The multicultural neighbourhood is covered in a sea of satellite 
dishes, connecting a million television sets in Germany via satellite to a wide 
range of free Turkish-, Arab- and Asian-language channels every night (Göktürk, 
Gramling and Kaes, 2007: 332). Ibo’s parents in Kebab Connection live in a similar 
neighbourhood.9
The initial shots present the cultural cartography of Kiss me Kismet and they 
give details of Götz’ environment. Spray-painting youths are covering walls with 
colourful graffiti. Young children play football in alleyways. There are many 
adult and older men and women, marked as Muslim and dressed in Western 
plainclothes, business casual, veils and headscarves. Their ethnic difference is 
not emphasised by stereotypical Oriental sounds or garments meant to indicate 
an association with Muslim fashion. British cult clash comedies like East Is 
East (1999) start out that way to mark British spaces as occupied by Muslim 
Others. While Götz strides through the diverse crowd of his multi-ethnic 
neighbourhood, face beaming with the joys of having all kinds of Turkish and 
Arab deli foods at his fingertips, the Berlin hipster runs into two youths who 
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bully a small boy. It is the first time that the viewer sees the tensions of culture 
clash at play in the film. 
Holtz uses the scene to introduce Götz as a foreigner. The German encounters 
two young men and a boy who speak Turkish. It is a language Götz cannot speak 
or understand. The linguistic aspect stresses his Otherness together with his 
expensive leather jacket, blond hair, blue eyes, pale skin, lanky body and towering 
height. Speaking German and referenced by his appearance and language as 
a  non-Turkish  figure in the film, Götz would like to intervene in the fight in 
order to  show that he cares about his neighbourhood. The bullies dislike his 
involvement. One pulls out an impossibly large Crocodile Dundee knife and 
threatens Götz before the two thugs take off at speed. Instead of thanking the 
German man for his help, the young boy who was bullied purposely pushes Götz 
aside as he runs away, too. What relieves the tension humorously in this scenario 
is the voice of the narrator who shrugs off the incident as Götz’ inability to face 
the reality of his environment: “Oh well, from the looks of it, Götz has still not 
learned how things work here. He’s just too nice for this world”. Götz dusts 
himself off in the meantime and gets on with his day.
The scene considers how German majority society can react to changing 
definitions of its spaces and cultural boundaries. Both Götz’ reaction and the 
narrator’s comment promote alternative solutions to negative emotions such as 
fear and anger in response to a society in transition. The actions of the Turkish-
speaking thugs and the Turkish-speaking boy also draw attention to Götz’ inability 
to interfere as a native German in cultural affairs he cannot fully understand. He 
must accept his position as an outsider and trade on Turkish expectations of his 
Otherness to participate in the cultural milieu of Kreuzberg. This means that 
somebody needs to mediate the clash context of Berlin’s Little Istanbul for him 
and translate what the disputes among Turks involve. That part goes to the other 
main character in Kiss me Kismet, a young woman named Aylin. She explains to 
Götz, after ending a brawl between Turkish German men and him in another 
scene, what he misunderstood about the three Turkish German boys: “[w]ith 
Turks it’s all about honour and keeping face. It’s not real, it’s all just for show”. 
Aylin is a beautiful young woman with Mediterranean features, long dark hair 
and dark eyes. It is a purposeful aesthetic construction. I expound on in greater 
detail in chapter four with the example of Hatice Akyün’s chick-lit novels. Weber 
calls such sexualised fantasies of the Oriental woman’s body functional count-
discursive tropes of Turkish German female bodies and identities. They relate 
to earlier German films which showed Turkish German women as the exotic 
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Other, a desirable non-white object for male Germanness (Weber, 2013: 144). 
German men like Götz had to protect it against the violent abuse of Muslim 
men, which fed right back into the cliché depiction of Muslimness and Turkish 
German gender roles as described in the reductive Turkish German drama films 
mentioned in the introduction. 
Kiss me Kismet shows Aylin to be more than just a token character. She is no 
damsel in distress and needs no saving. In fact, the eloquent lawyer intervenes 
in both Turkish and German and ends the violence quickly when Götz gets 
involved in a clash between his German co-worker and the Turkish shop-owners 
right outside his record store. He goes down with a head-butt to his face while 
Aylin does not even break sweat in perfect makeup and high-heeled stilettos. The 
humour in this scene relies on the viewer’s knowledge that Götz is a hopeless 
romantic. The audience may laugh at the aggression of ethnic Others because 
it serves to ridicule Götz’ act of German chivalry. Viewers can simultaneously 
admire Aylin’s ability to control the violent group of male Muslims because of 
her Turkish identity. As Aylin shoos the men away like children while Götz is 
ridiculed by them in the previous scene, the clash comedy plot harks back to 
conflict resolution through its trademark reversal of roles. This convention of the 
culture clash comedy genre emerges early in the film as a critique of gender roles 
and ethnic as well as male superiority.
The reversal of roles also frames the clash between familiar and unfamiliar 
cultural spheres. One can read the brawl scene as a criticism of German cinema’s 
Eurocentric attitudes. Stepping into what the film construes as Muslim Berlin 
draws attention to Götz’ German exoticism by conspicuously contextualising 
it during his everyday routine. His daily walk to his workplace is part of that. 
The viewer sees numerous shots of men with Mediterranean features talking in 
rapid Turkish and Arab while the camera walks with Götz at eye level. During 
the brawl in front of his shop, the camera catches glimpses of older onlookers 
wearing kaftans and full beards. All this stresses the juxtaposition of Götz and his 
ethnically diverse neighbours. In contrast, the German’s clothes are indeed very 
similar to the Western designer labels worn by most male leads in contemporary 
culture clash. Holtz adds to this jab at German male ego and being a white knight 
in shining armour with interspersed soundtrack hits from High Fidelity (2000) 
and Notting Hill (1999). As I detail in chapter four on Turkish German dick-
lit, both of these films are hallmarks of anti-macho messages during a period 
obsessed with constructing new masculinities as less toxic and less self-obsessed 
than the “Rambo 80s” ( Jeffers McDonald, 2007: 3). 
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Götz and Aylin develop romantic feelings for each other after their first 
encounter. The German, a DJ and music lover, is attracted to Aylin. His is a 
creative spirit and finds her outlook on life invigorating, especially her ability to 
maintain a work-life balance. Aylin enjoys life and hard work without losing out 
to late Western capitalism and turning into a corporate suit. In turn, she falls for 
Götz because he values artistic passion more than money in an embrace of the late 
1990s rom-com’s concept of tender millennial masculinity (Palmer, 2013: 122). 
Titzi loves Ibo in Kebab Connection for the same reason. This is, however, not 
to say that love conquers all in a naïve resolve of multicultural tensions. Despite 
their affection for each other, Götz and Aylin seem to put the interests of their 
families and friends before their own as the story unfolds. When they struggle 
to find common cultural ground, they give in to their cultural communities’ 
constant in-group pressures to stick with “people who are just a bit more like you 
and me”. Götz’ conservative German mother cites the line of “apples-to-apples” 
frequently to discourage her son from pursuing Aylin. Though Götz and Aylin 
fall for each other regardless. 
Just as do Ibo and Titzi over their passion for filmmaking, Kiss me Kismet’s 
protagonists bond over a permeating creative force, which is music.10 This 
matters because music, just like the creative art of filmmaking and acting in 
Kebab Connection, decentralises certain stereotypes attached to gender, ethnicity 
and religion. The stereotype in Kiss me Kismet is that of the arranged marriage 
imposed on the Turkish German woman by her father and a male-dominated 
community. Aylin’s Turkish German wedding ceremony with her Turkish fiancé 
Tarkan who speaks only Turkish is constructed as reductive space for her ability 
to love freely.11 A music track exclusively created by Götz for Aylin highlights this 
further. It turns into the couple’s love theme during the film. Towards the end of 
the film, the theme plays on a small boom box at Aylin’s arranged wedding with 
Tarkan. Hearing the song compels Aylin to reunite with Götz after an interim 
break-up, hence foreshadowing a harmonious conclusion to the clash comedy. 
It is common for lovers in interethnic clash comedies to keep oscillating between 
culture and romance and alleged tradition and supposedly modern thinking. 
These films emphasise an initial incongruity or discord between characters and 
modulate it later into love or another form of productive togetherness. Happy 
ends happen if different ethnic life models combine without replicating their 
shortcomings and failures. Berghahn’s take on recent German film comedies 
with hybrid characters suggests that this impulse has come to dominate the 
genre. There is a rift between family loyalties or attachments to one’s ethno-
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cultural community and romantic love. The schism hints at culture as an implicit 
hierarchy of values German-speaking film audiences are now questioning 
through the motif of romance (Berghahn, 2013: 4). The cultural identities of 
clash comedy protagonists are deeply engrained in them, which makes it hard 
to be compatible with members outside one’s own community. This works as the 
main trope for ethnic culture clash. That one character complements the other 
is simply not enough to assimilate into another culture or community. Götz 
for instance grew up with a loveless German mother who put her career first, 
while Aylin rarely encounters loveable goofballs like this German DJ in Berlin 
Kreuzberg. Theirs is a love based on the romantic comedy clash logic of opposites 
attract. This appears to be Berghahn’s idea of “crossover appeal” (Berghahn, 2013: 
4) in family comedies with ethnic Otherness. It all turns on a greater sense of 
partnership if multicultural love between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, and not 
just a man and a woman, is to succeed. 
As its clash story unfolds, Kiss me Kismet becomes less interested in merely 
reproducing comedy tropes of Germanness or Turkishness. The more Götz 
and Aylin try to accommodate their future in-laws, their cultural customs, 
their religious beliefs and their cultural values, the more the couple fails to 
negotiate a genuine hybridity. According to Burns, Kiss me Kismet mocks the 
German “multi-culti” fantasy of performing Germanness or Turkishness until 
one is “desperately locked into that fantasy” (Burns, 2013: 57). Götz and Aylin 
arrive at this conclusion when they face exclusion from their families for a 
commodification of ethnic differences. They decide to circumcise Götz and have 
him convert to Islam while Aylin tries to teach her parents the ways of a proper 
German dinner conversation. The final scenes of the film reveal and ridicule 
these actions as the undue imposition of Otherness. They are superficial gestures 
at best. When Götz suffers from the removal of his foreskin in his skinny jeans in 
the office of the Imam who performed the procedure, Aylin’s father still refuses 
fully to acknowledge the German’s Muslimness: “Bin Laden will be Santa Clause 
before this ever happens!”, he says half-jokingly. Aylin fails just as much in trying 
to win over Götz’ mother with a non-halal German pork roast.
Holtz complicates the notion of respect for ethnic diversity with lovers who 
must be loyal to multiple identities. Quick-witted banter scenes between Götz 
and Aylin after their failure to be more German or Turkish draw attention to 
the simultaneous reproduction and exclusion of ethnic Otherness in German 
society. Instead of empowering intercultural relationships, the xenophobic 
attitudes towards cultural outsiders feature a problem of not only the German 
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majority but also the Turkish minority community. Aylin demonstrates this 
when she shouts at her parents for their rejection of Götz as a Muslim spouse, 
“Because all you care about is your fucking honour!”. As Ezli notes of the scene, 
“This scene, as all other scenes in the film, is resolved through comedy. However, 
closely attached to the immense visibility of Islam here is its immovable position, 
which is the real condition for Götz’ integration into the Turkish family” (Ezli, 
2013: 203). 
The from-two-different-worlds theme makes clear how important the 
introductory scene in Kiss me Kismet really is. “The culture war over taking on 
the Other as part of the Self ” (Ezli: 204) first happens here as a central element. 
Holtz repeats it in variations throughout the narrative. Goetz is mixed up in a 
stand-off among Turkish German youth. Then he becomes involved in a brawl 
among Turkish German men because of his inadequate knowledge of the Turkish 
concept of honour. Later he visits the home of Aylin’s parents where he commits 
one cultural faux pas after another because of his lack of Turkish language 
skills, knowledge of Muslim rituals and of Turkish cuisine. In the end, even the 
marriage between the German and the Turkish German characters happens 
amidst another street side brawl after Aylin tells Tarkan and her whole family 
in clear terms what she thinks about sacrificing love for Turkish tradition whilst 
dressed in a white wedding gown: “No!”—to which her father appreciatively 
remarks to his displeased wife in accented German, “No. Her favourite word”. 
Aylin’s rejection of what the film alleges to be Turkish tradition and certain 
family expectations foregrounds the subversive quality of culture clash. She 
rejects a Turkish spouse by speaking in German. At the same time, she asserts 
herself as an independent Turkish German woman. Despite its lack of nuance 
regarding cultural diversity within Turkish German culture and tradition, the 
general thrust of this comedic clash scene bears out a disruption or rejection 
of the audience’s general knowledge about ethnic diversity in Germany. Aylin’s 
actions turn Germans’ essentialising ideas about Islamic forced marriage and 
female Muslim victimisation on its head. Also, Götz, and even more so Aylin, 
find relief from ethno-cultural normativity because they behave in ways in 
which no authentic Turkish woman or real German man should act; that 
is at least according to Götz’ racist friend, Horst, and Aylin’s extremist uncle, 
Melek. Götz and Aylin may experience cultural bias because of their innovative 
behaviour. Still, the couple is willing to stick it out through brawls, insults and 
a fight with Tarkan’s angered family members until there is a happy end. That 
dedication implies that Germans and Turkish Germans must consume ethnicity 
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with a multicultural appreciation for diversity and problems along the way if they 
expect any form of positive co-existence. 
There is religious bias in Kebab Connection, just as there are the racist friend 
of Götz and the prejudiced uncle of Aylin in Kiss me Kismet. Both suggest that 
Mandel’s idea of cosmopolitan anxieties is the flipside of openness towards social 
change (Mandel, 2008). Götz’ and Aylin’s impromptu wedding in the back of 
a VW beetle demonstrates this. It is the final scene of the film. Götz and Aylin 
appreciate each other’s presence because both have proven that they are more 
open-minded than the fist-fighting crowd outside the car. Aylin’s father drags the 
Turkish Imam who officiated at her and Tarkan’s ceremony into the car. Even 
the Imam recognises the borderless love between the intercultural couple and 
blesses it in the eyes of Allah. This marks the interior space of the VW Beetle, 
a quintessential German car, as emphatically transnational. Individuals in this 
space are free from stereotypical expectations about cultural norms and their life 
partners. 
However, the ending remains ambiguous. The couple may or may not get to live 
out its cultural hybridity and its clash romance as part of the wider community in 
Berlin Kreuzberg (Ezli, 2006). Kebab Connection also leaves viewers unsure about 
the likelihood of greater change in Germany’s society outside the multi-ethnic 
neighbourhood of the Schanze. As it is with Ibo and Titzi, all ends well for the 
clash comedy protagonists in Kiss me Kismet, too: that is they can live as a couple. 
Yet, the cultural transformation around Götz and Aylin is significantly limited 
to the interior of the car in which they get married. The people outside are still 
fighting and fail to recognise that their aggressive energies could be rerouted to 
serve a much better, socially productive purpose than to clash violently.
Cultural Redefinitions of Evet, ich will!-Evet, I do
A third culture clash comedy to complicate the integration of ethnic Otherness 
in Germany is Sinan Akkuş’ Evet, I do (2008). The wedding-themed comedy 
centres on three couples. They form a diverse ensemble of characters with varied 
ethnic identities and sexual orientations. As with the protagonists in Kebab 
Connection and Kiss me Kismet, this links the film’s representation of alterity to 
a self-conscious engagement with societal acceptance of difference. In Evet, I do, 
the Sunnite Kurd Coşkun and the Turkish Alevi Günay, the German Dirk and 
the Turkish German Özlem and the Turkish German Emrah and his German 
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boyfriend Tim, act as “brokers of cultural difference” (Berghahn: 8) when they 
respond “Evet”, or “Yes, I do” to their partners’ marriage proposals.12 Viewers 
hear these words during the first few minutes of the film. The phrase signals 
the beginning of a clash between the future spouses’ families, their cultural 
differences, and all their multiple attachments to a certain religion, a specific 
neighbourhood, a language, a tradition or a minority and majority community, 
respectively. 
Evet, I do revolves around the exposure of its characters’ identities to each 
other and to their communities. The stereotypical inscription of the characters 
with imagined identities clashes with their actual selves. None of the weddings 
can go ahead until this is resolved. Akkuş uses the characters’ intercultural clash 
dilemmas to comment on a defensive attitude towards inter-ethnic fraternisation 
in German society. It plays out as instances of superiority humour, which 
delegitimises some identities and validates others for the same reason. For 
instance, Coşkun and Günay indirectly clash over their ethnic backgrounds. 
Günay’s Kemalist father suspects Coşkun of Islamist extremism due to his 
Kurdish heritage. This is false. The liberal radio host Coşkun only stands in for 
his community’s conservative reputation. In yet another family context, Özlem’s 
parents insist that her daughter must marry a Muslim. This disqualifies Dirk and 
requires his conversion to Islam like Götz in Kiss me Kismet. And in the Turkish 
German neighbourhood of young Emrah, coming out as gay to his family is not 
an option for the closeted car mechanic. He presents boyfriend Tim to his father 
and mother as his best friend instead. As the wider context for the wedding 
motif, culture clash challenges and eventually disavows here the ethnic purity 
and compatibility test, which stands in the way of multicultural relationships.
The couples falsely assume that they need to hide their true identities to be 
accepted by and not to stir up controversy among other ethnic communities or 
in theirs. For characters such as Coşkun that assumption means downplaying 
his Turkishness and his identity as a Kurd, whereas Dirk needs to downplay his 
Germanness. The challenge for Emrah doubles in that regard. He needs to hide 
his homosexuality and his relationship with a German man from his Turkish 
German family and his Turkish German father, who is unsupportive of men 
being proudly gay. However, the pretence only works on a superficial level. 
The gay closet trope of “butching up”, and that of “Turking up” or “Turking 
down”, respectively, indicate that hiding alleged difference turns out to be less 
satisfying than probing its interstices. Berghahn and Sternberg correctly outline 
this realisation under the rubric of “the redemption of the marginal” (Berghahn 
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and Sternberg, 2010: 41). Other and more social issues connected to identity 
and belonging are raised as well in recent German comedy cinema with films 
like Maren Ade’s Toni Erdman (2016) and David Wnendt’s Er ist wieder da-Look 
Who’s Back (2015). There are claims that issues of race, colour, nationality, religion, 
ethnicity, regionality, language, generation, class, gender and sexuality still divide 
society. The clash plot of Evet, I do refers to them all. 
Akkuş makes it very clear that his point of view is about a critique of 
normativity. He also leaves no doubt with his bilingual film title that there is a 
difference between communities, which one cannot deny. Rather than catering 
to the notion of superior and inferior identities, the filmmaker teaches the 
audience how to find joy in not fitting into established categories and coming 
out as something Other. His characters play a host of stereotypical roles for all 
they are worth to make this point. They deliver over-the-top performances of 
ethnic, linguistic, religious and sexual identities they assume others to expect of 
them. To put on an identity performance is a popular feature of culture clash as 
described above. It is a big part of the meet-the-parents scenes of Evet, I do. They 
prelude the actual weddings of Coşkun and Günay, Dirk and Özlem, and Dirk 
and Emrah, though only Dirk’s and Özlem’s wedding is included in the film. The 
Turkish wedding and the gay wedding never make it on to the screen. 
Initially, Günay’s father foils Coşkun’s wedding plans. The widower and 
devout secularist refuses to entrust his only daughter “to a religious fanatic, 
who locks up his wife at home and forces her to wear a headscarf ! Your mother 
and I didn’t come to Germany for this”, he explains to his daughter in an angry 
and bitter tone. Coşkun refuses to give up. The father’s disapproval requires 
Akkuş’ most romantically minded groom to prove his cultural compatibility. 
Of course, that plan spirals out of control and turns into the actual danger for 
true romance to succeed. Coşkun follows his elderly Turkish uncle’s advice. 
Viewers may remember that red flag from Kebab Connection with Ibo’s uncle. 
Coşkun kidnaps his fiancé as a hyperbolic gesture of love. According to 
rural traditions in Turkey, so his uncle tells him, such gestures demonstrate 
the groom’s sincerity and should help to bring the future in-laws round. The 
allegedly authentic Turkish tradition does not work here. Instead it turns into a 
farcical performance somewhere between Hollywood gangster film and cheesy 
romance. In fact, it backfires. Coşkun appears less like a romantic and more like 
the cliché of the aggressive honour-killing Muslim when he stands with a toy 
gun in the apartment of Günay’s father. It takes only five minutes for German 
police to have him surrounded by a special weapons and tactics team. The police 
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arrest Coşkun for public endangerment and “for suspected attempt to take a 
hostage and resisting police authority”.
A similar, albeit less dramatic, mishap unfolds when Dirk’s parents accompany 
him on a visit to Özlem’s parents. For Dirk, and indeed for the viewer, Evet, I do 
confirms that purposeful catering to someone else’s ethno-cultural expectations is 
a disservice to one’s own identity. What Sieg calls “commodified ethnic mimicry” 
(Sieg, 2009: 231) leads to disappointment. Dirk shares Coşkun’s eagerness to act 
like an authentic Other and he recreates every step of a Turkish wedding ritual 
as conveyed to him by Özlem. Traditionally, as Özlem explains to Dirk in an 
earlier scene, the groom’s father must ask the bride’s parents to consent to the 
marriage.13 The performance fails and is already revealed as a charade while the 
couple make their way to Özlem’s parents. It starts with Dirk’s mother. She insists 
on wearing a headscarf without knowing how to wrap it properly. Dirk finds that 
the way she puts on the head covering makes it look as if she has run away from 
a peasant theatre troupe. Indeed, she ties the scarf into a thick simple knot under 
her chin rather than wrapping it artistically round her head. Dirk’s father shares 
his wife’s gift for stepping right into cross-cultural blunders. Where possible, he 
embarrasses his son with several of them. Berghahn argues convincingly that 
the father’s refusal to say the phrase, “We ask you for the hand of your daughter 
in the name of our Prophet”, is evidence of a native German society plagued by 
xenophobic sentiments (Berghahn, 212). The German father’s compromise of 
saying “in the name of A Prophet” illustrates this.
Akkuş delivers further criticism of a naïve form of easy multiculture with Tim’s 
and Emrah’s storyline. He draws attention to the inability of individuals to accept 
that there are ethno-cultural alternatives to established identities and lifestyles. 
Benbow describes the latter as “recognizable ethnic stereotypes” (Benbow, 529) 
which work in culture clash to contrast innovation in society, mostly in countries 
with diverse ethnic paradigms and migration histories. Akkuş uses well-known 
stock imagery from wedding comedy films to focus his poignant ridicule on the 
centrality of the heteronormative family. The light-hearted ending of a typical 
romantic comedy generally demands a festive celebration if a young man asks 
a young woman to marry him. However, Akkuş’ film takes a more sobering 
perspective on the idea of a transgressive couple, both gay and transnational. 
They need sympathy more than they would need conformity when saying I do 
and coming out to the family (Berghahn: 212-219).
The meet-the-parents scene with Emrah makes fun of normative thinking from 
the outset, his and that of his family. There is the idea of heterosexual masculinity, 
turkish german muslims and comedy entertainment84
which Emrah’s conservative Turkish German father ostensibly supports and sees 
as superior to that of homosexual men. The father’s attitude towards his son’s 
arranged marriage with a middle-class Muslim girl can also be described as 
outdated kinship thinking to safeguard the status quo, as I show in my discussion 
of Kiss me Kismet. The prospect of being married to a woman pushes Emrah into 
the climax of his clash narrative, which is a coming out scene. The fear of losing 
Tim and being caught in a sham marriage motivates Emrah to out himself in the 
living room of his bride-to-be’s parents. The arranged marriage would have suited 
her well. She had planned to trick the closeted homosexual into marriage and 
being a father to her unborn lovechild with her black American ex-boyfriend. 
Shouting and yelling ensues. The situation makes Emrah’s Turkish grandfather 
wonder how to fix his grandson’s faulty “sex organ in the head”. The grandfather, 
who came along to the proposal ritual, still ponders this question while Emrah’s 
father inspects a pin-up photo of his half-naked son. Emrah had planned to give 
the picture to Tim as a gift for the anniversary of their relationship. He drops the 
nude photo by accident as he storms out, only for his father to pick it up from 
the floor while general chaos ensues. The next scene then tops things off, as a nosy 
German neighbour uses the intercom system to call up to the apartment of the 
sneaky bride to be. As she leaves the living room and runs into the hallway, the 
intercom system rings and she answers. While all hell breaks loose around her, 
the neighbour tells her something which sets up yet another clash scenario: “At 
the door, there’s a negr … urrhm … eerrhmm … there’s a bla … oh well, blimey, so 
what do you call that now? HE IS FROM AFRICA”. It is the American father of 
her unborn child, who is black. 
Akkuş refuses to supply the viewer with easy solutions to complex social issues. 
The couples must deal with their families and figure out how to express and 
negotiate their cultural, religious, sexual and racial identities despite assumed 
superiorities or allegedly correct behaviours. Some norms remain firmly in 
place. The reaction of Emrah’s father to his son’s coming out and relationship 
with Tim illustrates this best. The German-born Turk asks Tim never to kiss his 
son in front of him. He forbids them to hold hands. Tim and Emrah also need 
to keep their relationship a secret from the wider Turkish German community. 
“They ain’t all as modern as I am. And besides, gays and cars don’t mix well”, the 
car mechanic says sternly. This does not correspond to Wartenberg’s definition 
of ethnic romance comedies as “unlikely couple films” where eventually love 
between individuals has love win out over tradition, too (Wartenberg, 1999: 7). 
In the same vein, Akkuş puts Coşkun under the constant surveillance of Günay’s 
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distrusting father, who believes Turkish Kurds are religious extremists and 
oppressive husbands. Also, through the failed engagement ritual with Dirk, Evet, 
I do’s director cures Özlem’s hopelessly romantic sister of her romantic delusions 
of a German prince to sweep her off her feet. Danielle Steel fantasies are one 
thing. Negotiating the realities of interethnic romance is quite another. 
Akkuş criticises the commodification of cultural traditions and Turkish 
diaspora through the three couples’ problems with established norms or assumed 
knowledge about certain identities. It goes to the heart of this culture clash 
comedy, which is that life in Germany has fossilised certain Turkish rituals and 
significant acts, reducing them to a short-lived performance and a couple of 
rehearsed lines. Coşkun performs a popular practice in regional Turkey like a 
Hollywood cliché. If anything, it turns out to be an obstacle to his father-in-law’s 
appreciation of him as an open-minded Muslim in Germany. Coşkun complains 
regularly about outdated traditions and Turkish machismo, but he still adheres 
to alleged authentic Turkish-Kurdish norms despite thinking of them as inferior 
and out of place. He simply reproduces them because he considers them a 
means to an end. Similarly, Dirk’s lack of critical self-consciousness motivates 
his performance of an equally superficial reproduction of Turkish masculinity 
and Turkish customs related to weddings. He pushes his parents to do the same, 
thereby ignoring their reluctance to act Turkish. Emrah seems to be the only 
character able to muster enough courage to stand up for his hybridity because he 
rejects playing the straight Turk. Cultural norms need critical redefinitions, and 
their performance must allow for diversity. That message plays out in Emrah’s 
unintended outing. He sobs like a child in the arms of his totally perplexed 
mother.
Evet, I do offers a less cohesive vision of a society in transition than other Turkish 
German culture clash comedies. This may explain why the film ends on an even 
more ambivalent note than Kebab Connection and Kiss me Kismet. Akkuş’s film 
encourages the mixing of different cultures and identities and portrays romance 
as an entertaining learning experience. Yet, it also suggests that nobody should 
surrender their individual identity or assume that assimilation is an easy path to 
authentic multiculturism. Some differences remain and new forms of Turkish 
German identity are still forming. At the end of the film, the character of the old 
Turkish man Songül delivers a zinger on this issue. He watches as Dirk’s mother 
performs a belly dance at her son’s wedding reception. Songül is a Turkish migrant 
who has lived in Germany for more than 50 years. He is part of the so-called first 
generation. His one-liner smacks of superiority humour: “Everything moves, but 
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the belly”. “Well”, responds a Turkish woman next to him, “it can’t be helped”. 
It is his Turkish wife, Nazime. Turkish German writer Emine Sevgi Özdamar 
plays that part in a rare on-screen appearance. In Turkish and with a giggle, her 
character adds before the film ends on a black fade-out, “That’s what a German 
belly dancer looks like”. 
Identities across Time and Space in Almanya-Willkommen in 
Deutschland-Almanya-Welcome to Germany
Another popular comedy critique of exoticising Muslim migrants in German 
film is Yasemin Şamdereli’s Almanya-Welcome to Germany (2011). Almanya 
uses culture clash to comment on ethnic identity role-play like the other three 
productions I have discussed. The film also highlights what Berghahn points to 
as “aesthetic strategies [in German film which] conform to mainstream Western 
generic templates instead of embracing a ‘diasporic optic’” (Berghahn: 168). 
Almanya’s storyline follows the Turkish German Yilmaz family. The clan’s three 
generations encompass a host of different identities. The first generation consists 
of Hüseyin and Fatma Yilmaz. They were born in rural Anatolia, growing up 
there in a small village. Hüseyin and Fatma are the parents of three boys and one 
daughter. Muhamed and Veli were born in Turkey. They came to Germany as 
children in the 1960s with their parents and their younger sister, Leyla. Ali, the 
youngest son, was born in West Germany in the 1980s. He is the only member of 
the second generation who cannot speak proper Turkish. His father never tires of 
reminding him of that. The second generation has produced four grandchildren, 
of whom the young Cenk, son to Ali and his German wife Gabi, and his cousin 
Canan are featured with central prominence as the clash film’s commentator and 
voice-over narrator, respectively.
The film tells the story of how Hüseyin and Fatma met in Turkey. Then they 
had three babies and came to Germany when the children were old enough for the 
journey. Almanya describes how Hüseyin arrived as a guest worker in Germany. 
He came on his own by train before later bringing over the family in a second-
hand Mercedes. The children and their mother settled into their new home in 
another society. The new residence included a German “water closet” or toilet. 
Fatma wonders what kind of furniture item this is. Other scenes depict language 
barriers and cultural customs, and some revolve around the iconography of 
Christianity. These are myriad clash moments for the viewers to laugh at as the 
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plot unfolds. They also set up the context for the film’s use of flashbacks and 
foreshadowing when the whole family comes together for a nice Sunday brunch 
in what the story action marks as the present. Here, an elderly Hüseyin declares 
to the rest of the family that he has bought a house in Turkey and that they are 
all going on a road trip back to the old “Heimat”: “Family, I have surprise! I have 
bought house. In Turkey. In Sommer, we all go together there”, he lets them know 
with a big smile on his face. 
The patriarch’s idea of a return home to Turkey is a one-sided love affair. As he 
shows old sepia-coloured photographs of Anatolia to his grandson Cenk at the 
dining-room table in the first scene of the film, his wife and children only frown 
and scowl Cenk seems to be the only character thrilled to explore his family’s 
Turkish roots. The boy’s enthusiasm for the trip, the viewer finds out in another 
early scene in the film, is due to an incident at Cenk’s elementary school. Other 
children reject him for being a Turkish German hybrid. During a football game, 
neither the German nor the Turkish German children want to have him on their 
team. The children tell Cenk in a mocking sneer, “You’re not a real German!”. 
Others chime in: “And you’re also not a real Turk either!”. Cenk starts a physical 
fight with one of the children because he feels frustrated. The result is a black 
eye, which he shows his grandfather Hüseyin at the family brunch. Angered by 
the inconclusiveness of his in-between identity, he demands to know from the 
assembled Yilmaz members, “Well, so what are we now?! Turks or Germans?!”. 
To negotiate one’s ethno-cultural belonging is crucial in Turkish German 
culture clash comedies. Cenk’s “all-important question” (Berghahn: 1) is the 
same as the one Ibo asked himself a decade before the release of Almanya in 
Saul’s Kebab Connection. To define the nature of Turkish German hybridity is 
a challenge. Nobody in Cenk’s family knows the correct answer. Immediately, 
this draws attention to the same staples of “commodified ethnic otherness” 
(Sieg, 2009: 241) as in all the culture clash comedies preceding Şamdereli’s film. 
Almanya’s crucial clash scene confirms that Turkish food has a history of being 
used to express cultural identity. That food, which is too spicy for Ali, becomes 
a marker for Cenk to prove his Turkishness. Ali’s son devours a Börek with hot 
chili flakes to show he is a real Turk and to have the naïve performance validated 
by Hüseyin. The grandfather looks on with pride as his grandson eats. Then 
there is the outward appearance Ali’s older brother Veli presents through his 
Turko-stache or Turkish moustache. Ali teasingly calls it a Turkish greengrocer 
moustache. There is also Fatma’s headscarf. Finally, there are the Turkish and the 
German languages. Only Veli, Muhadem and Leyla can converse competently 
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and without accent in both languages. According to Ali, “Hüseyin should finally 
take a German language class”, while Cenk complains that his Turkish is as non-
existent as that of his father.
A heated debate around Cenk’s question about identity ensues among the 
family but produces no satisfying results. And so the boy must make do with a 
frustrating response: “You can be both, can’t you?”. That statement draws attention 
to ethnic Otherness and underlines a conspicuous element of multicultural 
universalism. The complex phrase confuses Cenk even more. To help the nine-
year-old with his dilemma, Canan tells him the story of the grandparents’ and 
his parents’ migration from Turkey to Germany. By retelling the story of Turkish 
German migration, Almanya combines incongruity, superiority and relief 
humour more intricately than any of the other films discussed here in order to 
construct a “multilayered diasporic consciousness” (Hake and Mennel: 1). The 
film simultaneously disavows naïve integration fantasies and ironises German 
culture as a commodity one could consume like food or even this integration 
film itself (Reimer and Zachau, 2017: 247). 
Almanya frames the question about Turkishness or Germanness with nostalgic 
memories. They tell of the first and the second generations’ experiences. For 
instance, the first flashback scene shows Hüseyin courting Fatma in Anatolia. 
Their wish to secure economic status in the West starts the larger story of labour 
migration from Turkey to Germany. Another scene a little later in the film shows 
the family’s first trip back home to Turkey with a boot-load of German chocolates, 
bottles of Coca-Cola and other souvenirs from the capitalist West. Şamdereli’s 
version of Turkish German hybridity paints culture clash with fondness. It is 
a sentimental fondness, which accompanies many moments of insecurity and 
failed assimilations. Those, in turn, are resolved with light-hearted humour to 
reveal that conformity does not have to be desirable and that ethnic identity 
typing in comedy is not a domain of Western films. In one scene, shortly after the 
family’s arrival in their first apartment in Germany, Fatma wonders why Germans 
put fancy porcelain chairs in their bathrooms. “And this? What kind of funny 
chair is this?”, she asks puzzled. In another scene, Muhamed has a nightmare after 
drinking too much Coca Cola, the quintessential Western beverage. In his dream, 
the Muslim boy sees Jesus Christ stepping down from a large wooden cross in 
his family’s German living room. The figure bleeds from his stigmata wounds 
and moans. With the slow growls of a zombie, which seems to be Muhamed’s 
explanation for the miracle of Christian resurrection, nightmare Jesus draws 
nearer until the child wakes up screaming his head off. The German Dachshunds 
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in the neighbourhood are totally alien to the children, too. Veli experiences a 
tremendous fright when he first sees a Wiener Dog: “Oh NO! There are monster 
rats!! There are monster rats!!”.
The Yilamz family’s journey to Germany looks like Alice’s travels to Wonderland. 
The purpose of this is to stress clash incongruity for humour, not realism. 
Normativity in Almanya is suspended as the comedic mode prepares the viewer 
to buy into Germany as an unfamiliar, outlandish landscape. To make this logic 
credible we see reality through the eyes of the Turkish protagonists. According 
to Emeis and Boog, “Almanya’s family portrait and the image it draws of society 
moves back and forth in episodes between [imagined] ‘orient’ and ‘occident’. It 
profits that way from the spirit of Culture Clash and the friction between different 
values systems and forms of belonging” (Emeis and Boog, 2011: 166). A montage 
scene with impressions of the family’s first Christmas in Germany stresses that 
discrepancy. In one shot, Muhamed, Veli and Leyla demand of their parents a 
proper Christmas celebration “just like all the other kids at school get”. In the 
next take, they accuse the mother of not wrapping the presents properly and of 
decorating a measly pot plant with only two baubles and the sparsest amount 
of tinsel. Hüseyin watches his favourite Turkish soccer team, Galatasaray, on 
television, whereas the children want to have Santa bring their presents. The 
exoticisation of German culture is complete as, finally, the lyrics of the German 
equivalent of “Jingle Bells”, namely “Kling Glöckchen Klingelingeling”, become a 
rather slurred “Plüm Düng Dong Plümmeldingellüng”. 
Almanya is a hilarious apprenticeship in cultural mimesis, the darling trope of 
assimilationists. Most attempts of the Turkish migrants to duplicate Germanness 
fail, yet the Yilmaz family is not broken up about it. Its perception of the German 
language oscillates between Charlie Chaplin’s nonsensical Hitler-bark in The 
Great Dictator (1940) and an onomatopoeic “mooooh”, which a German retailer 
uses as a phonetic crutch to communicate to Fatma the concept of cow’s milk on 
her first grocery shop in Germany. Şamdereli reserves the actual German language 
for the memoir sequences of the Turkish characters. Switching languages easily 
from Turkish to German so that Cenk can understand, young Hüsein’s and 
young Fatma’s native Turkish tongue becomes the language of the native German 
audience. In this sense, the director indicates that alternative languages and an 
embrace of the unfamiliar are long overdue in German cinema. This is supported 
by Whittier, who sees the end of linguistic hegemony in German film as a 
productive substitute for the strained discourse of “Eurocentric paternalism” in 
Turkish German cinema (Whittier 2011, 1). 
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Almanya also suggests that there is danger in glorifying the settler society. A 
good example emerges in an earlier scene. Canan tells Cenk why his grandfather 
moved to Germany as a guest worker. She tries to explain to Cenk that Hüseyin 
followed Germany’s call for an international “workforce” in the 1960s. The young 
boy pictures the German state as a loud and disembodied voice. The voice booms 
out of a loudspeaker to a crowd of young men in the Turkish city of Istanbul, 
men gathered around a hole in the frozen sea ice at the North Pole, a man sitting 
at an Italian family dinner table in Naples and a couple of males on the Greek 
island of Rhodes. Germany’s booming voice invites them in the motivational 
tone of a gym instructor to be part of the Federal Republic’s new labour force: 
“[d]ear citizens of the world, this is the Federal Republic of Germany! We are 
looking for workers. If you are young, strong, and possess a good work morale, 
then immediately contact the next official authority”. That all these guest workers 
were the victims of economic exploitation, lured by the capitalist promise of 
Germany’s economic miracle, becomes clear in the last scene of the film. The 
screen fades to black and Max Frisch’s 1965 comment on West Germany’s labour 
arrangements appears: “[w]e called for labour, but what we got were humans”.
The incongruity in the final statement of the film is not an accusation, although 
the gap between fantasy and historicity of German labour migration emerges 
constantly throughout the film. Rather, it works as Almanya’s explanation for 
Hüseyin’s diasporic desire to return to his birthplace as a human, not a guest 
labourer. Hüseyin’s return to his Turkish birthplace mirrors Cenk’s question at 
the beginning of the film. However, Hüseyin never makes it back all the way 
to his old village in Anatolia. He dies of a heart attack after making it at least 
to Turkey. The family decides to have him buried at a local Turkish cemetery 
before going back home to Germany. There, Cenk delivers an official speech 
in front of German Chancellor Angela Merkel at a special anniversary event: 
“50 years of labour migration in Germany”. Hüseyin was supposed to deliver 
his thoughts on coming to Germany as the country’s 1,000,001st guest worker. 
Talking about mutual understanding, he jokes with Cenk in an earlier scene at 
a Turkish barber’s shop about addressing Angela Merkel rather informally on 
this festive occasion: “Angela. You are from the EAST. I come from the EAST 
AS WELL. We both—EASTIES”. In his stead, Cenk delivers his grandfather’s 
prepared speech to German politicians, the media and his family: “I have been 
living here for 45 years. Sometimes it was good and sometimes it was bad. But 
now I am happy”. 
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The film concludes with a supernatural scene following the speech. Hake and 
Mennel describe this complicated ending as the nuanced aesthetic of a bittersweet 
“tragicomedy”, with death as the flipside of life (Hake and Mennel: 4). The 
ambivalent resolution of the narrative acknowledges the complexity of Turkish 
German identities in the last scene of Almanya. The transformed family, changed 
by the trip to Turkey and the flashback narrative, is distanced from the rest of the 
world. The viewer sees the Yilmaz family’s younger selves and older selves grouped 
next to each other as the camera moves slowly across a final shot of all the family 
members. The concept of change and sustaining German multiculture becomes 
considerably more complex here than in the conclusions of Kebab Connection, 
Kiss me Kismet and Evet, I do. Time is undermined while self-reflexivity and the 
simultaneous co-existence of multiple identities are foregrounded. One might 
refer to the surrealistic reconfiguration as an augmented realism reflective of a 
Turkish German consciousness of multiple identities. This ending very much 
leaves it up to the viewer to decide what kind of comment and insights into the 
question of Turkish German belonging the culture clash comedy delivers.

CHAPTER III
Television Narratives of Ottoman 
Invasion and Cohabitation
“In Ihren Filmen und Serien geht es um den Zusammenprall der Kulturen. Was gefällt 
Ihnen daran?”
“Außer in ‘Türkisch für Anfänger’ spielte dieses Thema nie eine große Rolle. Ich achte darauf, 
dass nicht alle blond und blauäugig sind, die in meinen Projekten mitspielen, weil das nicht 
zeitgemäß wäre und nicht der Realität entspricht, wie ich sie—vielleicht auch durch meinen 
Migrationshintergrund—wahrnehme.” 
“Your films and TV series revolve around the clash between cultures. What do you like 
about that?”
“This was never really something that was that important, only in ‘Turkish for Beginners’. 
I make sure that not everyone in the projects I put together is blond and has blue eyes. 
That wouldn’t be the time we live in and it wouldn’t correspond to reality and how I—
maybe because of my migrant background—see it.”
—Bora Dağtekin (KINO.de magazine interview, 2014)1
Summary
Sitcoms about blended families have helped to create discussion among American 
audiences about societal change and non-traditional structures of social organisation. 
In the 1990s German public broadcasters noticed the sitcom’s mass-cultural appeal after 
private networks had already imported numerous US sitcoms during the 1980s. Public as 
well as private television network providers aired a host of original German sitcoms shortly 
after the first attempts at German adaptations won over audiences and critics alike. The 
audience’s initial disinterest in Bora Dağtekin’s blended Turkish German family sitcom 
in 2006 however showed that alleged lowbrow humour and ethnic diversity in Germany 
were still a hard sell. The Turkish German screenwriter’s Türkisch für Anfänger-Turkish for 
Beginners was the first mainstream comedy series on public primetime television (ARD, 
2006-2010) to feature Turkish German individuals and native German individuals 
as members of the same household. Turkish German Metin and native German Doris 
pursue their romantic relationship. Their children Lena, Nils, Cem and Yağmur, and 
extended family members, Grandfather Schneider and Grandmother Öztürk, reject the 
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multi-ethnic living situation. In time though the characters come around and the viewers, 
too, warm up to the idea of ethnic sitcom families as the new normal in German society. 
This chapter dissects Turkish for Beginners as a televised comedy in Germany about 
different kinds of Germanness and related identities. The process of cultural integration, 
which arises from situational humour among family members in everyday life situations 
at home, in school or at work, is the series’ most prominent element. The ethnic sitcom 
helped German and international audiences to extend the meaning of the wider German 
family and disprove the myth of cultural normativity. 
A Sitcom to Capture the Turkish German Zeitgeist
In the quotation at the beginning of this chapter, Turkish German television 
and film screenwriter Bora Dağtekin points out that his work in the German 
entertainment industry captures a current aspect of German society, and that 
it links the issue of social diversity with the cultural phenomenon of migration. 
“Zeitgemäß”, or being contemporary, as Dağtekin says while reflecting on the 
screenplays and scripts which he has been writing successfully for more than 
a decade now, is as much a concern of his as is presenting diversity. Not all of 
Dagtekin’s writing and comedy projects focus on Muslimness in Germany, but 
his sitcom Turkish for Beginners (2006-2009), the long-running series about a 
blended Turkish/German family, is a reflection of the transformation of German 
society and directly related to non-native and Muslim Germans’ increasing 
visibility in popular culture and being more equal to the majority population. 
As I mentioned in the introduction and in chapter one, the need to reposition 
the national within popular culture has become increasingly important in 
German politics, international affairs, as well as in transnational criticisms of 
social relations. Turkish for Beginners can be considered a Zeitgeist commentary, 
in that Dağtekin focuses on issues of Turkish/German living, migration and 
integration in contemporary German society in the new century in all of his 
episode scripts. The series is set in an era of unmatched global travel, trade and 
migratory movements. I have described these circumstances before in the context 
of pro-social ethnic comedy and Turkish German culture clash film as examples 
of Arjun Appadurai’s claim that mobility is vital for transnational societies in 
terms of changing cultural spaces and cultural worlds. Distance and proximity 
have become synonymous with difference and sameness, respectively, as he argues 
(Appadurai, 1996: 21). 
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Dağtekin’s comedy series partakes in the German discourse on social change 
in the 21st century. It asks what defines cultural mainstream and what constitutes 
authentic Germanness or Turkishness, or a hybrid form of the two, while it traces 
the co-existence of four generations of a blended family. Turkish for Beginners 
starts with its German and Turkish German protagonists moving in together. 
Once set in motion, the story about a “soft undoing of the so-called parallel 
living in society” (Boss, 2015), as one media commentator referred to the plot 
of the series before it first aired in 2006, presents the struggle of the Schneiders 
and the Öztürks to live as one family under one roof. The narrative moves 
forward until the family members reach a point after three seasons at which all 
can define their identity in more complex terms than before because of their 
cohabitation. However, despite its title, Turkish for Beginners does not cater 
to the majority audience in Germany. The sitcom depicts the Turkish German 
minority experience in German society and balances it with different facets of 
alleged native Germanness, for example gender issues and pseudo-liberal politics. 
Dağtekin uses incongruity, superiority and relief humour explicitly to create 
more than one viewpoint in the narrative. The mix of different social pragmatics 
of humour complicates the viewer’s interpretation of Dağtekin’s fiction as an 
immigrant comedy. 
My analysis here complements Benbow’s study of gender in Turkish for 
Beginners and Peterson’s discussion of a cosmopolitan didactic in the show to 
teach multiculturalism to German viewers (Peterson, 2012: 96). Benbow outlines 
an important model of how a sitcom with a focus on ethnicity can instruct 
viewers how to see, and more importantly how to be, a female in Germany in 
different yet “equally valid or authentic ways” (Benbow, 2014: 234). She focuses 
in her analysis less on the spatial aspect of the narrative though, which is part 
of Peterson’s work on the narrative arc of “home-making” with the show’s 
characters and their “positioning” in a shared household (Peterson, 2012: 97). 
The concern of cultural studies with representations of diverse ethnic space(s) 
in popular culture contexts, as indicated by Stehle’s work on cultural spatiality 
in contemporary films and fictions about ethnic minorities in German society 
(Stehle, 2012: 122-123), is however a crucial issue I examine here.
I have outlined in the previous chapters that there is a push to reposition 
identities as hybridities in more recent German film to avoid the idea of clear-
cut national, cultural and socio-economic community lines. This promotion 
of diversity and social cohesiveness between ethnic communities in German 
society has become a matter of urgency after 9/11. Turkish for Beginners uses 
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three generations of Turkish German/German identities to achieve it. The 
sitcom does this also in an attempt by the show’s screenwriter to include a 
historical dimension. It is similar to the function of the multiple temporal 
layers the story switches back and forth to in Yasemin Şamdereli’s Almanya.2 
The narrative of the series involves individuals who lived through WWII, like 
the German grandfather, the old Schneider. Some lived for most of their lives 
in rural Turkey, like grandmother Öztürk. Some of the characters were born in 
the 1970s, like the Turkish German father and the German mother, although the 
former, Metin, came to Germany with his first wife as a migrant, while the latter, 
Doris, was brought up and socialised with her sister in Germany. The teenage 
children featuring in the series were born in the 1990s and they were all raised 
and socialised in Germany. The generational identity aspects place the terms of 
the Turkish German debate about Muslim integration into a broader timeframe 
and ethno-social context. The different ethnic identity types also acknowledge 
that German culture relies on a long tradition of consuming ethnicity in mass 
media fictions, as argued by Benbow and Sieg.3
Television and media critics in Germany, such as Alexander Kluge and Hans 
Magnus Enzensberger, have placed television at the centre of debates about the 
representation of social change and cultural diversity.4 The prioritisation of a 
mainstream medium is crucial to my work for, as the iconoclast of sitcom research, 
Mills, observes, “all entertainment, including the sitcom, plays an important role 
in society. Its effects may be deemed incompatible with critical thinking and 
rigorous analysis; but a sitcom is good entertainment precisely because it doesn’t 
require us to think critically. Yet […] the pleasures of sitcom are not simple, and 
certainly require an understanding of complex social conventions and generic 
rules in order for them to be enjoyed” (Mills, 2009: 5). My focus is therefore 
specifically on the plot structure of an entertainment format, which viewers 
in Germany and internationally have consumed as a representation of modern 
German multiculture (Yeşilada, 2008: 6).5 References to other popular sitcoms 
and comedy genres devoted specifically to questions of ethnicity complement 
my analysis of the multicultural and multigenerational family in Turkish for 
Beginners, which illustrates the potential of German mass-media as a pioneering 
forum for ethnic minorities to participate in German culture with a “distinctly 
diverse voice” (Yeşilada: 7).
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Co-Existence Modelling: The Ethnic Sitcom and Its Close 
Cousins on Television
Situation comedy on television enjoyed unprecedented levels of popularity 
in 1990s Germany. It did so because audiences had already been trained to 
recognise the pattern of a hate-them-love-them family comedy in popular 
sitcoms imported from America, such as The Cosby Show (1984-192), Family 
Matters (1989-1998) and Roseanne (1988-2018). German viewers thought the 
sitcom was a television format in service of the search for the Golden Age of 
the German Family. Their family appeal and rather simple, relatable plotlines 
had sitcoms reaching across traditional entertainment and cultural boundaries. 
Both public and private television channels with no extra costs to German 
viewers offered many versions of the sitcom at the turn of the century, though 
most were imported. Some featured apartments (Seinfeld, 1989-1998; Friends, 
1994-2004; Caroline in the City, 1995-1999) and workplace settings (NewsRadio, 
1995-1999; Scrubs, 2001-2010) as their organising principle. Yet public television 
channels in Germany preferred sitcoms produced in Germany, revolving around 
domestic issues and featuring German family life in houses or house-like settings. 
Germany’s leading taxpayer-funded public television channel, ARD (Public 
German Broadcasting), produced situation comedies like Berlin, Berlin (2002-
2005) in accordance with that premise. To add to this point, German-specific 
content is the trade mark of Germany’s state-run broadcasters, who offer public 
broadcast television. Channels like SWR (Southwest-German Broadcasting), 
NDR (Northern-German Broadcasting) and BR (Bavarian Broadcasting) are by 
definition German region-specific or culture-specific networks. They must adhere 
to an educational mandate for Germany’s national broadcasting guidelines. The 
Federal German Council for Public Broadcasting and Media Oversight sets and 
revises those guidelines every year (Kosnick, 2007: 53). 
Germany’s public television channels have a history of following highbrow 
standards for their programming. They see themselves as successors of earlier 
government radio and tax-funded newscasters in Germany. Cooke thus claims 
that the German public broadcasting channels’ issue with American comedy 
as lowbrow art has to do with concerns about the upkeep and safeguarding 
of Germany’s national culture and the traditional canon (Cooke, 2005: 156). 
Such concerns intensified after reunification. Original German television 
entertainment in the 1990s was considered central to revitalising a sense of 
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modern Germanness, particularly in light of a surge in xenophobic attitudes and 
a stark economic division between East and West Germans (Cooke: 157). 
A counter-trend to this was lowbrow, mass-culture comedy formats about 
multicultural Germany. They went on air in the late 1990s and played on the 
many references to ethnicity and easy German multiculture in the country’s 
public discussions on social change. One of the hottest topics was the clash 
between supposedly native German and Turkish German migrant culture. Some 
references, for example the headscarf, Islam, the Turkish masculinities, the class 
struggle and lack of education of migrant communities were frequently cited in 
intellectual debate, in literary circles and in the wider public. They were over-
used to the point of being cliché, soon appropriated as stock comedy props by 
popular shows like Erkan & Stefan (Dunphy and Emig, 2010: 4-5). That sketch 
show aired on ProSieben, a German commercial television channel. On the 
show, two German comedians play a rather dim-witted German-Turkish low-
life duo, who find themselves in everyday-life situations: “[d]öner and dance 
club, totally cool dude, ey!” (Dunphy and Emig: 8). Erkan & Stefan did not last 
long in the pantheon of German television comedy. The duo failed to open up 
Turkish stereotypes and minority issues like religious discrimination and social 
bias for more critical readings and multilateral foci. Other comedy shows like 
Kaya Yanar’s long-running sketch series Whatcha Looking At?! (2001-2005) had 
more to offer to the audience. It aired on ProSieben’s private competitor channel, 
Sat1, and outlasted the competition (Bower, 2011, 378). Yana’s show was better, 
albeit still not good enough for the programming directors of German public 
television, at thematising the problematic environment of ethnic discrimination 
and religious bias in German society. 
Yanar usually gets the credit for being the first non-native German to combine 
ethnicity and mainstream comedy on German television. He does this by 
augmenting ethnic stereotypes until they become visible as cultural myths. The 
performances are as overdrawn as Groucho Marx’s stage makeup and as easy to 
recognise as Yanar’s costume-like repertoire. One may think of them like the 
beaglepuss, the novelty pair of horn-rimmed glasses with attached eyebrows, 
plastic nose and bushy moustache caricaturing Groucho Marx (Struppert and 
Keding, 2006: 22).6 In his popular show, Whatcha Looking At?!, Yanar took 
the audience through short clips of caricatured ethnicities and bits of Seinfeld-
like stand-up He performed them in fast-firing gag reels. He was dressed like 
a Turkish bouncer, a German welfare recipient, an Indian IT specialist or a 
gypsy woman telling fortunes to customers. The principle of Yanar’s comedy 
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was interchangeable ethnicities. He offered through his comedy sketch reel a 
variety of ethnic performances and exaggerated costumes to motivate viewers to 
inspect ethnicity and ethnic roles “as discursive constructions of a wider social 
dialogue” (Struppert and Keding, 2006: 23). The German media lauded Yanar 
for this innovative use of mainstream comedy. At the time, talk show hosts 
and opinion journalists assured their viewers that this kind of ethnic humour 
rerouted tensions in Turkish German migration discussions into comedic relief. 
Whatcha Looking At?! was a way of exposing sentiments of superiority about 
ethnic prejudice in both host and migrant populations. It was meant as a lesson 
in self-ironic deprecation. Struppert and Keding make a case for the innovative 
quality of Yanar’s television comedy similar to my argument. The show took 
ethnicity and ethnic essentialism to mainstream audiences without keeping their 
enjoyment off limits. I revisit this duality in chapter five with a discussion of 
contemporary Turkish German stand-up comedy on YouTube. 
Yanar injected his status as a German person of colour into clichéd 
representations of Turkishness. He was the principal cast member in a family TV 
show. He was perceived as brown, or at least as ethnically non-white. Spielhaus 
describes with great insight into the Turkish German integration discussion 
that this opportunity for Yanar to present something new was astonishing for 
mainstream ethnic comedy on German television screens. 11 September had 
caused a new wave of “Muslim othering in Germany” (Spielhaus, 2013: 182) 
and a distrust of the Germanness of those self-identifying or being perceived as 
Muslim. The subsequent increase in discussions about non-native populations 
in German society, and the promotion of their visibility could just as easily have 
pushed ethnic comedy to the fringes of German television. The viewer numbers 
for Whatcha Looking At?! however held steady and host channel Sat1 became the 
weekend winner in primetime ratings. The loyalty of Yanar’s audience prompted 
other German networks to follow suit and produce formats with Turkish 
German themes to get in on the ethnic comedy business. There was Kebab 
Pretzels – Integration in Bayern (2011, BR) and The Özdags (WDR, 2007-2008). 
RTL, another private broadcaster, entered the ethnic comedy ratings race with 
Everyone Loves Jimmy (2005-2007), which was a sitcom about a Turkish German 
family in German suburbia. The working title of that show was Crescent Moon 
over Little Istanbul (Spielhaus: 183). The ratings success of RTL’s as well as Sat1’s 
comedy programming eventually carried over to non-commercial broadcasters. 
In 2005 ARD executives ordered the first ethnic situation comedy ever to air on 
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public German television. In 2006, the genre of ethnic sitcom in Germany came 
of age when Turkish for Beginners began its award-winning three-season run.7
My So-called Hybrid Life: The Setup
Lena Schneider’s narration is the focal point for the story of a Turkish German 
Brady Bunch. She talks directly into a hand-held camera at either the beginning 
or end of each episode to sum up the previous episode’s plot or to lead into next 
week’s episode. Through voice-overs and close-up face shots, Lena shares her 
experiences with best friend Kathi, who went to the United States for a study 
year abroad. Kathi’s eventual return causes a shift of video addressee. Lena then 
talks to her father Markus in her videos. The German father lived with the family 
in the Amazon jungle before his divorce from Doris when their children were 
still young. This kind of the classic “Dear Diary” form, a self-reflective narration 
style (Allrath et al., 2005: 3-6) and the trading-places scenarios are the sitcom’s 
dominant aesthetics. 
The series opens with teenage drama in the blended family. Lena tells viewers 
how Turkish for Beginners is about a patchwork family after they all move into a 
shared house in Berlin’s migrant district of Neukölln. She calls the neighbourhood 
“difficult to say the least, problematic at best”. The Schneider-Öztürks/Öztürk-
Schneiders move from two separate houses into a new home, an “old shed with 
a garden fit only for middle-class squares who like to live around a boring ass 
ghetto in the middle of nowhere”, as the 15-year-old Lena describes it. “None of 
my friends will even dare to set foot in this slum! How for God’s sake am I meant 
to explain THIS to my friends at school on Monday?”, Lena asks her German 
friend who went to America on a student exchange programme. During the first 
episode, Lena is recording her family’s moving day on camera to document the 
horror of it all. The family’s relocation is Lena’s own personal nightmare. She 
refers to the unwanted situation of living with two Turkish Germans as “bogan 
internment”. The viewer knows already from this episode that Lena is referring 
here to her new stepsiblings, Cem and Yağmur. The three of them get into a 
massive fight over storage space on the removal van. Lena immediately resents 
16-year-old Cem for being “a total dick-driven pseudo macho”. Things are equally 
bad with her de facto stepsister. The 15-year-old Yağmur, a devout Muslim who 
wears a headscarf, has already clashed with Lena, an “infidel”, over religious beliefs 
and moral values during their first family dinner. 
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Fighting with other family members during dinner, breakfast or lunch over 
different opinions or values is a go-to comedy scenario in Turkish for Beginners. 
That a conflict plays out over a family meal is the classic trope of basically any 
sitcom’s Thanksgiving episode. Viewers see during the pilot how the fighting over 
a large family meal gathering first happens in Turkish for Beginners. A flashback 
cuts from moving day to a dinner scene in a Chinese restaurant. Here, haram 
Peking duck and unblessed soy sauce cause serious trouble. “That’s just barbaric 
and improper”, finds Yağmur, disgusted by Lena’s favourite dish. She gets even 
more enraged about the “faithless German airhead girlie” when Lena disrespects 
Metin, Cem’s and Yağmur’s father. He is a police detective with Berlin’s criminal 
investigation unit and a widower. Lena shouts Metin down when he breaks the 
news of the family reshuffle to his and Doris’ children. Lena’s 14-year-old brother, 
Nils, “Nille”, likes Metin. This drives Lena’s anger up to the next level. Lena, who 
had expected to hear news of a break-up instead of a lifelong union, unleashes her 
frustration at mild-mannered Metin Öztürk. Metin tries to reason with her, “this 
usually works out well with kidnappers”, which makes Lena’s liberal mother who 
is a psychotherapist by trade object vehemently to her partner’s idea of the parent 
foot coming down: “Let’s not be that militant, honeybunny!”, Doris tells Metin 
in a soothing voice. The 39-year-old has been a single parent for most of Lena’s 
and Nils’ life. Her parenting style is distinctly New Age. Doris’ “Gefühlskreis”, or 
“circle of feelings” is indicative of this. It describes the German mother, making 
her children sit with her on the floor and hold hands. While articulating their 
emotions, eyes closed, they sway back and forth with Doris beating rhythmically 
on a drum draped in faux fur.
The dinner scene is so memorable because of its utter failure to reconcile 
cultural differences. There is reductive knowledge each side presumes to have 
of the Other. If not to a full-blown food fight, the scene leads to the teenagers 
flinging ethnic clichés back and forth, and then turns into a stand-off between 
reductive ideas about Germanness and Turkishness. Dağtekin’s script splits the 
two families right down the middle of the screen to reinforce that point visually. 
The German Schneiders are on one side of a large dinner table. The Turkish 
German Öztürks are on the other. The placement mirrors the so-called parallel 
society in Germany. No character refers to it specifically, but it conjures up 
the two-world paradigm mentioned in chapter one, which Zafer Şenocak and 
Emine Sevgi Özdamar write about in their prose novels on social change and 
cultural spatiality in Germany. The majority society lives in one cultural sphere 
and the minority society inhabits another. To live in both worlds requires a dual 
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perspective. The quotation placed at the beginning of this chapter explains that 
Dağtekin’s intention is to recreate but also challenge that viewpoint in Turkish for 
Beginners. Dağtekin uses comedy to cut across cultural spheres by entertaining 
the people in each world with life on the other side. His let’s-live-together, 
blended-family sitcom works through long-held stereotypes to get there. The 
scriptwriter refuses to reproduce earlier integration discourses, which had The 
Turks and The Germans live in separate places and/or houses and interact only 
in public spaces. Benbow observes that integration in that sense is presented in 
the show’s initial episode as a fait accompli. The characters load all their things on 
to the removal van despite the fights they have had and those still to come. Like 
it or not, the diverse members of German society are ready to take the next step 
and move in together (Benbow: 248). 
A Space for Difference
The incongruity humour of Turkish for Beginners quickly moves past the idea 
of ethnic stereotypes and stand-off clashes for cheap laughs. Episode two shows 
how. The plot in this episode is all about the new family home and mundane 
actions such as getting up in the morning and standing in line for the bathroom. 
The show’s iconic yet also quotidian aspects of how people live their lives in 
German society are purposeful. Family members live together but may differ 
from each other in how they are typical Germans, Turks, women, men, mothers, 
fathers and Muslims. In fact, the whole of the rest of season one of Turkish for 
Beginners lets characters explore how well they fit into certain identity moulds 
and whether they actually want to fit into them. These explorations play out 
in countless family quarrels, walk-by banter, hefty burns and stinging one-line 
zingers. It all happens inside the shared home of the blended Turkish/German 
family in corridors, bathrooms, on staircases, in the garage, living and dining 
room, or the kitchen. The funny comes from everyday forms of difference in all 
ordinary spaces. One can assume that viewers have experienced such moments in 
their own families. Turning ordinary life into funny situational comedy, in this 
context, is also to suggest that there is humour in travesties of hyperbolic ethnic 
biases. Most episodes of Turkish for Beginners focus on that message instead of 
pointing to fundamental disagreements over politics or religious beliefs. Initially 
unwanted, the ethnically Other side of the blended family ends up enabling 
personal growth rather than stunting each other’s identity development. 
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Congruent with this goal, Turkish for Beginners’ focus is on living areas as spaces 
with cultural significance and an awareness of identity-specific chores. Gendered 
chores feature more than others in the plot. They connect closely to daily routines 
like doing the dishes or preparing a meal, as there are minor dissimilarities in 
each of these performances in each family home. Benbow describes the deliberate 
emplotment of spatiality and ethno-sexed identity as an invitation of the viewer 
“into the intimate domestic sphere of a Turkish-German family and its roles” 
(Benbow: 235). And in this sphere, the basis of the ridiculous and the ludicrous is 
the departure from the norm, the incongruous. The deviation from standard ways 
of doing things or being something outside the expected becomes the relatable 
butt of the joke without tearing the difference down. This definition proposes 
comedy as intimately concerned with normative behaviours of all kind, which 
Turkish for Beginners exploits in the most common setting of sitcom families and 
a staple sitcom locus: the kitchen. Dağtekin’s characters do the cooking as they 
do gender, as they do culture. They are funny when they get it wrong and even 
funnier when they try to fix what was never broken. Doris is leading the charge 
in that regard. For instance, there are the family dinners. It is here that something 
as trivial as preparing supper triggers an ethnic clash storyline when Doris insists 
on being a happy housewife, although she loathes cooking. She takes over the 
kitchen only accidently to feed pork meatballs to the Öztürks. Yağmur sprints 
to the toilet to throw up the non-halal meat in a panic when she finds out. A 
staunch vegetarian, Doris wonders why meat eaters would care anyway about the 
different types of meat they eat: “[p]igs, cows, sheep, they all had a face before 
they got minced up. What does it matter?”.
Wary of another “international incident”, as Lena calls the pork episode in one 
of her video messages to Kathi, Doris turns into a very conscientious cook. The 
German mother resumes kitchen duty the morning after “Piggate”. A reluctant 
chef, she boils eggs for almost an hour just to be sure that she has killed off any hint 
of salmonella. “You could use those as ammunition in warzones”, Lena remarks in 
a snarky tone while pounding an egg with a metal spoon. Metin prefers “one egg, 
soft yoke and firmly cooked whites, please and thank you, honeybunny”. He then 
receives an egg so overcooked it could be a piece of rock, but rather than hurt 
his partner’s feelings Meting silently forces it down. Assured by Metin that she 
was successful, Doris beams with pride after having mastered the art of boiling 
eggs: “It ain’t all that hard after all!”, she says with confidence in her culinary 
abilities. Metin shudders, his face hidden behind his broadsheet newspaper as 
she goes on, “And tomorrow, it’s omelette for breakfast, my darlings!”. Another 
turkish german muslims and comedy entertainment104
household chore Doris has failed to master is the laundry. Her understanding of 
how to wash whites and colours lacks some nuance: “[s]eparating whites, colours 
… and whatever goes into boil wash - total waste of time!”. Metin volunteers to 
do his own laundry when he hears this. He loves to separate whites from colours 
as well as fold, press and starch his shirts for work at the police station, but Doris 
bans him from the laundry room. “Oh, come on now, Metin. That’s so easy and 
simple anyone could do it”, Doris explains to him. “Why, do you think I’m too 
stupid for this?”, she asks him with an angry undertone in her voice. The scene 
cuts to night-time and the linen cupboard in Doris’ and Metin’s bedroom. The 
viewer sees Metin getting ready for bed. For most of season one, he sleeps in pink-
stained singlets.
The series’ humour is often rooted in the subversion of normative identities, 
including enjoyable missteps around certain gender roles. The way in which it dives 
into the domestic space and works in sexist subtext makes Turkish for Beginners 
more complex than the average German sitcom. Dağtekin complicates the ethnic 
identities of his characters through their interactions with and perceptions of 
each other primarily on the premise of gender-based stereotypes. For instance, 
Turkish German Metin serves as the “poster child for a Turkish migrant father’s 
integration into German society” (Wellgraf, 2008: 36). Notably, however, the 
show makes the point that this is only a fantasy. Mainly, though, it is a fantasy of 
Metin’s. His attempt at a neat and nice family dinner during the flashback scene 
in the Chinese restaurant elicits annoyed frowns and mumbled asides from Cem, 
Yağmur and Lena. These reactions address several incongruities between the way 
other characters think a supposedly real Turkish man should act and the way 
Metin behaves on his own terms as a Turkish German. Every person at the table 
reacts differently to Metin’s behaviour. This raises questions about restrictive 
imaginations of Turkish masculinity reminiscent of the male protagonists in 
Turkish German culture clash comedy. At the first family dinner, Metin performs 
the identity of a father, a Muslim, a migrant, a man and a romantic partner. And 
the other characters let him know that he fails at all of them.
Cem finds it embarrassing that Metin is not willing to act in the way his son 
thinks a real Turkish man should act: “Oh dude, what kind of impotent Turk are 
you?! You can’t even get that little Missy (looks at Lena) to shut up”. Yağmur’s 
reaction to her father’s behaviour suggests that she thinks Metin should act less 
German: “[t]he Quran says that a woman should be obedient to a man, and the 
daughter should please the parents, not like this … (she looks at Lena with an 
angry expression)”. A self-declared hippie, Doris rejects what she sees as Metin’s 
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old-fashioned Germanness, which complicates a simple alignment of normative 
Turkish-German with normative male-female stereotypes. She says in the tone 
of a patronising primary school teacher who is trying to explain something to 
an angry child, “Now, now, Metin, let’s not be an authoritarian. You’re much 
worse than any German stiff ! And besides, this is all so totally forced. One has 
to allow one’s feelings to come out and to articulate them. Otherwise this all just 
builds up on the inside and we all need to feel that we are in a safe and loving 
space, don’t we? After all, we are now O-N-E family”. The middle-aged, blonde 
German woman ends her reprimand with a wide, toothy smile. “Oh boy, how 
great! Circle of feelings”, Nils adds happily. A close-up shot of Metin’s face reveals 
that all those different reactions are utterly confusing for him. 
A Family and Its Generations to Mirror Social Change
Dağtekin emphasises the incongruity of certain characteristics and clichéd 
behaviours. Because each of his characters acts in accordance with the imagined 
ethno-sexed behaviour of a certain type of Turkish or German stock-type 
personality, they remain individually distinct but retain a generational quality. 
There are the children and the parents, while the grandparents come in later 
in the series. One may argue that they all represent the first, second and third 
generations of Turkish German migrants and the corresponding German 
counterparts. This set-up accounts for the plot’s ongoing concern with identity 
formation. Each episode turns on how a character finds a more authentic version 
of the Self in negotiation with other characters. The characters of all generations 
in the Schneider-Öztürk family serve that purpose in their identity performance, 
funny and flawed as it may be. 
In a similar reciprocal relationship, Turkish for Beginners invokes the culture-
clash premise and the hybridity theme in the pilot to satirise what viewers may 
think Turkishness or Germanness should look like. The family dinner at the 
Chinese restaurant cites Turkish machismo and German pseudo-liberalism. 
The scene is laden with generational conflict, opposing ideas, culture clashes 
and different lifestyles. Even the issue of language and mutual understanding 
emerges briefly when Metin tells Cem in Turkish to “behave and shut up” or, 
as the subtitles read, “there’ll be some bitchslaps coming right your way”. While 
those tropes of gender and ethnicity appear, they do not make for big and overly 
dramatised events in the lives of Turkish German people. Benbow finds that the 
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sitcom already moves on in the second episode from any damaging stereotypes 
about aggressive male Turkish Germans. There is no domestic abuse at the hand 
of Turkish German men or any honour killings. Dağtekin instead addresses issues 
like the depiction of modern womanhood in German society in more complex 
and nuanced terms with Doris’, Lena’s and Yağmur’s character development 
(Benbow: 248).
The whole premise of the series’ pilot episode can be understood as a Zeitgeist 
platform for the ensuing narrative of Turkish Germans living with Germans, and 
vice versa. The show’s producers manage to negotiate the line between overdoing 
the representation of identity and reducing its importance to inconsequential 
comedy. Turkish for Beginners redefines Germanness and Turkishness through 
a complex in-between identity and cultural hybridity, which is enacted by each 
family member. The last line of the show’s theme song goes “Nothing bad can 
happen to us/All of us together do our best /(We all) against the rest”. The song 
suggests a close-knit relationship between Turkish Germans and Germans when 
the opening credits are rolling. It plays on while close-up shots of the family 
members’ faces are montaged together at the end of the introduction sequence 
to form a family portrait. The viewer can see in the montage that Doris and 
Metin are in love while Lena, Cem and Yağmur appear upset. The dysfunctional 
family image also serves as the show’s promotional picture and can be found on 
the DVD compilation covers of season one and season two. It morphs into the 
snapshot of an idyllic family portrait before the scene fades to black and the show 
ends in the final episode of season three. 
This is a valuable clue. The purpose of the show is not to delve into the 
psychological damage of decade-long assimilation angst or the dangers of living 
with Others. It is to try to reduce that damage and diminish the anxieties of inter-
ethnic coexistence by styling cross-cultural living as a funny family experience. 
Next to the catchy pop song of the introductory sequence, the last image of 
the happy Schneider-Öztürk family at the end of season three suggests that the 
blended family can laugh off the tensions inherent in the ongoing debates about 
ethno-cultural problems in Germany; in particular, as alleged by Sarrazin or the 
AFD, those problems which come from mixing Muslimness and German culture 
in marriage. The opening credits depict children who are reluctant to become 
a new family. The parents are clearly smitten with each other. They kiss while 
they are holding hands. Benbow writes about the trope this image seeks to undo, 
“Years of portrayals of forced marriages and honour killings—culminating in the 
middle of the decade [2004] with a notorious issue of Spiegel magazine on ‘Allah’s 
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outcast daughters’—have created the expectation in the German mediascape that 
Turkish [German] marriages are at best unequal and at worst abusive” (Benbow, 
2014: 2).
The perceptions Muslimness and Turkish Otherness in Turkish for Beginners, 
which readily surface during the first episode and in many other moments of 
the series, underscore the prevalence of negative views on cultural hybridity. 
The show does not shy away from the precarious us-versus-them tenet of anti-
Muslim-migrant arguments like that of Sarrazin. I described in chapter one 
how his bigoted rhetoric participates in a long history of anti-Muslim bias in 
German-speaking cultures. According to Peterson, who accurately recaps some 
of Sarrazin’s controversial concepts, Sarrazin’s claim is that German society 
would be better off without migrants who refuse to assimilate. This means “that, 
conversely, Germans are fine just the way they are” (Peterson: 97). Viewers 
of Turkish for Beginners also frequently encounter this neo-segregationism 
during the show. For one, there is Doris’ father, Grandfather Schneider. With a 
seemingly perpetual gusto, he focuses in his xenophobic rants on Turkish Others 
as “goat herders” and “terrorists”. Peterson’s referencing of what Sarrazin states 
in his demagogic books is almost verbatim a copy of the Old Schneider’s usual 
performance of anti-migrant hate speech. “They [the Turks in Germany] have 
not learned our language; have not succeeded in our school system; have not 
taken on our norms, values, customs and habits; and, most visibly, have neither 
emancipated their women nor left the neighbourhoods where they congregate” 
(Peterson: 97). 
Apart from contemporary dealings with immigration, Turkish for Beginners 
invokes Germany’s past dealings with ethnic difference and minority identity 
politics. At the end of season one, Old Schneider moves into the Turkish German 
household. Doris’ father is an old Nazi remnant and a self-proclaimed former 
“business tycoon”. Grandmother Öztürk mirrors his prototypical German 
identity. Metin’s very conservative mother from Turkey moves in with the blended 
family at the end of season two. The German granddad and the Turkish granny 
stress through their dislike of ethnic diversity a perspective on German society 
which Corkhill and Lewis point out “can benefit from the acknowledgement 
that the ‘German’ in German culture, whether we are talking about nineteenth-
century or contemporary German culture, is always already shot through with 
influences and elements from other cultures” (Corkhill and Lewis, 2014: xv).
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“Gy-Gy-Gy… - Gyros Vendor?—No. Gynaecologist”
It is vital to analyse the diversity of identities as one of the features in Dağtekin’s 
pro-social ethnic comedy. It is also important to consider the de-centralisation of 
the Western gaze through a focus on what the series seeks to teach the German 
audience.8 Peterson contends that “there are, of course, other frameworks that 
might prove useful for thinking about the issues that TfB [Turkish for Beginners] 
raises. The model of intercultural communication helped to legitimate the study of 
literature and film produced by minority authors in Germany, and the instruction 
paradigm that frames [Peterson’s] analysis is certainly communicative” (Peterson: 
98). However, these approaches reveal little about humour as a complication 
strategy to suggest that ethnicity cannot explain every difference between certain 
identities; and, as Göktürk asked in her reading of earlier comedies about social 
change in Germany, how the mode of comedy can highlight a newer generation 
of Turkish German narratives and character developments in a pro-cosmopolitan 
portrayal of Turkish German life (Göktürk, 2008: 2). While Benbow warns about 
“a certain fetishization of Turkish German otherness” (Benbow: 249) in the 
context of light entertainment like ethnic sitcoms, Turkish for Beginners extends 
national cultures and established identities. That the sitcom was liked and lauded 
because it explored more complex notions of Germanness may suggest more 
optimism in the wider public about the diversification of Germany’s mainstream 
culture. 
Turkish for Beginners depicts expectations regarding gender, religion, class 
and nationality as a dense network of stereotypical knowledge about people’s 
identities. The pilot episode makes clear that the first impression of the Other 
relates to many generalised assumptions and premature judgement of character. 
Dağtekin then disentangles that network to reveal its inaccuracy. He suggests 
that there is a host of naïve assumptions about what constitutes authentic 
Turkishness or Germanness and how allegedly real Turks or Germans should 
behave; what they should look like; how they should talk, dress and think. 
I have described how the dinner scene in the pilot lists certain incongruous 
characteristics and behaviours. Dağtekin assembles them around a dinner table 
and highlights their clash through the different characters who participate in 
the blended family’s first dinner fight. Fostering social tension is a way to put a 
sitcom in the service of the discovery of new social realities in a society. The way 
in which some community members perceive other community members may 
show up in conflict situations, when one side hurls easily available tropes at the 
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other. Wellgraf notes that Dağtekin uses that context for a comedy of conflicts, 
but also a comedy of democratic resolutions: “both sides make fun of each other 
in equal terms and on equal footing” (Wellgraf: 39). 
There is situational humour in this family fight and the many other fights which 
happen afterwards. It encourages discussion about what each side thinks of the 
other and when and why it is socially permissible to laugh at the heated issues 
around migration. That means superiority humour complements incongruity 
humour. In the series, this combination reminds the audience that a critical self-
perception is as important as being critical with the perception of the Other. Later 
episodes of Turkish for Beginners provide the viewer with numerous scenes about 
characters who make fun of Others because they consider themselves superior 
to them. Though, when failing to justify the logic of their own flawed identity 
performance, they suddenly recognise that they are mistaken in demanding 
normativity from Others. Characters may fall from their imagined superior 
height, feeling more educated, emancipated, sophisticated, modern, wealthy, 
attractive, masculine, feminine or German or Turkish than another individual 
or group. Introspection leaves them as the laughed-at dupe of an episode. But it 
is not necessarily a one-dimensional or extreme-minded character who bears out 
the ridicule for feeling superior. In the context of ethnic sitcoms in Germany in 
the new century, the dupes are also younger and relatable figures in whose heads 
some clichés about other communities are still firmly anchored (Benbow: 239). 
In the fifth episode of season two Dağtekin presents the most poignant display 
of superiority humour combined with incongruity humour. In a short exchange, 
Metin has a father-to-suitor conversation with Yağmur’s future love-interest, 
the Greek German teenage boy Costa. Costa has been Cem’s best friend since 
Kindergarten, “when we two were still in the ‘German For Foreigners’ class 
that they put all migrant kids in”. Costa is a close family friend. The viewer has 
no reason to doubt Metin’s respect for the non-ethnic German with a Greek 
migration background. That is until the police officer informs Doris of his views 
on migration in a scene before talking to Costa: “Oh well, honeybunny, I don’t 
mind foreigners of course as long as they make themselves useful in Germany 
as proper members of society”. Metin says the same thing to his own mother in 
season three when Granny Öztürk tries to make money with textile brand forgery. 
“Anyone who doesn’t like it here can just leave”, he says sternly while Doris seems 
rather shocked. Even just the semblance of improper behaviour puts Metin on 
high alert after Cem and Costa perform a “street gangsta minority rap” in the 
living room of the Schneider-Öztürk’s house so that they can become famous on 
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YouTube. Metin pulls Cem’s sidekick aside and asks Costa about his parents’ jobs. 
He believes that they are blue collar workers and hence may have a bad influence 
on his family’s middle-class status: “Hey Costa, tell me, what’s it that your parents 
do for work?” Costa, who suffers from a bad stutter, responds: “My mmm-mm—
mother is a ttt-tt—tteacher.” — “And your father?” — “Gy-Gy-Gy…” — “Gyros 
vendour?” — “No. Gynaecologist!”. 
Metin’s assumed superiority evaporates instantly. The Turkish German middle-
class man is shocked, as his reaction suggests: “WHAT?! So, then, you come from 
a family of academics?!” Metin applies to Costa the same reductive thinking 
which the openly racist Granddad Schneider applies to Doris’s life partner in the 
second episode of season two: “Oh come on! Turks are all goat-herding Kanacks! 
The lot of them!”, Old Schneider yells during one of his temper tantrums. The 
racist remark follows on the heels of a television newscast about the German 
federal government’s integration policy and German Chancellor Merkel’s 
diplomatic engagements with Turkish German politicians. The realisation that 
he behaves like Old Schneider is enough to leave Metin flustered. The Turkish 
German father continues to grapple with his fragile illusion of being the “modern 
man” and a “good German citizen”. A later episode bears this out. In their nightly 
conversation before the couple turns in, Metin recapitulates the events of the 
day and turns to Doris. He asks her, “Mrs honeybunny, tell me, am I really that 
insensitive? I try so hard to understand everyone. Like I try to understand women 
and do everything to be an enlightened male”. Doris rolls her eyes while directly 
facing the camera, her head turned away from Metin. She turns her face to him, 
putting on a doting look, albeit with a hint of attitude: “Well, Mr honeybunny, I 
think we’d better talk about this another time. Good night”. Doris turns off the 
bedroom lights. All Metin can do is look utterly perplexed as the lights fade and 
he is left to ponder this question on his own. 
The awkward pillow talk shows that the series thematises gender roles and 
political attitudes just as much as ethno-cultural identity issues. Turkish for 
Beginners puts them in a relatable social dimension. It all goes back to everyday 
life and the comedy arising from common family matters. One instance of this 
plays out in a dance club scene in season one’s third episode. Lena wants to go 
out for drinks and tricks Yağmur into accompanying her: “You can very well sit 
here at home in front of the telly and grow old and bitter under your headscarf, 
but that’s no fun at all. There’ll be some dingbat dude even for you if you come 
along to the club. They let in minors tonight, even ones dressed as prudish as 
you”, she teases the conservative Muslim. At first, Yağmur refuses. She finds that 
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Lena should stay at home and watch television rather than jump around half-
naked in a discotheque with drunken boys drooling over her. But with her ego 
challenged, Yağmur agrees to “underage hours at the club”. Doris is happy to 
play along with her daughter’s proposal, namely that Lena and Yağmur should 
go out unsupervised and without a curfew. “Of course, my little gherkin! Young 
women must be able to master life and draw their own boundaries. Don’t come 
home early, not before 11pm!” This positively horrifies Metin. “Should you need 
me, call me! Call my mobile or, better yet, call me on my on-duty phone. This 
means I get to turn on the siren and I’ll be there in a jiff !”. Of course, the pseudo-
emancipatory attitudes of Lena and Doris backfire. At the end of the episode, 
Doris is worried sick with fear. She believes that something has happened because 
the girls stay out until midnight. She needs Metin to calm her down. Lena, who 
wanted nothing but strict rules from her laissez-faire mother, ends up hopelessly 
drunk and potentially vulnerable to sexual assault. Yet, she arrives back home safe 
and sound thanks to Yağmur.
Notably, the series lets Turkish German as well as German characters take 
comfort in learning that they can still evolve beyond the stock identities they had 
imposed on themselves. Again, introspection is key. Benbow points to season 
two’s plotline here. It is consumed with the storyline of Metin’s proposal of 
marriage to Doris and her repeated refusals of the “yoke of marriage” (Benbow: 
246-247). In episode three, Doris yells at the top of her voice at a puppy-eyed 
Metin: “I! DON’T! WANT! MARRIAGE!”. Dağtekin channels in episode 
six of season two a feminist critique of Western notions of “romance fluff ” in 
a reversed mother-daughter talk between Doris and Lena in the family kitchen: 
“You’re such a feminist, you can’t even take it that the man is the one to propose”, 
says Lena. Doris responds while cutting onions for dinner, “Yes, but I’m going to 
make an effort. That’s why I do the laundry more often now and I don’t always 
have to be on top when Metin and I have sex. I’ll just have to grin and bear it 
when he proposes”. - “Is that supposed to be some kind of practice for you in how 
to be a woman?”—“Oh my, it’s going to be horrible. Just what kind of gender role 
has history burdened us with?” […]—“Gee, you’re so unromantic, Doris. You 
don’t even cry when you’re cutting onions”. 
Predictably, however, the preliminary superiority of Doris’ feminist protest 
at marriage turns out to be susceptible to the alleged inferiority of traditional 
romance and female stereotypes. The German woman finally allows herself to 
be whisked away by her “middle-class Romeo” after a botched Botox injection 
to keep her looking young and after buying a reasonable wedding gown, a beige 
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trouser suit. “There are just so many occasions I can wear it to”, explains Doris 
while she models the purchase to Lena in what is the anti-climax of every rom-
com’s get-the-gown scene. Metin accepts this all as part of Doris’ complex 
personality, which reassures her that it is the right choice for her own life. “I have 
a kitchen and kids, and I cried when someone asked me to marry him. I am a real 
woman”. Doris says these lines in an over-the-should shot while dancing her first 
dance as a married couple with Metin. She says the words to herself rather than 
to Metin, who leads her across the dance floor. The camera zooms out while the 
couple keeps dancing on a barge on the River Spree in Berlin after their wedding 
ceremony. Peterson writes that, here, the didactic message of the comedy series 
hinges on the fact that Turkish for Beginners “humanizes and complicates issues 
that are both intensely personal and highly charged politically” (Peterson: 101), 
while the humour turns on the acceptance of Otherness in Others and the Self.
When Grandad had a Girlfriend 
The narrative of Turkish for Beginners repeatedly suggests that predetermined 
ideas about migrants or other narrowly drawn identities are undesirable. There 
is also a rejection of aggressive behaviours towards Others because they seem 
different. The end of the series demonstrates how liberating the reflection on 
incongruities and a more critical self-image can be. One could call this a form of 
relief humour. It encourages individuals to refocus their energies on maintaining 
and developing relationships rather than pushing away Otherness. Several of 
the show’s couples come to that happy-end conclusion. Lena and Cem can find 
common ground and their relationship ends on a happy note in the final episode. 
Lena gives birth to their mixed-ethnicity child after dumping her German 
boyfriend Axel in season one. That relationship was too easy and unsatisfying for 
Lena. In contrast, the effort it takes to work out her problems with Cem turns 
into a desire to understand the Turkish German character better. Ultimately, the 
process of getting to know Cem’s true identity turns into romantic love. Cem 
vows in turn to clean up his act because he wants to be there for his family—“not 
like those loser-dads in the papers, those who simply run off. That ain’t me”, he 
assures Lena. 
The substitution of anger with enjoyment culminates in the final episode of 
the series. Lena and Cem repeat the insults for each other from the first episode’s 
dinner scene. However, the context has changed completely. “Stupid German 
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bitch princess”, says Cem to Lena with a big smile on his face. “Turkish macho 
dick”, responds Lena in a kind tone. They look at each other and cannot suppress 
their giggles. Amusement has replaced aggression. The moment both characters 
laugh off their initial hatred for each other while holding their new-born child 
illustrates this. The scene reminds the viewer of the promotional image of the 
series. It featured the bickering children and the smitten parents. At the end of 
the series, Yağmur has learned to accept more diversity in her life and to embrace 
the Turkish German duality of her identity. She marries Greek German Costa 
before starting a career as an interpreter for Turkish and German at the Federal 
German Parliament in Berlin. In episode two of season one she had still yelled 
at Doris for buying Greek olives and being totally mindless of the long-standing 
conflict between Greece and Turkey: “Are you out of your mind, Doris?! GREE-
EEE-EK olives?!”. In the finale, Costa and Yağmur hold hands and smile at the 
camera. 
Second- and third-generation characters enjoy the liberation from resentment 
and aggressive energies. Their plotlines end in love stories. The first generation 
may find love, too, despite being firmly set in its ways. Dağtekin’s series suggests 
that members of the grandparent or first generation can still learn to embrace 
ethnic diversity and social change. Something positive will happen to them if 
they do. Hermann Schneider lives and dies to prove this point. Economic failure 
forces Doris’ father to live with his daughter in a multicultural household. 
Nothing could displease the alt-right nationalist more. He is forced to enter 
hostile territory where his blonde German daughter is fraternising with “a 
Muslimist”. Hermann’s racist rants and “kick out the foreigners!” ramblings are 
hyperbolic. He shouts in a militaristic style at people and plays military parade 
music in the family’s living room to romanticise the “good old times” of his 
youth. His character is caught up in a stereotypical Germanness. All the other 
members of the Schneider-Öztürk household agree that he is a “Nazi artefact”. 
Yet, a feeling of relief also comes to this character as well as those who initially 
hated him. The joy over his ability to change ensures that Hermann’s reductive 
portrayal as a racist does not overshadow his rendering into an identificatory 
figure with positive attitudes towards a modern Germany.
Old Schneider harbours a great amount of hatred for everyone who is different 
from his generation. He objects to everything who and which is not historically 
Bio-Deutsch. This negativity must be gradually replaced by positive emotions 
before his character can find joy in how German society has changed. Doris finds 
her father’s presence revolting until he shows signs of moral betterment. The 
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sitcom puts the figure of Hermann through its paces, a fact which is mirrored in 
his journey through the living areas of the Schneider-Öztürk house. The series 
highlights Old Schneider’s initial disappointment with what he calls his Turkish 
prison camp. There a numerous instances of quick-witted dialogue between father 
and daughter ending in humorous dismissal of his anachronical mindset: “In the 
olden days they wouldn’t have served that dog chow to any decent German”, he 
rambles during the family’s weekly “Kebab and Köfte” dinner. “In the olden days 
you also still fit into your Hitler army uniform”, counters Doris. “Now shut it. Eat 
your salad and then it’s off to the attic again!”.
Hermann is an obnoxious character who reluctantly inhabits the blended 
home. His daughter stores him away in the attic of the Turkish German house 
because of his continual hate speeches. Hermann Schneider is the spectre of Nazi 
Germany. It occasionally makes an appearance in the spaces connoted as the 
present, the living areas of the second and third generation on the first and second 
floors. There, Hermann regularly encounters the introvert Yağmur. He finds joy 
in poking fun at the oversexed German women appearing on German television 
programmes with her. It is not until his death that the macho-chauvinist ceases to 
dwell both in a racist past and the attic, where he denies the demographic reality 
of present-day Germany: “We’ll have those foreigners kicked out eventually. All 
it would take are decent politicians like the ones we had before”, he regularly 
shouts to nobody while pounding with a fist on his old “Volksempfänger”, a 
kind of radio receiver developed by engineer Otto Griessing at the request of 
Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels.
Granddad Schneider’s identity is conflicted. The conflict is similar to that 
of older German sitcom characters such as “Nasty” Alfred in A Perfect Match.9 
The grandfather’s racist mindset has endured despite his increasingly frail body 
and his economic losses. Both have damaged his sense of pride and his ego as “a 
German of yonder, who never needed the help of others—and in particular not 
the help of no foreigners!” He repeats this Sarrazin-like rhetoric in various forms 
to Doris and the other members of the multicultural home. It is only gradually 
that Hermann gradually warms to the idea of becoming reacquainted with his 
hippie daughter, his granddaughter and “the in-house Turkos” after he suffers a 
stroke and is moved down from the attic to the second floor. Doris and the rest 
of the family decide to nurse him there and include him in their lives. The family 
cares for Hermann despite his disrespect for them. Their acceptance for him 
motivates Old Schneider to rethink his behaviour. His redemption arc therefore 
closes with a love story, too. He finally changes his ways when he falls in love 
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with a Jewish German woman. Her name is Esther. When Doris asks if Esther is 
offended by Hermann’s Nazi past, the octogenarian proclaims with a wink and a 
wave, “Oh no, not at all. I mean, I’ve always had a thing for bad boys”. 
Love and romance are a staple of most mainstream sitcoms (Benbow: 247). 
Where it gets mixed up with ethnicity, the sitcom genre simply adds that 
aspect to its situation humour plotlines and revises a character’s story as an 
arch of redemption. These are quite popular with audiences for offering images 
of harmony and resolve, as is the case with Old Schneider. His love for others 
compels Hermann to come to terms with modern-day Germany and his place in 
it. A positive outlook on life in the New German Family offers Old Schneider an 
insight into non-aggressive ways of being German, a father to his daughter and 
a member of a Turkish German family. The grandfather transforms. He ends his 
existence with a changed perspective on different communities and their existence 
in Germany alongside Germans like him. His final deed is representative of the 
transformation from hateful to loving being. He convinces granddaughter Lena 
not to abort her Turkish German child. What Old Schneider believes to be the 
“only good thing” in his life finally allows him to die in peace. The death even 
moves Doris to let go of her negative feelings for Hermann. Two episodes later, 
she laughs tears of joy at the memory of Granddad Schneider while looking at the 
first ultrasound pictures of Lena’s baby. As Benbow interprets such metaphors, 
of which there are many in Dağtekin’s series, “The family—like Germany’s 
multicultural society—might have its share of conflict, but there is plenty of love 
there” (Benbow: 247).
Granny Business 
Another example of how Dağtekin’s situation comedy moves beyond the standards 
of Turkish German stereotypes is Granny Öztürk. She enthusiastically takes up 
the idea of textile brand piracy in old age. Metin’s mother is initially portrayed 
as an old-fashioned Muslim. The widow moves from Turkey to Germany to be 
with her son and to make sure that Yağmur grows up a proper Turkish woman. 
Metin’s daughter likes her conservative grandmother, whereas Doris receives 
nothing but negative comments from the old woman: “Her [Doris] no can cook, 
no good Turkish woman, no good wife”. Lena’s wardrobe elicits similar criticism 
from the old woman, who insists that female emancipation in Western countries 
is ludicrous. “If you not be good housewife, you not have good husband”. This is 
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a nugget of gendered wisdom the old Öztürk matriarch tries to instil into Lena. 
Another is: “Who dress like tramp, is tramp”.
The granny settles quickly into the multicultural household and tries to set 
in motion a process of re-traditionalising the family, both Turks and Germans. 
The turn to rural Turkish tradition refers to the stereotypical norm of Turkish-
German femininity in relation to motherhood and matriarchy: “that Turkish 
terror Granny and her old-fashioned bs”, Cem complains when the old woman 
kicks him out of his bedroom. It would be unthinkable for her to share a room. 
Then the grandmother demands that Cem do something worthwhile with his 
time like finding a job or marrying a decent Turkish girl. At the very least, “not 
hang around and waste time, like that Coos—taaa”.
The arrival of the Turkish Granny bears a resemblance to the earlier arrival 
of the German Granddad. Both figures are first generation and they cater 
to the clichés of their respective cultures. The Turkish woman appears moral, 
pious and family-oriented; she wears a headscarf and speaks only very little and 
broken German. The German grandfather, as described, is the poster child of 
an aged Nazi in a Hollywood film. Initially both characters seem to be defined 
by little other than their love for their national heritage and the long-gone past. 
Their negative reactions to mixed cultures hint at this. The old Schneider and 
the old Öztürk dislike the in-between identities of Metin, Doris, Lena, Cem 
and Yağmur. They reject the way these hybrids dress, think or re-define their 
nationality as their characters change. However, Dağtekin avoids in the storyline 
of “When Granny Makes Big Business” the relief humour perspective viewers 
had with Herrmann Schneider. He focuses instead on the incongruity humour 
arising from her role as the old-fashioned Turk and the not-so-innocent and, 
one might say, borderline criminal entrepreneur. She does business “like a Baller 
Boss”—this is Cem’s definition of a self-made man who runs his own company 
and makes money by doing virtually nothing, mostly Turkish Gangsta rappers he 
watches on television. 
Turkish for Beginners parodies here the cliché of an old-fashioned granny who 
is more Turkish than most Turks. The viewer finds out after a couple of episodes 
in season three that Granny Öztürk regularly sneaks out of the family home at 
night for a joyride in Doris’ car. One night, Doris and her sister Diana catch 
Granny red-handed. Both Schneider sisters are blonde and blue-eyed. They 
vehemently advocate female empowerment, gender equality and the study of 
sexual self-help books to find one’s G-spot without a male. Their shock at finding 
Granny Öztürk behind the steering wheel starts off a conversation about female 
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identities in Turkey. The old woman reluctantly tells the two German women 
that she quite enjoys driving because Turkish women were extremely limited 
in their life choices when she was young: “[b]ack then in Turkey, women may 
not drive, may not get driver’s licence”. Yet, the stern Turkish matriarch admits 
that she and her late husband always dreamed of the time when Turkish women 
would be allowed to drive a car. In fact, they conspired to break the law in Turkey 
to do so: “[e]very Sunday, when us drive together out of the city to countryside, 
I do the driving”.
The revelation is greeted with curiosity by the whole family when they 
eventually find out about grandmother Öztürk. Cem is happier than all the 
other Schneider-Öztürks to hear of his grandmother’s night-time excursions. 
Acknowledging that his grandmother “has quite a cool attitude for such an 
old bag”, he tries to put her to work accordingly. She is a skilled seamstress, so 
Cem ropes her into working in a rag-tag sweatshop where she is supposed to 
sew designer brand labels on Aldi polo shirts. However, the joke is on Cem and 
Costa, whom Cem has recruited as an accomplice in the scheme. The Granny 
they think is a naïve old lady blackmails them into doing most of the sewing 
themselves when she realises what Cem is up to. “If you not play along, I go to 
police and tell all. Then prison! And this one here, with pretty face”—she points 
to Costa—“will have much fun there”.
The plan fails in the next episode when Metin closes down the backdoor 
business: “[w]hat in the world are the people going to say when they find out that 
my mother is a brand forger? This is a misdemeanour!” Cool as a cucumber, the 
grandmother cannot see the harm. “Should only big brand companies in West 
get all the money? Why should I not get my share from rich tourists who would 
buy totally overpriced things in Turkey?”, she asks reproachfully in Turkish 
before moving out of her son’s home.
Here, as it is with all characters I have described, the ethnic sitcom makes short 
work of reductive identity typing to convey its most poignant conclusion with 
a sense of humour: it is never too late to understand how different contexts add 
new layers to the production of one’s identity.

CHAPTER IV
Bridget Jones’s Halal Diary
“Lass mal gut sein, es hätte schlimmer kommen können. Immerhin kann sie ordentlich 
Deutsch. Und sie trägt kein Kopftuch.”
“Never mind. It could have been much worse. At least her German is good. And she 
doesn’t wear a headscarf.”
—Mariechen, an old German woman who comments on Lale Akgün’s ability to 
fit into German society as a second-generation Turkish German (in Lale Akgün’s 
Tante Semra im Leberkäseland-Auntie Semra in the Land of Pork Meatloaves)
Summary
Millions of readers around the world know chick-lit because of Helen Fielding’s Bridget 
Jones novels (Bridget Jones’s Diary, 1996; Bridget Jones: The Edge of Reason, 1999; Bridget 
Jones: Mad About the Boy, 2013; and Bridget Jones’s Baby: The Diaries, 2016). A large 
readership also knows dick-lit because of Nick Hornby’s successful novels (High Fidelity, 
2005; About a Boy, 1998). Both genres are popular fiction and usually depict the lives of 
single women and men who work in white-collar jobs in urban environments through 
first-person narrations. Chick-lit novels gravitate towards overbearing parents and 
outdated life models, while much of dick-lit revolves around neurotic obsessions with 
popular culture to escape adulthood and responsible behaviour. Romantic relationships 
and sex are the most poignant aspects of chick-lit and dick-lit characters in their twenties. 
Characters in their thirties are usually married and contemplate family life or consider 
the validity of alternative lifestyles as singletons. Turkish German versions of chick-lit 
and dick-lit add to the traditional structures the perspective of non-Western men and 
women who grew up in Germany as sons and daughter of Turkish migrants. They write 
as narrators of their own life stories, using a first-person viewpoint. The added layer 
of Muslimness complicates the negotiation of previous and contemporary identity 
models despite the authors’ ability to work the issue of their ethnic identity seamlessly 
into Western life stories. This chapter claims that Turkish German chick-lit and dick-
lit authors write in their fictions astute observations on changes in German society, 
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specifically the debate about the ability of Muslim migrants to become German and 
their children to value German culture. Selected works of Hatice Akyün, Lale Akgün, 
Hülya Özkan, Kerim Pamuk, Ihsan Acar and Murat Topal show that Muslim Germans 
are just as neurotic, obsessed with shoes, cars and the allure of home ownership as are 
their fellow Germans. A change in economic status of first-generation migrants and their 
social upward mobility through bilingual language proficiency and access to education 
and jobs in media and entertainment have cast their personal stories in the light of funny 
life writings. The majority population in Germany increasingly seeks access to them.
Turkish German Comedy Literature as Part of the 
Global Funny 
The commercial success of Turkish German chick-lit and dick-lit in Germany 
arises in part from the genre’s position in the larger comedy entertainment culture 
of the West. The novels I discuss here remained on the bestseller lists of Spiegel 
magazine for months and more. As I pointed out in the introduction, some even 
claimed a top ten, if not top rank, spot for several weeks. Some topped amazon.de’s 
download charts for e-books for months on end. Akyün’s two novels are already 
in their seventh reprint due to an increasing demand for their protagonists’ funny 
attitudes to relationships, love and society. It is doubtful whether Einmal Hans 
mit scharfer Soße-A Spicy Kraut and Ali zum Dessert-Ali for Dessert will ever 
outsell the Bridget Jones series (Bridget Jones’s Diary, published in 1996, Bridget 
Jones: The Edge of Reason, published in 1999 and Bridget Jones: Mad about the 
Boy, published in 2014, all by the large British publishing house Vintage Press). 
But the success of the German-language variant of chick-lit and dick-lit rivals 
the Anglo-American original’s popularity in the context of Germany’s crowded 
book market. A Spicy Kraut has already been adapted for cinema as a film version 
called Spiced Up Jack (2013), which the film adaptions of three of the Bridget 
Jones novels show is good business. A cinematic release based on Lale Akgün’s 
Auntie Semra in the Land of (Pork) Meatloaves premiered in 2015.
One explanation for the local competitiveness of contemporary Turkish 
German chick-lit and dick-lit in Germany is the way the literary genre has 
adapted the comedy elements of earlier English-language versions. Smyczyńska 
stresses in The World According to Bridget Jones the (self-)ironic attitude of 
chick-lit and dick-lit protagonists in which they take on “normativity” and their 
perceived “failure” as “conventional” men and women (Smyczyńska, 2007: 3). 
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Women like Bridget make fun of their consumerist desires through their own 
commodification (Smyczyńska: 4). The cliché that they are obsessed with their 
body image plays out in Bridget Jones’s tally of weight, and alcohol units and 
cigarettes consumed per day. Hatice Akyün, inversely, keeps a log of l her stiletto 
shoes. Faulk meanwhile argues that dick-lit men write about (gendered) norms 
through “trends” in consumer culture (Faulk, 2007: 25). In Nick Hornby’s High 
Fidelity, the protagonist Rob Fleming sorts people and, in particular, his ex-lovers 
into top ten lists and labels them as “hip” or “lame”. Kerim Pamuk describes 
German culture in a similar way by listing the country’s regional identities from 
“normal” to “intriguingly quirky” (Pamuk, 2009: 24).
The aspect of self-irony in chick-lit and dick-lit novels also relates to several 
facets of incongruity, superiority and relief humour as I have outlined them in 
chapter two. Deeply ironic humour in Anglo-American chick-lit and dick-lit 
frequently involves incongruity and discordance with norms. German chick-
lit and dick-lit authors rely on it as well. Turkish German characters who 
target themselves and their foibles for comedic effect entertain the reader with 
exaggerated characterisations of allegedly typical Turkishness and Germanness. 
Hatice Akyün and Murat Topal utilise outsized self-portrayals with which they 
ridicule what the German media refer to as “Klischeetürken” or basic Turks. The 
basis of both Akyün’s and Topal’s humour is that they play with expected clichés 
and what happens in the actual everyday lives of Turkish German individuals. 
Their unexpected normality runs counter to certain expectations that Turkish 
German women are forcefully married off or that all Turkish German men 
are aggressive machos and misogynist brutes. I have already touched on these 
discourses in chapters two and three in my discussion of a nexus between gender 
roles and both ethnic and religious clichés. 
Superiority humour in contemporary chick-lit and dick-lit of Western 
mainstream cultures is closely interwoven with incongruity humour because 
both rely on hierarchical structures and evaluative judgement. From the contrast 
between two identities one may emerge as the supposedly more civilised or, 
in myriad other ways, the superior one. Bridget Jones’s refusal to be the dumb 
office blonde demonstrates this when she pushes back against her male and 
female colleagues’ prejudice. Why not just be the best dumb blonde then is also 
a question which Amanda Brown’s popular chick-lit heroine, Elle Woods, asks 
herself in Legally Blonde (2011). There are also several instances of humour in 
Lale Akgün’s novels where the author reveals implicit social pressure in German 
society simply because others consider her inferior as a woman, as a Muslim and 
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as a non-native German. One can relate to her opposition to being reduced to 
something less than German men, which the humour in her writing bears out in 
reversals of assumed hierarchies in German society. Specifically, Akgün targets 
the sexual self-esteem of German male politicians, which Ihsan Acar and Hülya 
Özkan echo in their description of Turkish and German attitudes towards over-
used assumptions about other cultures.
Incongruity and superiority humour serve as components of an overriding 
structure in chick-lit and dick-lit. Both Fielding and Hornby in their chick-lit 
and dick-lit novels use incongruity and superiority humour as reference schemes 
for cultural bias and to show just how available discriminatory sentiments are. 
Relief humour, in contrast, highlights a person’s reaction to these schemes and 
how to deal with discrimination, which Benbow describes as the didactic agenda 
of modern chick-lit (Benbow: 90). The mock-aggressive play of chick-lit and 
dick-lit authors with prejudices against certain groups of women or men bypasses 
a distressing affect. When chick-lit and dick-lit characters laugh at potentially 
offensive stereotypes, they exploit the harmful energy in them (Ferris and Young, 
2006: 43; Pearce, 2007: 216). Readers can then understand that certain tired 
expressions and assumed roles stand for hostility and repressed anger, which 
chick-lit and dick-lit authors re-route into laughter. The allusion-transgression 
mechanism is the trademark relief humour of “Bridgets who deal constantly with 
male fuckwittage” (Smyczyńska: 3). It is also a prominent humour mechanism in 
Kerim Pamuk’s dick-lit novel each time the Turkish German author ironises the 
social habitus of Germans to group-related feelings of ethno-cultural superiority 
vis-à-vis ethnic minorities who identify as Muslim.
Ethnic Chick-Lit and Dick-Lit as Constructions of Gender(ed) 
and Turk(ed) Identities
Contemporary Turkish German chick-lit and dick-lit are indebted to a global 
comedy phenomenon. The defining features of Fielding’s and Hornby’s novels, 
like so much chick-lit and dick-lit following after them, appear in Akyün’s, Akgün’s 
and Özkan’s novels with female authors who work in or with the media “and have 
either autobiographical elements (Bushnell) or use an autobiographical format 
(Fielding’s diary format). Texts that started life as a newspaper column (such 
as Bushnell’s) are also common in chick-lit” (Benbow: 92). The resemblance to 
Anglo-American precursors reveals that light-hearted Turkish German chick-lit 
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and dick-lit is not as new as German publishing houses like Rowohlt may want 
their audience to believe (Yeşilada, 2009: 118). However, two features of the 
genre are certainly innovative in the context of Turkish German literature. They 
concern the issue of transnationalism and the focus on stories about Turkish 
German suffering and marginality preceding them. The themes are hybridity, 
liminal identities and the negotiation of a new identity across the borders of 
established ones. This defines the Turkish German chick-lit and dick-lit novels 
I discuss here as cosmopolitan comedy narratives. They reject national cultural 
borders like those outlined in the introduction and chapter one, keeping Jewish 
Germans and Turkish Germans out of mainstream German culture at arm’s 
length. Because of that, the writers reclaim “socio-spatial constructions like 
borders, fences, houses, kitchens, and backyards” (Cisneros, 2014: 4) and invite 
readers to join their transnational lives in all these spaces (Seyhan, 1996: 16; 
Fenner, 2011: 13).
I examined the exploration of cultural spaces and the crossing of ethnic and 
gendered identity borders in chapter two in my analysis of Turkish German 
culture clash film comedies. The idea that Turkish Germans are incompatible 
with the majority society as described in chapter three’s ethno-spatial and multi-
generational analysis of Turkish for Beginners is also central to Turkish German 
chick-lit and dick-lit. All this connects the novels here to culture-clash comedy 
films and ethnic television sitcoms about non-native women and men who are 
more concerned with how their hair looks than with proving that they are not 
part of “a violent and threatening global Islam” (Benbow: 89). And while some 
novels like those of Hatice Akyün and Murat Topal are informed by discourses 
on forced marriage and honour killing debates and Islamic extremists, they are 
instead more interested in debunking the myth of the between-two-worlds 
paradigm Adelson writes about in The Turkish Turn (Adelson, 2005: 4-5).
The notion of Turkish Germans as exotic, non-European Others still interests 
German-speaking audiences. Contemporary Turkish German dramas in film and 
on television, such as Fatih Akin’s Aus dem Nichts-In the Fade (2017), resemble 
earlier films and television productions. The common scenario in the 1960s 
and 1970s was that of violent husbands abusing their wives and Muslim fathers 
brutally attacking their daughters. The success of Feo Aladag’s Die Fremde-When 
We Leave in 2010 therefore blindsided critics who believed that audiences were 
no longer interested in Turkish German female suffering at the hands of Turkish 
German males. Some researchers were not surprised though. Benbow details 
how there was a renewed curiosity after 9/11 about life in Germany’s parallel 
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societies, which she calls ”autoethnographies, a genre that [set] the agenda for 
subsequent literary portrayals of Turkish German women, [combining] elements 
of sociology, ethnography, and autobiography to various degrees” (Benbow: 15). 
Cheesman insists that these texts were instrumental in heightening existing 
anxieties about a sense of disintegrating Germanness (Cheesman, 2007: 2-4). 
Stories “ghost-authored by German journalists” (Benbow: 15) appealed the 
most to audiences. Weber adds that Turkish and German gender roles became 
intricately bound up with ethnic identities in this context. That connection still 
dominates contemporary Turkish German entertainment fictions in the new 
century (Weber, 2013: 2-3).
Not all chick-lit and dick-lit authors from ethnic minorities focus on the 
undoing of an association between ethnic identity and gender identity. Scholars 
like Yeşilada have argued that only female migrant authors with certain privilege 
in society, through liberal upbringing, high levels of education, monetary 
wealth, family support can reject ethno-gendered victimhood as an issue of the 
past (Yeşilada: 118). There is a “new confidence of nice Turkish women living 
next door” (Yeşilada: 117). “These new German-Turkish women” have optimism 
about their own lives and they publish books about it with large German 
publishers like Rowohlt, but it is not a reality for all migrant women (Yeşilada: 
117). One could however argue that the direction at least seems promising. 
Second-generation chick-lit authors and, as I propose in this chapter, also dick-
lit authors want to highlight positive alternatives to overly sensationalising 
representations of Turkish German identity tropes. It is a pertinent aspect in 
promoting independence and the privilege of not having to reproduce these 
tropes for commercial benefit as a result of the first generation’s struggles. 
Turkish German Chick-lit and Dick-lit
Turkish German comedy novels by male, first-generation authors like Şinasi 
Dikmen and Osman Engin have already presented a view of hybridity 
which starkly  contrasts with “the agonies described by Turkish-German 
autoethnographers” (Benbow: 90) about suffering and exploitation as 
documentary fiction in the 1960s. Dikmen and Engin wrote in the 1990s about 
skinheads too dumb to tell Indians from Turks and about German bureaucrats 
as senseless and dictatorial as Alice in Wonderland’s Red Queen. The authors I 
discuss here take it a step further by writing about shoes, good sex, top-ten lists 
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and their in-laws from rural Swabia. Audiences still perceive Turkish German 
authors of the first generation as excessively Other, yet things have changed in 
the new century for Turkish German chick-lit and dick-lit novels of second-
generation authors (Burns, 2007). German-speaking readers consider their 
books as sufficiently Western and German, so the focus in those stories could 
shift from accent to accessory in the first place. 
A shared feature of the chick-lit and dick-lit novels in this chapter is the 
rejection of Turkish German women as victims and Turkish German men as 
victimisers. Instead, maternal advice about late-age pregnancies replaces female 
suffering, and well-meant meddling of blood-relatives and in-laws in one’s career 
choices and personal affairs substitutes for a brutal Muslimised machismo. 
The beneficiary of this shifting viewpoint is the audience, which can catch a 
glimpse inside the daily life of novelists with parents as overbearing or spouses as 
infuriatingly passive-aggressive as their own. Hülya Özkan’s novel, for instance, 
revolves around the idea that mother knows best, while Murat Topal agrees 
to his father’s notion of happy wife, happy life. This is not to say that Turkish 
German Otherness has disappeared in the second generation’s negotiation of 
Turkishness and Germanness, but the focus is more on dual identity and German 
transnationalism than it is on dealing with a new culture and a new home country.
Hatice Akyün: Intercultural Romance 
Hatice Akyün’s first autobiographical novel Einmal Hans mit scharfer Soße-A 
Spicy Kraut (2007) and the follow-up novel Ali zum Dessert-Ali for Dessert (2010) 
remain to-date the most prominent examples of contemporary Turkish German 
chick-lit. Akyün introduces her family and her family’s migration background in 
the first novel. In the second she goes on to tell readers about her life as a single 
30-something woman in modern Germany. She describes in “jaunty, accessible 
prose” (Benbow: 89) her day-to-day “living in two worlds”, as the subtitle of her 
books reads. This includes a doting father and a nosy mother, a conservatively 
minded sister and a self-declared ladies’ man of a brother. It matters for the novel 
that Akyün identifies as Muslim and was born in rural Turkey in the Anatolia 
region. Yet, the chick-lit theme of finding a husband and marriage while pursuing 
a career is more central to the narrative than the negative stereotypes about Turkish 
German femininities. The focus on family and relationships is also important in 
Akyün’s second novel, in which the choice of male partner continues to eschew a 
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stereotyped discourse on violent husbands and forced marriage. The perspective 
is decidedly positive when the story ends happily and with Akyün’s partner by 
her side (Benbow: 97).
A Spicy Kraut borrows heavily from Bushnell’s Sex and the City and Carrie 
Bradshaw’s obsession with having Mr Right and having great orgasms, too. 
Akyün’s most urgent concern is to find a suitable lover and the perfect pair of 
high heels. Each is a necessary component for a life which she models on the 
consumerist ethos of Western chick-lit heroines like Bridget Jones. Female  se-
cond-generation authors with a migration background like Akyün’s have a history 
of defining their modernity through independent consumption (Butler and 
Desai, 2008: 10). Their works’ didactic message is that women are now in charge 
of choosing both footwear and life partner, which Benbow writes “characterizes 
chick-lit above all” (Benbow: 96). This confirms Butler’s and Desai’s statement 
that “neoliberal feminist subject-making [is] based on the notion of ‘choice’” 
(Butler and Desai: 8). Akyün’s choice falls on a German Hans with Turkish spice 
for a husband, despite this being unheard of in her Turkish family circles. 
While her parents would prefer a Turk for their daughter, Akyün wants a 
German. Only one dipped in hot sauce though will strike the perfectly palatable 
balance between the cultural stereotypes of German reliability and the sensual 
passion of a Mediterranean man: “the sex appeal of a Ferrari, but the reliability 
of a Volkswagen” (Akyün, 2007: 106). This image of cultural hybridity reveals 
a conflicting desire in Akyün’s first novel. Ommundson refers to it as reflective 
of “the challenges facing young women as they navigate between careers and 
relationships, independence and commitment, and commodity culture and 
traditional values” (Ommundsen, 2011: 108). The point chick-lit makes about 
middle-class women is that they must negotiate feminist gains and consumerist 
motivation through gainful employment. It is by that logic that Akyün uses the 
established structures of Turkish German ethnic humour, which I have described 
previously as pro-social, to insert her life story into a popular chick-lit universe. 
The in-between identity of “a spicy Hans—just dare to imagine that!” (Akyün: 
87) trades on the interethnic romance motif viewers can see in Saul’s Kebab 
Connection with Titzi and Ibo, and in Turkish for Beginners with Lena and Cem. 
There is a tension in Akyün’s longing for cross-cultural romance. It provides 
the impetus for her reflection on the complexity of second-generation migrant 
identities as integrated. These reflections emerge from the circumspect nod 
to a first-generation discourse on violence, Islam, and Muslim women. Weber 
observes that there has not for a long time been an alternative to the portrayals 
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of Turkish German women and their romantic relationships in German society 
(Weber: 152). Harsh Islamic laws which punish adultery are of no consequence 
for Akyün’s life. She is not interested in sensationalised honour killings or overly 
dramatic tragedies in the life stories of Turkish German women. However, she 
acknowledges both jokingly when she talks about her own family as an example 
of the contrary: “[m]ost German […] men don’t believe me when I tell them that 
the men in my family are totally harmless. German men were so afraid for no 
good reason that my father would have his sons beat them up, only to save the 
honour of the family” (Akyün: 64). 
Akyün makes clear to the reader that she and no one else controls her life, her 
bed and her shoe cupboard. She recognises what Montoro calls the basic premise 
of post-feminist chick-lit, namely that life on one’s own terms and credit card 
should be the norm for women (Montoro: 88). Such normality does not mean 
that Akyün is less aware of the normal realities and everyday lives of many Muslim 
women in Turkey who are forced into marriage by their fathers or brothers. She 
uses incongruity humour to establish a tie between her German lifeworld and 
the Turkish flipside to her modern lifestyle. When the question of a forced 
marriage in rural Turkey is put to her, Akyün simply responds with a flippant 
answer which has a serious undercurrent. There was once an Anatolian groom, 
she tells the reader, but his relatives found the marriage dowry being offered by 
the groom’s family, the al-Mahr, unaffordable: “[y]es, his family didn’t want to 
pay four camels and their farm truck for me. It turns out that they wanted to save 
it [the al-Mahr] for their older son’s future wife, which meant that I just barely 
got off the hook” (Akyün: 105). 
The key to Akyün’s light-hearted portrayal of second-generation Turkish 
German women as allegedly just as modern as other German women is romance 
between interculturally competent men and women. She is comfortable 
with living in the liminal space between two worlds, as the blurb inside the 
dustjacket of A Spicy Kraut reveals. The only problem is that Akyün’s multi-
ethnic competence restricts her dating pool to men who equally live between 
two worlds. One could call it a test of second-generation transnationalism, or 
looking for Mr Cosmopolite-Right on the pages of Turkish German chick-lit. 
Akyün’s novel shows how potential suitors fail this test because they act too 
German or Turkish and, thus, are incompatible with transnational Germanness. 
Akyün’s German “Hans”, for example, almost dies of eating a Turkish dish with 
extremely hot peppers. Hans’ real name is Stefan. He eats the peppers only to 
impress Akyün’s father, which Nick Hornby would refer to as a balls-to-the-walls 
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moment. Stefan fails both the food test and the couch test. He cannot find the 
mustard-coloured couch in the living room of Akyün’s family and gets lost in a 
sea of shaggy Turkish carpets and colourful wall tapestries. Akyün describes the 
clash of Germanness and German body with Turkishness and Turkish space in 
this scene with observational relief humour. She comments on every shade of 
red and green in Stefan’s face and the amount of sweat the six-foot-two man can 
produce. Scared that Stefan’s cultural competence may be as limited as his palate 
and sense of direction, she declares the relationship a failure.
Akyün’s romantic preference for a Spicy Kraut was an illusion of her own 
making. Because of this, she questions her personal cultural prejudice against 
Turkish German men in her second novel, Ali for Dessert. After a period of 
intense reflection, she ends the dating embargo on Turks and starts seeing 
a Turkish German man: “[b]ut, what was I to do with a Turk who can’t even 
speak proper German? One who goes around breaking women’s hearts? Now 
it turns out it was I who have fallen for this stereotype” (Akyün: 58). But there 
is a happy ending after all, as Akyün decides to date and later have a child with 
a so-called Turkish “Ali”. He is a second-generation Turkish German man with 
dark eyes, brown skin and raven hair. Akyün reveals that he teaches literature at 
a German high school and that he holds a university degree in German Studies, 
just like herself. It is a classic turn of events in chick-lit and most mainstream 
romantic comedy. There is the obligation of chick-lit authors to “kiss many frogs 
until Mr Right appears” (Ferris and Young: 17). And kissed many frogs Akyün 
has, because she stereotyped instead of acknowledging diversity among Turkish 
German men. The second novel ends in a long-term, monogamous relationship 
and a baby daughter for Akyün. This serves as confirmation that Akyün is right 
to pin her hopes of continuing her Turkish German identity development on 
her life partner’s education and emotional intelligence rather than his ethnic 
background. In Ali for Dessert, Akyün admits that she has freed herself from a 
desire to choose a partner who is bio-Deutsch. She admits that this obsession was 
mainly to mark her status as a professional Turkish German woman in modern 
Germany, which was all about being seen with the right brand of husband on one’s 
arm like an expensive bracelet. However, this kind of transnational femininity 
in German society is anchored in Western domesticity and essentialist identity 
thinking. It is a criticism of scholars of Turkish German chick-lit I engage with in 
the next section on Akyün’s fellow chick-lit author, Lale Akgün.
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Lale Akgün: Hybrid Women
Lale Akgün devotes her two novels, Tante Semra im Leberkäseland-Auntie 
Semra in the Land of Meatloaves (2009) and Der getürkte Reichstag-The 
Turk(ed) Parliament (2010), to the experiences of second-generation Turkish 
German women. Akgün migrated as a very young child to Germany with her 
father, mother and her younger sister. Her first novel, which centres on the 
time between the family’s arrival in Germany and Akgün’s marriage to Turkish 
German husband, Achmed, puts a positive spin on the supposedly woeful tales of 
Turkish newcomers in 1960s Germany. Her second novel picks up Akgün’s later 
years in life. Its plot starts after she has completed a German university degree in 
clinical psychology and has been running a private practice for several years in 
the German city of Cologne. The Turk(ed) Parliament details her career change 
from therapist to politician as the first elected official in the German Parliament 
who is of Turkish descent and a practising Muslim. Both novels have been in high 
demand in the media since their publication, and Akgün herself has appeared 
many times on television like Hatice Akyün.
Akgün’s public persona is primarily that of a female intellectual. The image 
of Akyün and similar Turkish German chick-lit authors features more as that of 
Sex and the City alpha chick fashionistas and girly girls despite their invitations 
to expert roundtables on Turkish German integration. Akgün also fits less into 
the mould of a “media-savvy, articulate, photogenic [example] of a new cultural 
phenomenon” (Benbow: 100), by which Benbow refers to Hatice Akyün’s 
description as an “’integrated’, non-threatening, refreshingly uncomplicated face 
of Turkish German femininity” (Benbow: 100). While Akyün talks publicly of 
cold waxing her upper lip and intercultural dates in keeping with her chick-lit 
author’s image as a modern woman, Akgün defines her own modernity through 
socio-political activism for marginalised Turkish German youth in urban areas 
and lower-class city spaces.
Akgün’s chick-lit comedy and her idea of femininity are more reflective and 
contemplative than Akyün’s. Auntie Semra in the Land of Meatloaves, which was 
made into a film in 2015, also focuses overall more on female character diversity 
than Akgün’s novels. Akgün draws for humour on the clashes among women 
like her mother and her aunt, whereas A Spicy Kraut’s and Ali for Dessert’s 
humour hinges mostly on funny dating scenarios between women and men. 
This is not to say that Akgün rejects the German reader’s multicultural curiosity 
in what Yeşilada has termed “profitable Chick-Lit alla turca” (Yeşilada: 135). 
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Akgün’s books feature her as the Turkish native informant. She narrates as the 
ethnographic insider, who presents Turkishness to the German majority society 
with a self-ironic take on integration, abused Muslimas and orientalist clichés. 
Directly addressing the readership and a look inside the daily life of her Turkish 
German family thus put Akgün in the same genre category as Akyün.
Akgün in her focus on how hybrid identities of Turkish German women clash 
with each other deviates somewhat from the romance plot of the chick-lit mother 
genre. Central to Auntie Semra in the Land of Meatloaves is the explicit contrast 
between Turkish German femininities, specifically first- and second-generation. 
The relationship of Akgün with her mother Latife, for example, represents an 
acknowledgment of women in reference to modern Turkishness. The title 
character of Akgün’s aunt Semra adds yet another layer to that context. Latife is a 
Kemalist mathematician. Her identity confronts the domestic stereotype of the 
first generation’s veiled Turkish German housewives, who supposedly all took 
care of household and children while the husbands did manual labour in German 
factories. There are several instances in the novel where Latife reads her husband 
the riot act or where her academic training enables her to put racist German 
officials in their place. That Akgün’s mother also clashes frequently with senior 
citizen and Turkish national Semra, who bends the rules of Islam according to 
her own needs, ironises the notion of anti-modern Turkishness and a generalising 
perspective on womanhood even further.
There are today still pressures in German society for Muslim females to 
perform their identity in clichéd ways. Landfester in her analysis of contemporary 
Turkish German literature finds that Akgün’s women figures can violate these 
expectations. Yet they can do so only because genres such as chick-lit put the 
feel-good aspect for the female, integrated and modern reader before religious or 
ideological problems (Landfester: 2013). What Montoro describes as the female 
individualism of Bridget Joneses who rebel against others wanting to speak 
for them plays out in Semra’s unapologetic love for finely ground pork loaf, a 
Southern German dish known as “Leberkäse” or liver cheese. Latife insists that 
Aunt Semra is a religious hypocrite and that she cherry picks from the rules of 
Islam for women despite Semra’s hajj to Mecca and the holy places. Semra shoots 
down the criticism with a simple pun before she bites into her pork sandwich, 
decorated by a wide grin on her face: “I don’t know whatever it is you are talking 
about […] but my German is just as good as yours. This stuff here is made of liver 
and cheese. I mean, that’s what it’s called, right? Where in the world would any 
pork in there come from?” (Akgün: 115). The battle between Latife and Semra 
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over who is more modern and more emancipated ends when the old woman 
makes another un-Muslim choice. The 65-year-old does as she pleases and washes 
her meal down with a big glass of cold German beer.
Similar incongruous humour moments resurface in The Turk(ed) Parliament. 
Akgün is confronted with German women who fear the alterity of Turkish 
German femininities and German men who want to exploit it: “Oh dear, oh dear, 
we cannot vote for you if you wear a headscarf ” (Akgün, 2010: 1), say two old 
German women to Akgün in the pre-election phase of her campaign. “Why for 
heaven’s sake aren’t you veiled? That would get us the Turkish vote” (Akgün: 46), 
old, white German MPs say to Akgün on her first day as an elected member of 
Germany’s Federal Parliament. The struggle with reductive images of Muslim 
women is clear. Akgün laughs these off with the same laid-back attitude Semra’s 
character displays in the first novel when confronted by Latife. 
In fact, Akgün decides to enjoy clichéd perceptions to teach the reader about 
a persistent bias against Muslim women in Germany. Her Turkish German 
husband chuckles as she tells him of her male colleagues’ issues with sexual 
“endurance” (Akgün, 2010: 34) in a chapter entitled “Soft German Wood”. 
Akgün reduces Germany’s most influential individuals to their limp penises. 
This mirrors the reduction of Turkish German women to mute bodies under 
veils and exotic beauties with no brains.1 In her thoroughly modern way, though, 
the board-certified psychiatrist prescribes a generic brand of Viagra, which her 
husband traffics across borders from Turkey to Germany. Akgün finds delight 
in her ability to show smug German men how much they depend on Turkish 
migrants, and the allegedly less modern Muslim women, to please both their 
German wives and mistresses (Akgün: 34). “Putting a couple of the members of 
this old boys’ club in their place” (Akgün: 34) reflects how the chick-lit agenda 
of Turkish German women defies assumptions about male dominance in society 
(Ferris and Young: 43). All that is needed is a little resistance to hegemonic 
identities. Hülya Özkan approaches her identity as a modern, Turkish German 
woman in ways similar to those of Akgün and Akyün. She self-styles the world 
to which she invites the German reader. I discuss her book next, before turning 
to the perspectives of Turkish German dick-lit authors on the nexus between 
gender and Muslimness in German society.
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Hülya Özkan: Border Crossing
Hülya Özkan participates with her novel “in the [Turkish German chick-lit] 
project of inducting the German reader into the normalcy of Turkish German 
lives” (Benbow: 96). Özkan’s Güle Güle Süperland-Bye Bye Süperland (2011) is 
the narrative of what her novel’s subtitle describes as “A Trip to My Scary Nice 
Family”. The text starts and ends with Özkan’s Turkish German mother, who 
declares excitedly to her daughter in a long-distance call from Turkey as the story 
begins, “We have sacrificed a small goat for you!” (Özkan: 1; 187). It is an annual 
tradition for the mother to have her daughter visit her during Eid al-Fitr. At 
the time of the Muslim High Holidays the mother’s immediate family gathers 
to celebrate the feast of sacrifice. The mother divorced Özkan’s father only ten 
years after the family’s move to Germany in the 1960s. This sets up the border 
crossing context for the author’s account of her regular visits to see her mother 
in the Istanbul suburbs. Özkan’s mother lives happily there with the rest of her 
side of the family, while the father lives permanently in Germany with his two 
daughters. 
Regular visits from Germany to Turkey are routine for Özkan. This becomes 
clear in the first couple of pages of her novel. She describes her pre-flight rituals. Her 
habit is to pack light because her home is in Germany. She has a German husband 
and a Turkish German daughter, and she never stays in Turkey for more than a 
couple of weeks (Özkan: 3). Özkan also prepares herself mentally and physically 
for her Turkish relatives and the Turkish bazaars in Istanbul with meditation and 
hot yoga. It is a similar mindset to that of Bridget Jones, who readies herself with 
a baker’s dozen of tequila shots for visits to her mother on the outskirts of Leeds. 
These measures seem unnecessarily drastic, but they are essential. Özkan assures 
the reader who might have never been to Istanbul or stayed with Turkish families 
before that one might go mad without appropriate preparations: “I once heard 
somebody say about Istanbul: You cannot conquer this city. It conquers you—
just like my mother. If that’s supposed to be a compliment about Istanbul, then it 
must be because of Istanbul’s magical beauty. […] Istanbul is not for the weak or 
for people who love their everyday routine’s reliability. You have to be quite light 
on your feet or, better yet, you have to have multiple personalities so that Istanbul 
won’t wear you down—just like my mother” (Özkan: 13). 
Özkan rejects the notion of her novel as exotic travel writing. The reader 
might expect such a perspective from the native informant on orientalist images 
of modern Turkey (Yeşilada: 117). Instead, Özkan sets up old tropes like lifting 
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the veil or a Western gaze into her Turkish lifeworld like a dreaded family trip 
to spend Christmas with one’s relatives. She describes her trip to Turkey as the 
common practice of a German “courtesy visit” (Özkan: 4). German family 
satires such as Vicco von Bülow’s Papa ante Portas (1991) have propagated these 
hopelessly old-fashioned German rituals since the early 1990s. Bye Bye Süperland 
falls more in line with German family comedy than with Turkish German family 
drama. Most importantly, it has the chick-lit feature of the overbearing parent 
who drives her daughter insane over the Christmas/Eid holiday. Özkan’s crossing 
into another cultural sphere is also only temporary, which counters the tragic 
notion of the impossible return motif. Second-generation filmmakers like Fatih 
Akin (We Forgot to Go Back, 2001) have frequently commented on it as a source 
of identity trauma in Turkish German documentary films.
Özkan’s novel is a light-hearted entertainment comedy about family quibbles 
rather than a sad story about split migrant families or Turkish German female 
suffering. Her mother and sister are at the centre of this. The dust cover of the 
novel plays on the notion of geographical displacement as the norm for Turkish 
German writing. The image shows Özkan’s mother with a mobile phone with 
which the doting parent is only “a phone call away” (Özkan: 4). “Many thanks, 
my beloved Turkish Telcom” (Özkan: 5), remarks Özkan in an ironic tone. It is 
a comment on her mother’s ability to interfere more frequently in her daughter’s 
life choices through texts, emails and free-to-download smartphone apps. It is 
actually easier for the mother to meddle in the daughter’s life than if she lived 
next-door in Germany. Virtual connectivity further undermines the cliché of 
the travelling Turkish German migrant family, which German families pitied for 
coming to Germany in an old car and with many rest stops along the German 
autobahn (Berghahn, 2014). Özkan makes fun of this scene’s over-use in drama 
films on the Turkish German diaspora with an example of anecdotal humour. 
She rather enjoyed it when the family forgot her annoying sister at a German 
autobahn service station during a toilet break. “It took a couple of kilometres 
before my parents discovered to their horror that the silence in the back of the 
car was for a good reason” (Özkan: 64).
There are many amusing family moments in Bye Bye Süperland. Citing them 
supports Berghahn’s point that all family narratives about migration and diaspora 
“have a great deal in common” (Berghahn, 2014: 5). Özkan employs the ethnic 
comedy staple of the you-never-call-you-never-write Jewish mother to show that 
Turkish German families are no different from German families. That she is so 
close to her mother despite the geographical distance is the sign of a positive 
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discourse on international movements across borders, which replaces a notion 
of traumatic loss over leaving the Turkish home behind. Almost every chick-lit 
mother drives her children mad. Özkan’s mother knows how to manipulate her 
daughter emotionally. A good deal of the story is about how Özkan’s mother 
has been pulling at her daughter’s heartstrings for a long time. The Istanbul 
resident succeeds in making Özkan travel to and fro between the Bosporus 
and the Rhine so often that transnational travel, a regular commute, eventually 
becomes an essential part of the daughter’s second-generation hybridity. Parallel 
societies are therefore no real concern for Turkish German women such as 
Özkan. Her simultaneous attachment to the mother in Turkey and her blood 
family in Germany is unproblematic. What Özkan finds more burdensome is 
that unlimited international talk plans are now offered by Turkish telephone 
providers. One of her tongue-in-cheek comments suggests that mothers around 
the world use that phone plan feature to tell their daughters across the borders of 
countries that “it wouldn’t hurt to lose a bit of weight, now wouldn’t it” (Özkan: 
24-26). 
Bye Bye Süperland illustrates how Turkish German chick-lit authors ironise 
dated ethno-cultural clichés about transnational travels through their connection 
to stereotypical gender rhetoric. Özkan suggests that kinship, cultural similarities 
and multiple loyalties often intersect in modern families. Whelehan confirms 
them as a typical chick-lit tenet in a variety of cultures. She argues that it is 
important to note, though, that contemporary chick-lit novels mock the 
concept that modern women should be able to have it all, “while nobody asks if 
the grass is actually greener on the other side” (Whelehan, 2005: 87). This plays 
out in Özkan’s novel in a chapter called “Lost in Bureaucracy”, in which Özkan 
indeed “has had it with all [sides]”. The Kafkaesque red tape Turkish authorities 
confront Özkan with during one visit makes her yearn for Germany’s “regular 
counter opening hours for line B” (Özkan: 44). She unexpectedly rejoices in the 
thought of a German “local city worker who is available every day from 9 to 5 and 
doesn’t put much emotion into their job” (Özkan: 44). The experience confirms 
Özkan’s suspicion that more choices between ethnicities, cultures, countries and 
lifestyles do not necessarily mean that one has better alternatives. Her mother’s 
rant against Turkish handymen and a wish addressed to Allah for double-glazed 
German windows in the winter in Istanbul stress this point (Özkan: 18).
The reader may not be surprised by the end of the novel that Özkan’s Turkish 
German travel experiences have left her like Aunt Semra with a decidedly 
pragmatic perspective on border crossings. She operates in a space between 
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formal rules and the realities of her life as a Turk and as a non-native German. 
There is one occasion on which Özkan flies back to Germany in company with 
her German husband after a lengthy visit to Turkey. She wants to turn her life 
companion of 20 years into a drug mule. Her mother’s home-made Turkish 
Mumbar sausage in her luggage, Özkan tells him, would never pass through 
German customs if she, as a non-EU citizen, carried it in her suitcase. But that he 
should smuggle filled sheep intestines instead scares the German. He puts his love 
for EU customs regulations on imported goods before the unique Turkishness of 
his wife’s non-European food: “[t]here was nothing I could do. Whatever I said 
to my husband, he wouldn’t commit to a life of crime” (Özkan: 7-8). To have to 
relinquish Turkish food at German customs is a sobering reminder for Özkan.2 
She realises that there are still times when she crosses borders as a liminal German 
while her native husband seems to relish his national privilege of unrestricted 
access and implicit trust. Similar moments appear in Akyün’s and Akgün’s novels 
in the clashes between German men and Turkish German women and allegedly 
modern German politicians and female Turkish German politicians, respectively. 
Özkan is as amused as Akyün and Akgün that she has the cool to react in gleeful 
spite to the patronising behaviour of white German men, sending the husband to 
sleep on the couch that night when they got home from the airport. 
Kerim Pamuk: Post-colonial Narratives
Gender and sexuality have been some of the central issues in the novels of 
male Turkish German writers like Feridun Zaimoğlu since the early 1990s. 
Schmidt argues that the nexus between minority men in Germany and diverse 
masculinities has been to date “somewhat overlooked in scholarship in favour 
of issues of ethnicity” (Schmidt, 2011: 199). It is precisely this issue of ethnic 
minority masculinity and male Muslim identities which contemporary Turkish 
German dick-lit brings to the fore. I have mentioned how the genre started with 
the comedy novels of male Turkish Germans such as first-generation authors 
Osman Engin and Şinasi Dikmen. Their novels foreground the construction 
of a gendered Turkish German identity. Cheesman points out, though, that 
Engin’s Kanaken-Ghandi-The Kanak-Ghandi (2000) and Dikmen’s Hurra, ich 
lebe in Deutschland-Hooray for Germany (1996) focus much more on ethnicity as 
imperfect performance than on a reasonably credible notion of authentic Turkish 
masculinity (Cheesman: 23-24). 
turkish german muslims and comedy entertainment136
Yardley finds that it is a sign of progress in the debate on gender identity when 
male novelists tackle traditionally female issues related to “dating, jobs and life 
direction” (Yardley, 2013: 24). Male Turkish German authors such as Kerim 
Pamuk, Ihsan Acar and Murat Topal focus on these aspects in their second-
generation Turkish German dick-lit novels. The stories are also autobiographical 
but work with different aesthetics from Turkish German chick-lit novels. Both 
Turkish German chick-lit and dick-lit celebrate the upwardly mobile migrant 
who moved from suffering to success. However, the men in Turkish German 
dick-lit do not follow the Bridget Jones formula. They follow Anglophone dick-
lit models when they make lists and draw up rankings of popular culture trends 
rather than sharing their stories directly via email or diary, or in direct address to 
the reader. The man in Nick Hornby’s dick-lit refer to and think of themselves as 
autonomous, whereas popular chick-lit women strive for notions of community 
and being relatable, according to Barry Faulk (Faulk, 2007: 153). Pamuk, Acar 
and Topal fall broadly into this category. 
The difference in communication style is a crucial point to make because dick-
lit authors are less interested in conveying intimate “confessions” to their reader 
than chick-lit authors who write for their “sisters” (Ferris and Young: 23). Yet, 
the men still want to produce with their “comic writing a male bildungsroman 
[about who they are], the ups and downs of a relationship, fatherhood, or their 
place in society in general” (Faulk: 155). These male “dicks” just write in another 
way. They dress up their incessant, lacerating self-analysis as a beguiling self-
expressive identity like music snob Rob Fleming, a nod to James Bond author 
Ian Fleming, in Nick Hornby’s High Fidelity (1996). Dick-lit novelists proffer 
“the voyeuristic charm of getting to know male psychology at its most intimate, 
while avoiding connotations of psychosis” (Faulk: 155). David Fincher’s Fight 
Club (1999) has become an iconic dick-flick for portraying that issue in popular 
Anglophone cinema.
Female and male Turkish German authors of second-generation chick-lit 
and dick-lit share a sense of Germany as the German home. Turkish German 
literary scholars point out that contemporary Turkish German comedy 
novelists have moved on from certain features of first-generation authorship. 
The second-generation label refers no longer to aspects of migration itself but 
to post-migration scenarios (Specht, 2011: 23). Kerim Pamuk suggests in his 
novel Allah verzeiht, der Hausmeister nicht-Allah Has Mercy, A German Janitor 
Doesn’t (2009) that second-generation Turkish German men like him were 
unmistakably socialised in Germany. Nevertheless, native Germans, specifically 
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other men, question Turkish German men’s identities. They doubt that their 
modern masculinity is equal to theirs because of a family’s migration history, an 
exotic visual appearance or an “un-Germanic” name (Pamuk: 3). 
Pamuk demonstrates how Turkish Germans make fun of their perception as 
lesser Germans to retaliate in a comedic pissing match between lads. In his novel 
he draws on the idea of promotional travel writing to present Germany to the 
reader as an unknown territory (Bendixen and Hamera, 2009: 1-3). The story of 
Allah Has Mercy, A German Janitor Doesn’t (2011) starts out with the assumption 
that Germany is an exotic place which is just waiting to be discovered by non-
European adventurers. The novel begins with Pamuk’s invitation to an imagined 
Oriental reader: “[m]y dear fellow brothers and sisters in the faith who hail from 
the East” (Pamuk, 2011: 1). They are invited to go with him on a journey through 
this strangest of places called Germany. On the first page of the narrative a plane 
descends on Germany and aboard are Pamuk and his fellow explorers. Their 
travels through Germany are going to shed light on and evaluate in a mode of 
cultural superiority the cultural differences between German natives and non-
native Muslims in the country. 
Pamuk explores German society by contrasting Muslim selves with German 
Others. This reverses the ethnic minority perspective in Hatice Akyün’s and 
Lale Akgün’s novels. Ironically, though, the German reader is both object and 
addressee of Pamuk’s novel. The book is written exclusively in German with a 
primary focus on German traditions. German social values lurk in the shadow 
of discourses on violent “ghetto Turks”. The reader becomes aware of this when 
the alleged promotion of Germany quickly turns to rankings of the country’s ten 
most racist regions and politicians most likely to bring back “the little black one”. 
This is not about a dress but a little, black upper-lip moustache (Pamuk: 4-12). 
Pamuk’s inversion of ethnic Otherness is significant. As Adelson points out, 
exploratory desires have a long history of fuelling the Germans’ colonialist 
thinking. Them bringing their more advanced culture to pre-modern areas and 
people is a long-held Germany fantasy of superior Germanic culture (Adelson: 
23). One could argue that the German majority population has had similar 
motivations to civilise members of the Turkish German minority in Germany 
over the course of the past 50 years. The language in the AfD’s 2020 political 
programme would suggest as much. 
Pamuk makes numerous jabs at the Germans’ colonial fantasies. The cover 
image of Allah Has Mercy, A German Janitor Doesn’t satirises a Eurocentric terra 
incognita notion of the unknown Other and presents the reader with a contour 
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map of Germany. Stock image cartoons show mothers in yoga pants as they 
push sport buggy strollers in West Germany, while the image of a “Currywurst” 
or curried sausage food truck replaces Germany’s capital city of Berlin in East 
Germany. These stereotypes about German culture, that women in active war 
rear their children during workouts and that Germans love their iconic sausage 
street food, are substitutes for actual geographies. The substitution reorders the 
hierarchy of allegedly superior German culture. Stock images reduce Germanness 
to funny tropes of food and white-people-meme lifestyles. The process is akin 
to other popular internet memes, which superimpose alternative messages on 
existing imagery. Turning the German map into a meme-like caricature alludes 
to the availability of clichés about other countries and cultures in the German 
popular imaginary. 
The non-native German or integrated reader benefits from Germany’s 
Othering. He or she may find it amusing that a Turkish German author would sell 
Muslim foreigners the idea of resettling and making a good life in Germany. And 
to do so as if no other Muslim person had ever set foot on German soil. Pamuk 
emphasises the Christopher Columbus-like exploratory gesture by addressing 
the reader directly as his fellow Muslim brothers or Muslim sisters, whose “Cattle 
Class flight” is about to descend upon the exotic lands of Germany (Pamuk: 2). 
Pamuk uses a satirical perspective on promotional literature to conjure up the 
historical labour migration discourse of West German politicians. I discussed 
this aspect in chapter two in my analysis of Şamdereli’s culture clash comedy film, 
Almanya. Şamdereli revisits how West German elites invited migrant workers 
in the 1960s to come and share in Germany’s welfare. Yet, Germany failed to 
make good on its gilded promises. I consider the reappearance of the same 
motif of broken promises in Pamuk’s novel as a mocking allusion to Germany’s 
self-promotion as cosmopolitan host country. Mandel has comprehensively 
commented on this topic (Mandel, 2008: 1-3).
There is a profound affirmation in Allah Has Mercy, A German Janitor Doesn’t 
that Germany is compatible with Muslimness. Pamuk insists that male Muslims 
who journey between the Rivers Spree and Rhine will be pleased to find that 
Germanness is very similar to different Muslim cultures. It is basically the same. 
Like Toula’s Greek father in Joel Zwick’s My Big Fat Greek Wedding (2002), 
Pamuk traces all of Germany’s cultural riches back to their origins in the Muslim 
world. A case in point is Pamuk’s voyage to every corner of Germany to break 
down the boundaries between actual Germanness and an imagined Muslimised 
one. Several interludes along the way allow him to reflect on German dialects, 
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traditional garments and buildings. He is certain that Bavarian gibberish sounds 
like ancient Turkish; that Swabian folk wear for women appears as colourful as 
Persian wedding gowns; and that the Brandenburg Gate’s architectural design was 
inspired by the grand architecture of Arab mosques. In My Big Fat Greek Wedding, 
the first-generation Greek American father keeps on interrupting everybody in 
the film only to explain how every aspect of Western culture in America goes back 
to ancient Greece. Pamuk also pauses his own narration several times. He tells the 
reader how Germans profited from the many Arab and Turkish foods and ethnic 
cuisines which the first explorers brought from the Orient to the land of pork 
Schnitzel and overcooked cabbage, Kraut (Pamuk: 88). 
Yet Pamuk also warns his readers against unadvisable behaviour as Nick 
Hornby’s protagonists often do. The preoccupation with the most agreeable 
places for Muslims in Germany bears traces of Anglophone dick-lit’s home-spun 
and commonplace wisdom and humour. There is no greater similarity between 
Pamuk and Hornby than in how Pamuk farcically explains that Muslim men 
should not think of “Easties” (Pamuk: 54) as their Eastern brethren. Muslim 
men may come to regret this kind of thinking and encounter Eastern German 
hospitals instead of Eastern hospitality. Any “Shawarma-Shiite” (Pamuk: 76) 
who wants to experience German health care from the inside is advised to go 
to Brandenburg city with a full beard and the Quran in hand. Nick Hornby’s 
protagonist, Rob, advises the reader in High Fidelity not to ask true connoisseurs 
of music for cheap bubble-gum pop. Will Freeman warns his young male protégé 
in About a Boy that wearing his mother’s handcrafted knitwear in middle school 
is low-hanging fruit for bullies and getting punched. 
Pamuk writes in a flippant, snobbish tone. It is the trade-mark feature of 
dick-lick narrators. He creates for himself a superior position of alleged cultural 
expertise on Germany’s many sub-cultures, specialising in people who wear 
Birkenstocks (Pamuk: 93-95). The professed knowledge sustains humorous and 
sometimes even quite challenging commentary on the reductive pseudo-colonial 
and orientalist perceptions which Western Europe’s white Christians have of 
other ethnic communities (Benbow: 106). However, one must note that it is a 
facetious exaggeration of cultural difference to destabilise assumed hierarchies 
in everyday culture. Cheesman has shown that Turkish German comedy authors 
like Dikmen and Engin do not call for the Turks’ isolation from the majority 
population. Rather, their ironical viewpoint serves them to inform the native 
readership about the struggles of minorities so that all communities can live 
together more happily (Göktürk: 177-178). This is certainly the case when 
turkish german muslims and comedy entertainment140
Pamuk addresses his own status as an integrated Muslim German man in modern 
Germany. It is easy to “bro-friend” native German men, he writes. All it takes is 
male bonding over urban male rituals like rooting for the same sports team, be it 
Galatasaray or Bayern Munich; or paying for a trip to Rio, “including intensive 
female care services for all of one’s needs” (Pamuk: 20; 45).
In some places Pamuk channels the persona of a merciless German janitor 
to come off as satirical about self-indulgent Germanness. The theme of 
Germany as a pseudo “multi-culti” nation is central to his book. He criticises 
the Germans’ need to be indistinctly the same without space for alternative 
forms of Germanness. Exemplary of this is the preposterous primary of German 
masculinity. As if German culture standards were not enough, German menswear 
and beauty trends had Germanified Turkish “[…] princes walk around in this 
country wearing leather jackets, greengrocer moustaches, and mullets” (Pamuk: 
125). Imaginary Germany emerges here as a dead-end for the expression of ethnic 
Otherness at the cost of assimilating to fit into German society. 
Allah Has Mercy, A German Janitor Doesn’t extolls the pleasures of ethnic and 
gender clichés for better or, literally, worse for fashionable wear. The book’s core 
is a comedic reversal of the sought-after 1990s list of do’s and don’ts in popular 
entertainment magazines, revered by both chick-lit and dick-lit protagonists as 
the gospel. Pamuk’s list of don’ts asks Muslim men to beware of male German 
caretakers. Pamuk explains that they are like Germany’s local ISIS, in that “they 
fight with self-sacrifice against the demonic chaos of unruly humanity, seeing 
themselves as the final and unsurmountable line of defence for German rule of 
law. They are: German janitors. They can easily compete with our Taliban and 
Jihadis when it comes to religious fervour, test of faith, courage, and martyrdom” 
(Pamuk: 18). Another don’t is about Muslims trying to understand native 
Germans: “[t]he German is a deeply fractured creature, my dear Aubergine-
Osmane. He always wants to be everything at the same time. If you were to 
ask him for their most favourite reflection, he would give you in response a 
most carefully crafted advertisement online-dating profile: spontaneous, but 
domesticated; sturdy, but sensitive; romantic, but grounded; emotional, but 
reasonable” (Pamuk: 106). Pamuk projects onto Germans their own anti-
modern idea of Turkishness and ethnic difference. This strategy shows how he 
plays Germany’s cultural chauvinism for laughs. A similar ridicule of cultural 
authenticity is apparent in Ihsan Acar’s novel. He portrays the notion of original 
Turkishness as a desire of German readers to reaffirm their stereotypical image of 
Turkish men in modern Germany.
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Ihsan Acar: Ethnic Originality 
Dick-lit authors frequently depict men as questioning and conflicted when they 
fail to fulfil oversimplified gender concepts offered by self-help manuals like John 
Gray’s infamous 1992 publication Men Are from Mars, Women Are from Venus. 
Ihsan Acar in his second-generation dick-lit novel Der Türke: das Original-The 
Real Deal Turks (2007) questions the effects of a similarly dichotomous view of 
ethnic identities as exclusively German or Turkish. Acar deploys a host of ethno-
cultural clichés to explain his Turkish German identity. His story first depicts his 
childhood, then youth, and finally adulthood in the German city of Berlin. He 
sees himself neither as an integrated Turkish German man nor as an allegedly 
original Turk. This sums up Acar’s approach to what Gill calls the “laid-back 
attitude of the new lads” (Gill, 2009: 3) in contemporary dick-lit. Gill argues that 
modern men depend less than the so-called traditional old boys on restrictive 
notions of masculinity and ethno-nationalist sentiments of societal order to feel 
safe when society changes around them (Gill: 5). 
Acar’s attitude can be described as defiant of the old ways. He dislikes 
predetermined concepts of The Turkish and The German man and Turkish 
German and German masculinities, respectively. Yet, the reader will find no 
outrage over religious discrimination or protesting ethnic bias in Acar’s book. 
That was the hallmark of male Turkish German authors like Zaimoğlu and his 
novel Kanak Sprak (1995) in the 1990s. Instead, Acar mirrors Akyün’s style of 
“irony, knowingness, and distancing […] and sometimes he is being even deeply 
shallow” (Gill: 4) to make a witty point about how modern Turks do integration, 
namely by instructing natives in supposedly inferior ways of being Turkish. Why 
try to climb the ladder if others can just come sliding down is an apt summary 
of Acar’s viewpoint: “[i]t’s much more convenient that way” (Acar, 2007: 54), 
he explains with what I suggest here is a reformulation of Kuispers’ example 
of pro-social American redneck humour (see chapter one). Acar embraces the 
stigmatisation native Germans associate inferior Turkishness with, especially 
when it refers to adolescent male Muslims who are categorically “unreliable, hot-
headed, and emotionally unstable up to the last inch of their frosted tips” (Acar, 
2007: 16). 
Acar, like Pamuk, upends the clichéd images of Turkish migrants which 
Germans put to the ethnic minority even after 50 years. His advice to Germans 
is to learn from Turkish lifestyles rather than to demand like Thilo Sarrazin that 
Turks should assimilate to be more German and less Turkish. Acar’s opinion 
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that Germans could benefit from some Turkish passion may remind the reader 
of Hatice Akyün’s A Spicy Kraut. “Having a chilled out Köfte BBQ in the city 
park without permission” (Acar: 43) refers to Pamuk’s dismissal of the Germans’ 
obsession with order in Allah Has Mercy, a German Janitor Doesn’t. His anger at 
cultural patronisation is evident, yet again not phrased in anger when Acar writes 
in the final section of his novel as a direct address to the German reader, “Now 
you know enough about them to take part in the integration of the German 
Turks. Get a CD of Ferdi Tayfur or Sezen Aksu. Roll down your window when 
you’re going for a cruise in your car and turn up the volume as soon as you spot a 
Turk. They’ll totally dig it” (Acar: 110). 
The last lines of The Real Deal Turks seem to encapsulate an insight into how 
Germans consume ethnic difference through reductive knowledge about other 
Germans. They are also exemplary of Gray’s simple opposition of Venus and Mars. 
Dick-lit characters like Hornby’s male heroes use black-and-white thinking first to 
deconstruct and subsequently to reconstruct their masculinities in line with, or 
against, the mainstream norm. Acar treats such mutually exclusive thinking as a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. He ironises the alignment of gender with ethnic identity 
to express his concern about the Germans’ assessment of minority identities as 
authentic versus inauthentic males. This plays out in Acar’s novel as episodic 
accounts of him growing up in Germany as a second-generation Turkish German, 
whom the locals accepted only when he behaved according to the Germans’ 
expectations. Acar suggests that German men want to see Turkish German men 
as Other males who threaten both German and Turkish German women. There 
are stock images of Turkish German men as Islamic extremists, abusive fathers 
or brutal husbands who trick both unsuspecting Turkish German and German 
women into marriage and then show their true colours. These types are, however, 
nowhere to be seen in the urban German landscape Acar tells of in his book.
Turkish German men who consider themselves utterly normal bear the brunt 
of contemporary debates about cultural authenticity in Germany. I have shown 
in chapter two how they are accused of pretence if they are not visually Turkish 
or deemed inauthentic if they refute gendered clichés. The Real Deal Turks toys 
with the idea that Turkish German men come from a different world from 
German men, specifically in terms of romance. Even more revealing than a lack 
of problematic integration discourse is thus Acar’s critical opinion on more and 
less desirable ethnicities in the context of romantic relationships. Love, courtship 
and romance appear as the central themes in his novel and most of the other 
novels discussed here. I explained in chapters two and three that interethnic love 
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elicits a reaction from mainstream audiences like no other notion of cultural 
fusion. And again, I would point for this to the much-cited two-world paradigm 
which German chick-lit and dick-lit authors undermine in different scenarios in 
their novels. 
Turkish German novelists such as Acar and Pamuk use dick-lit comedy to 
reclaim the right to be any kind of man and masculinity they wish to be, and 
they represent this confidence as part of their dick literature. The humorous 
appropriation exemplifies the contemporary state of Muslim German fiction 
and non-fiction: “The enforcement of a duty of authentic and yet at the same 
time essentialist depiction of suffering from Turkish Otherness leads to writers 
working though The Guy Turk or The Girl Turk with comedy” (El Hissy, 2012: 
42). Another second-generation Turkish German comedian and author, Murat 
Topal, features last in this chapter. Like Pamuk and Acar, he, too, opts for comedic 
subversion of traditional Germanness and Turkishness. This strategy pokes fun 
at the Germans’ obsession with foreigners to choose between authentic Turkish 
and authentic German masculinity.
Murat Topal: Identity Construction
Murat Topal thematises ethnicity and identity formation in his two novels Der 
Bülle von Kreuzberg-Kebab Cop (2010) and Das Dach kommt später-Rooftop 
Goes Up Later (2012). The topics manifest as acts of identification and actual 
construction work. When Germans doubt Topal’s Germanness and his right to 
be in Germany, he takes this on by creating a place for himself and his family in 
German society. In his first autobiographical novel Topal speaks of his childhood 
and his first job. He was born to a first-generation migrant father from rural 
Turkey and a German mother. Later, he became a policeman in the migrant-heavy 
Kreuzberg district of Berlin. The second novel is the narrative of how Topal tries 
to build a house for his young family (Topal, 2012: 1). The cop-turned-comedian 
sets out to fulfil the manliest of man dreams in German society: “Family, I shall 
build us a home!” (Topal: 2). Kebab Cop and Rooftop Goes Up Later resemble 
Akyün’s A Spicy Kraut, as Topal invites the reader with his novels into the private 
realm of a Turkish German’s allegedly hybrid everyday life. That he ironises what 
Yeşilada terms the “look beyond the veil” (Yesilada: 117) as a “look beyond the 
Turko moustache” suggests a laid-back dick-lit attitude I have discussed in Acar’s 
work.
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The most urgent task for Topal in his first novel is to highlight that he is not 
a cliché Turk despite his physical appearance. He writes about his looks, “Tall, 
broad-shouldered, and by now without hair, shaved off by choice, one should say” 
(Topal, 2010: 6). Topal confirms on the first pages of Kebab Cop that underneath 
the bouncer-like appearance there is a softie. What he sees as more fitting for a 
description of his visual appearance would be a Turkish version of Mr Clean. 
He is all smiles and ready to scrub toilets harder than any German housewife 
ever has. The incongruity between Topal’s self-description and his perception 
by Germans as Other is obvious. In a graduation photo of his trainee class at 
the Berlin police academy, remarks Topal, he stood out like a sore thumb in the 
middle of a sea of blonde, blue-eyed German men. The same is true for an old 
picture of his primary school class (Topal: 6). Yet, he concludes that this was a 
good thing, because his parents and friends and other family members always 
had an easy time spotting him in the crowd compared to the identical blondes 
(Topal: 6). 
Pamuk and Acar dismiss the issue of stereotypical appearance. Topal makes it 
the centre of his novel, just as Akyün does in her first book. He jokes frequently 
in Kebab Cop that he has learned to enjoy the status of a German hidden in plain 
sight, an ethnic chameleon. This plays on the two-worlds idea and assimilation 
as overblown concepts which are only skin-deep. The second-generation Turkish 
German man has learned to capitalise on his perceived Turkishness in the same 
way that in chapter three I described Kaya Yanar has with his ethnic comedy. 
Turkish German men like Yanar and Topal speak little to no Turkish and have 
never lived or associated their identity with Turkey; that is, other than to play it 
as a joke in their stand-up routines. Instead of rallying angrily against reductive 
identification as Turkish Others, they express their objection to incongruous 
ideas about their identities by tricking people with racialised expectations.
The prime example of how Topal laughs off misidentification by German 
natives is the chapter called ‘To protect and to swerve’. The title character, 
Topal’s Kebab Cop, deals with racist attacks on his persona on a regular basis. His 
professional life is no exception. During the arrest of a “skinnie”, as Topal refers 
to a German Neo-Nazi skinhead he catches red-handed in the verbal abuse of 
an African migrant, he puts on a fake Turkish accent close to Erkan and Stefan’s 
performance described in chapter three. One should note that Kaya Yanar does 
the same in his ethnic drag performances in Whatcha Looking At?!. “’Ey Dude”, 
says Topal dressed in a German police uniform, “you got’s trouble ther’ or whad? 
Do I slam you in the slamma!” (Topal: 118). The reader knows that Topal has 
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reached his goal when the disbelieving attitude of the German skinhead who is 
being arrested turns to sheer shock as the scene progresses. “’I want a real German 
police officer! Immediately!!! I do know my right!’” (Topal: 118), he yells. Topal 
reacts with humour to the racist man’s disregard for the police uniform and his 
undeniable status as a German officer of the law. He responds in jest while keeping 
up the ethnic charade: “’You right?’—Some low hanging fruit that was!—‘You 
right about what? Is no problem, can also take you to jai-ail, you be right there, 
too’” (Topal: 118). 
Topal relishes in the sudden reversal of cultural authority. He considers it a 
sign of actual multiculturalist progress and relief from having to do this alone 
when his colleagues jump on the ethnic comedy bandwagon. The co-workers add 
further horror to the duped Nazi’s worst nightmare of being arrested by foreigners 
in his own country. Two female, blonde colleagues of Topal put on thick Russian 
accents while a male colleague answers with an Eastern European twang the plea 
of the racist for a real German policeman: “Whurr arr the haandcufffs?” (Topal: 
119). The Germans de-escalate the drama before it even begins. According to 
Topal, the whole troupe laughed heartily all the way back to headquarters while 
the racist German was utterly puzzled by this scenario (Topal: 119).
Scenes from the day-to-day life of a German policeman with Turkish looks 
reveal a casual racism. Those experiences of casual racism in Germany receive 
sustained attention by Pamuk and Acar. The two authors write about it, like 
Topal, in a witty and informal tone to assure readers that Turkish German men 
can respond with class rather than retributive violence. Schmidt points to anger 
issues as the motif most problematically linked to Turkish German masculinity 
and literary depictions of Muslim men in German society (Schmidt: 200). Topal 
is aware of this. He contributes in Rooftop Goes Up Later thematically to the 
prominence of debates about non-native and Muslim German men and about 
domesticity. The cover page of the second novel alludes to this with a stick figure 
drawing. What is supposed to look like a man wearing a construction helmet is 
holding a baby’s pushchair with the left hand. With his right hand he is doing 
construction work. It is a reference to both the two-world paradigm of Turkish 
German hybridity and the gender bind of modern women featuring so vividly in 
Akyün’s chick-lit. 
Topal is quick to assure the reader that he did not force his wife into marriage 
and that it was not arranged. In fact, he admits that it is hard for him even to 
get a word in edgeways at home. This is always true when his Swabian wife from 
the German Alps and Topal’s German mother with a love for Prussian discipline 
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decide what is best for him (Topal, 2012: 2). The confession ironises the cliché of 
the Turkish husband who locks up his wife behind bars after the wedding and 
separates her from the family. Nothing could be further from reality in Rooftop 
Goes Up Later. Topal’s in-laws pay regular visits to “Muratle”, as his wife’s mother 
calls him in one of Germany’s local Alpine dialects (Topal: 12). The visits make 
Topal feel more confined than usual in his small rental flat in central Berlin. The 
in-laws also trigger his wish to escape from the many nagging Germans in his life. 
The nagging motivates him to dream up a German “self-built home, the kind 
that makes a real man, well, real” (Topal: 19). It is not he, but German women 
who run his life, so he must be more proactive. Topal closes the first chapter, 
“Haya, Haya, Build a Home”, not with a Turkish proverb as Akyün often does 
when she talks about her Turkish German family in A Spicy Kraut, but with his 
mother-in-law’s regional wisdom of wise, German-Alps-dwelling people (Topal: 
11): “Muratle, my little dearle, see reason. If you only ever live in a flatle, then 
you’ll die in the end on rentle” (Topal: 12). 
Hilarity ensues accordingly. The dick-lit counter-discourse to prevailing horror 
scenarios of patriarchal and bossy Turkish German men intensifies with each step 
of the construction, from property purchase to the finishing touches of the title’s 
rooftop. Topal has two left thumbs when it comes to handiwork. This undermines 
the Turkish macho cliché as much as his Turkish father’s incompetence in doing 
construction work. The old Topal is similarly incompetent at being a rugged, 
male craftsman. Father and son decide to include real German men in the 
construction project after several near-fatal accidents with chainsaws and diggers 
for hire by the hour. However, what Gill calls “instructive older masculinities in 
dick-lit” (Gill: 26) fail regardless of the ethno-national credentials attached to 
them. The 92-year-old German Gerd is as useless as Topal’s father. “Building a 
house as per official regulations” (Topal: 43), what kind of German man making 
it through WWII would have ever heard of that? The response comes swiftly 
and with a bang as the trio try to dig a hole for the foundations of the house but 
hit solid rock. A colossal explosion is the direct result of two clueless Turkish 
German men who are handling construction-site explosives under the direction 
of an equally clueless German man.
German perceptions of Turkish German masculinity are ridiculed numerous 
times by the time construction finishes at the end of the story. All the acts of 
positively imbecilic males and masculine hubris shed new light on the question 
of who the real boss in Turkish German families is. Akyün points out that it is 
not the men, either German or Turkish. Topal confirms this with the perfect 
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answer to a question raised by Akyün about German masculinity: “[s]ometimes 
I wonder where in the world German men left all their testosterone?” (Akyün, 
2007: 146), Akyün asks. “At the local building regulations office” (Topal: 
34), speculates Topal. Though neither Akyün nor Topal rejects the notion of 
gendered Turkishness or Germanness as such. They seem to agree instead that an 
attribution of gender roles to ethnicities is an everyday stereotype over which one 




“Jilet Ayse “Ghettobraut aus Berlin Neukölln”! Isch schwöre isch bin Türkin und raste aus, 
wenn mir was nicht passt! BAM! Auf die Fresse!” 
“Jilet Ayse “Ghetto braud from Little Istanbul in Berlin” I tells you I’s a Turk lady and I 
go crazy if I don’t like something! WHAM! Punch you in the face!”
—Idil Baydar’s introduction to her online comedy channel on 
YouTube, performing as her alter ego, Jilet Ayse (Baydar, 2011) 
Summary
This chapter deals with the most recent phenomenon of contemporary Turkish German 
comedy. A new generation of Turkish German comedians republishes content like 
recorded live performances and televised appearances to online platforms or uses digital 
media to publish original work. Enormous online viewership segments and a wide range 
of affordable, high-resolution recording devices such as hand-held cameras and even 
smartphones have created a new way for comedy to circulate in and across different types 
of mass media. Embedded in message boards, review sites, blogs and social media apps, 
a digital entertainment world has flourished, often competing with, if not overtaking 
in its reach, the impact of traditional screen media that are television and cinema. The 
online world serves niche characters such as Jilet Ayse in publishing her cliché-ridden 
satire videos without the use of an intermediary. Several short to medium-length clips 
of ad hoc performances and republished content form a hyperlinked body of Turkish 
German online comedy, all connected through user preference algorithms and audience 
interactions. Sometimes fans edit or comment upon primary materials, thus creating a 
meta-discourse around the original performance.1 This chapter contends that new media 
comedians like Jilet Ayse, a fictional persona created by Turkish German comedian Idil 
Baydar and the Turkish German stand-up Osan Yaran, spearhead the second-generation 
movement of Turkish German humour culture without filling stadiums like Bülent 
Ceylan or Kaya Yanar. Of the popular culture platforms these new comedians are 
using, YouTube has become the primary site in which Turkish German Muslim content 
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producers and consumers can interact with global users to present a fuller spectrum of 
ethnic essentialism and religious bias in 21st-century Germany.
Counterhegemonic Framing of Ethnic and Cultural Diversity in 
YouTube Comedy 
At the end of the second decade of the new century, it may not be surprising that 
Turkish German comedians are widely publishing their comedy on YouTube to 
thematise their faith, their cultural values, their ethnic identity and their kind 
of Germanness as part of their comedy. The online streaming portal offers 
them easy access to global audiences, who consume the content in German or 
aided by closed captions and situate it in ethno-cultural discourses through user 
comments and/or comedian-user interactions. YouTube was launched in 2005 as 
a video streaming website. It “provided a very simple, integrated interface within 
which users could upload, publish, and view streaming videos without high levels 
of technical knowledge, and within the technological constraints of standard 
browser software and relatively modest bandwidth” (Burgess and Green, 2009: 
1). When Google bought YouTube in 2006, it added tools to facilitate copyright 
infringement and digital piracy, to block users who pirated content or to monetise 
on content via advertisement integration. This meant content producers could 
make money off their copyright material and, eventually, form larger and more 
complex YouTube channel networks (Snickars and Vonderau, 2009). Another 
important factor to mention here is that YouTube content is usually prone to 
less regulation than state-run or even private broadcasting and other mainstream 
media (see the educational mandate for German state-run television in chapter 
three), which means that comedians like Serdar Somuncu can try their hand 
at different and perhaps less tame content than they present to mainstream 
audiences on broadcast television (Bower, 2012). 
Turkish German comedians have capitalised on YouTube’s connection of 
revenue with views and clicks or hit counts. The cultural economy of YouTube 
as an entertainment institution sustains the development of their comedy’s 
counter-hegemonic potential. Turkish German comedy has gained visibility for 
its mission to further the sense of Turkish German agency and Turkish German 
screen power (Yeşilada, 2008) I described in the introduction with reference to 
cinema and television. One can align this argument with similar claims about 
Afro-American, Indian American, Asian American and Muslim Canadian 
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comedy in digital screen cultures as laid out by Bore and Bradley (Bore, 2017; 
Bradley, 2015). 
It is the concern about contemporary representation which the Turkish 
German comedians discussed in this chapter echo in their recorded and 
republished comedy performances, developing projects and original scripted 
sketches. They tease out the complexities of Turkishness and Muslimness 
by turning normal everyday experiences about narrow definitions of what 
it means to be Turkish or Muslim in German society into enjoyable YouTube 
entertainment. In mainstream screen media and even in popular print fiction, 
traditional commissioning and production practices cannot compete with the 
ease of making content for YouTube or releasing copyrighted material there 
under the company’s Creative Commons licence. According to Tofler, this holds 
true for costs of production, labour costs and adherence to cinema screen and 
television broadcasting regulations (Tofler, 2017: 820). Shareability is another 
factor. Online content is usually of shorter length, and longer, existing work can 
be edited down to a series of brief clips and interlinked highlight reels. Highly 
visible YouTube content also attracts increased sponsorship deals or funding 
opportunities for future commissions. In this context the online environment 
offers emergent comedy artists, developers and performers a potentially viral 
performance stage. 
Stehle and Smith-Prei have proven the potential of online popularity as an 
effective public forum in their case studies on Turkish German rapper turned 
academic, Dr Reyhan Şahin/Lady Bitch Ray. “LOL likes” can draw the 
attention of millions to marginalised Turkish German voices like those of a 
“hyper-sexualized ‘ghetto bitch’” (Stehle, 2012: 229). The popularity principle 
underlying what Smith-Prei calls Şahin’s “pop-feminist aesthetic [derived from] 
the depiction of negatively coded female corporeality” (Smith-Prei, 2011: 1) also 
underpins the digital representations of what it means to be Turkish German and 
a woman in the age of identity politics. Like Lady Bitch Ray’s Turkish German 
music videos, the popular entertainment genre of Turkish German comedy 
bears out a negatively coded ethnic Otherness, too. However, the producers 
of Turkish German online comedy express issues of migration, gender and 
assimilation explicitly through forms of pro-social ethnic humour I described in 
chapters one and two to elicit enjoyable user reactions. A closer look at comment 
threads attached to YouTube content by Idil Baydar and Osan Yaran suggests 
that viewers participate in this pro-social project, actively including themselves 
as both external and Turkish German in-group participants in the dismantling 
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of ethnic hierarchism and allegedly improper behaviour for “Germans with 
Turkish immigrant background” (Tuzcu, 2013: 157). 
Idil Baydar: Positioning “Jilet Ayse” as Relatable Migration 
Comedy on YouTube
The user comments posted in response to the landing page video on Jilet Ayse’s 
YouTube channel frame the overdrawn Turkish “Kanak” (Mayroth, 2016) clichés 
she performs as relatable comedy entertainment.2 In the video clip, which is only 
42 seconds long, a half total shot shows Jilet Ayse sitting on a red velvet couch. 
There are colourful pillows draped neatly around her. A small pot plant stands 
on a knee-high coffee table. Viewers can only barely make it out in the lower half 
of the frame. Jilet’s long hair is high, poofed-up, teased out on top and pinned 
back at the sides into a fauxhawk. She wears glossy, bright red lipstick and lots of 
makeup and rouge. She is dressed in a printed nylon windcheater, zipped open to 
reveal a t-shirt which reads “WALLAH! I AIN’T DONE ANYHTING”.3 It is a 
play on the Arab phrase for “I swear” and the pronunciation of a German phrase, 
meaning “It wasn’t me”, and said to refer to a certain Turkish German sociolect 
used in Turkish German comedy as a shorthand accent. This is “Germany’s 
migration nightmare” (Mayroth, 2016) and comedy Youtuber Baydar puts it on 
full blast in her high-res video.
Jilet welcomes the audience with a spoof take on Turkish German girlie talk. 
This aspect of the performance is a remnant of Baydar’s early comedy days starting 
around 2010. She was reportedly more “entertainment-savvy” (Mayroth, 2016) 
and made fun of German television events such as pop-cast act Monrose, which 
consisted between 2006 to 2010 of Turkish German singer Senna Guemmour, 
Turkish German singer Bahar Kızıl and Italian German singer and actress Mandy 
Capristo. Making fun of being a Mandy, who became famous for dating Turkish 
German soccer star Mesut Özil, eventually landed Baydar a freelance job with 
Bild Zeitung, Germany’s largest daily tabloid. However, the satirical Mandy 
impersonation, a throwback to Baydar’s early skits as a Turkish vlogger princess 
with a ludicrous baby voice like Gülcan Karahancı’s during her days as an over-
sexed music channel host on German broadcasting station VIVA, disappears in 
a matter of seconds. Switching gears drastically, Jilet suddenly makes a face and 
starts yelling right into the camera with her upper body hunched forward in a 
menacing way and her voice switching to a baritone register, “Eyy, FUCK YOU!! 
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Okay?! You’re on my channel! Who do you think you are? Why you think you 
can just come over here on my channel and step all over it?! Watch out, dude, 
there’ll be some punches going straight to your ugly face!! What you wanna find 
here? Hey!? Well, lemme tell you what you’ll find here: you gonna find the crime, 
the victims, and the perps!! Do you get my drift?! Don’t get onto my channel! 
Because, if I’m too STRONG, you’re just too WEAK!!” 
Users posting in the public comment section below the video address Baydar’s 
creative talent and her ability to pack a lot of anti-racist humour into a very short 
video recording: 
You totally had me after only 10 seconds :D
i come to this channel and i see this…i can’t stop laughing anymore hahaha that 
woman is amazing
i love your videos jilet !! 💕 that’s why i came to your channel please don’t hit me 
😂😂😂😂😂😂😂
Perfection. Don’t let them intimidate you, ever. Solid woman of honour. If you 
need anything…message me. Have subscribed you.
The comments indicate that YouTube users appreciate the character of Jilet Ayse. 
Some seek it out specifically because her kind of relatable, short-clip or teaser-
sketch content may not be available elsewhere. Certainly, the comedy standard 
on television and in cinema, as I described in chapters two and three, is different 
from Baydar’s fictional character. Ayse hails from Berlin-Tempelhof, a so-called 
problem area. She is loud, dressed to exacerbate demands for cultural integration 
of ethnic Others’ visual appearance, and she uses a cliché-ridden Turkish German 
accent while employing explicit language. All this would require censorship on 
television or necessitate film regulation labelling, or at least would have to go 
through the official route of broadcast censoring and cinema content oversight. 
Because of the style, tone and innovative take on ethnicity at the intersection 
with social class, comedy critics frequently employ comparisons between Baydar’s 
Jilet Ayse and German stand-up comedian Illka Bessin’s popular character, East 
German Cindy from Marzhan. Cindy hails from Berlin’s notorious blue-collar 
sector, Marzhan. Her origins mirror Jilet’s imagined origins in Berlin Tempelhof, 
a migrant-heavy blue-collar district. Both women are loud, uncouth and stand out 
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among online comedians for their play on being mainstream culture’s anxieties 
incarnate. Cindy is the nightmare of allegedly encultured high-brow Germanness. 
Jilet Ayse’s character embodies the fears of all Germans who fantasise about non-
integrated and anti-assimilation Turks, namely nasty Turkish migrant women 
whose bodies and personas take up uncensored media space online “without 
asking for permission or forgiveness” (Şahin et al., 2016: 121). 
The reception of Ayse’s rebellious comedy performance is overly positive in 
YouTube’s comment section. On Twitter her handle’s description reads: 
I’m budiful, my favurite designer is Adidas, I luv my dog Massacre Fatma and my 
8 cell’s CUZ YOLO IN THE SWAG4
Like most user comments on YouTube, Twitter users also showed support for 
Baydar’s comedy persona and reacted positively when she joined the messaging 
service in December of 2012 with the following tweet:
Ey ohh victim cuntz, jilet ayse is on Twitter now !!! 
A fan reacted to this by tweeting:
The only thing that really made it all worth it driving to Sava Nald [and their 
designer runway show at Berlin Fashion Week] was the fact that I met @
jiletayse. And now, it’s time for some Dürüm [Kebab wrap]!
On Instagram Baydar tends to posts 10-second shorts she tapes at home on her 
smartphone. While these appear less produced than her YouTube videos, and 
some of the videos seem to be spontaneous, unscripted improvisations, thousands 
of her followers appreciate the over-the-top physical comedy quality of Jilet’s 
rants and ramblings about German politics and German popular culture. 
This comment was posted in response to Jilet’s video post about a soccer game 
in which a Brazilian player makes her want to get naked and “make love to him 
with her child-bearing hips”:
@so4loe 😂😂😂😂😂 Dedicated and Expressively Eloquent that woman 😂 😬
The audience feedback and direct interactions of users with Baydar’s comedy 
content shed light on the politics of German popular culture entertainment in 
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digital transnational media contexts. The explicit language and imagery frame the 
Turkish German comedian’s critique of objectifying and sexualising Turkishness 
and Turkish women, especially when it comes to the depiction of female Turkish 
German bodies, language and the historic discourse on media representations of 
ethnic German Others in Germany (Stehle, 2012). 
Baydar’s comedy content turns on a mockery of Turkish German femininity 
ideals by her being a butch, big and unrestrained loudmouth. The way Jilet acts 
is in total incongruence with accepted forms of being an integrated Turkish 
German woman in German society, as has become apparent in the romantic clash 
comedies I discussed in chapter two. From a circumspect look at gender-marked 
usernames who post comments both in Turkish and in German on YouTube, 
Twitter, Tumblr and Instagram, it seems that a broad cross-section of Turkish 
German and native German female online users appreciates the incongruity 
humour of Baydar’s Turkish German anti-lady. Users’ largely favourable embrace 
of Baydar’s online comedy is essential and moves her into the vicinity of female 
American comedy giants with relatable comedy routines. Amy Schumer and 
Tiffany Haddisch are two prominent contemporary examples of this. 
The ironic performativity of Baydar’s fictional projection from “Turkish ditz” 
to “Turkish mob wife” to “Twitter She Turk” and “Insta-Kanak”, all identifiers 
Jilet Ayse uses to describe herself, points to the possibility of online media as 
a space for intelligent pop comedy (Goltz, 2015). Given the current climate of 
online trolling and Twitter abuse of comedy artists like American comedian 
Kevin Hart for perceived minority bias in his comedy routines about gay men 
(Romano, 2018), digital audience support for Jilet suggests that audiences are in 
on the joke with her. According to Tully, acceptance by the mainly female online 
audience is possible because younger female comedians have learned to turn a 
post-feminist logic around, thus letting women off the hook if they dare to laugh 
at ”incongruous [identity] performance strategies: mimicking patriarchal logics, 
inverting the grotesque, and juxtaposing serious feminist issues with parodies 
of frivolous pop culture texts” (Tully, 2017: 339). Jilet is likable because she is 
relatable. She refrains from pseudo-satire and from reproducing the dominant 
ideology of anti-social ethnic humour, which would be to bash German women 
as anti-female or anti-Turkish, or by mocking only qualities perceived as typically 
female German. 
However, Baydar’s performances also make fun of the general integration 
debate in Germany. This political aspect positions her doubly as an active 
participant in the discussion on female voice in a patriarchal discourse and 
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male-dominated comedy landscape (Stehle, 2012). Speaking as a female Turkish 
German comedian through the performative mask of a Turkish German woman 
is the context for the recurring thread of migrant Otherness. It features constantly 
in Jilet’s YouTube videos. The continuity of theme and topic suggests that airing 
German minorities’ discontents about a continually negative framing of Turkish 
German identities, specifically by female comedians for female audiences, has 
not diminished in the 21st century; on the contrary, “marginalized female comics 
provide particularly interesting examples of autobiographical performance. 
Because they represent a group marginalized by the dominant (male) culture, 
female comics rhetorically construct and perform their marginality onstage. In 
so doing, they perform both self and culture, exemplifying for audiences the 
inevitable interdependence between personal and social identities. […] Their 
social critique is potent and, because it is offered in a comedic context, safe from 
retribution as well” (Gilbert, 1997: 317).
In this sense, female comedians like Baydar perform their marginality through 
rebel personas like Jilet Ayse. It is an act “simultaneously oppressive, by using 
demeaning stereotypes, and transgressive, by interrogating those very stereotypes 
through humorous discourse” (Gilbert, 1997: 318). Baydar’s present and past 
work confirms that this interplay is very much deliberate. She skilfully pairs 
opposite identities, subverts social hierarchies. And she offers thousands of 
online users a brief relief from the dutiful reprimand of online users who support 
ethnic Turkish stereotyping; and from having to police female gender clichés. 
Other aliases or phrases Baydar has used to describe Jilet to German mass media 
outlets and in online interviews demonstrate this pop-feminist awareness. There 
are “migration nightmare”, “Germany’s Future” and “National Kanak”. Though, 
despite the praise for her ingenuity, Baydar’s work has not received universal 
approval. There is some criticism of the way she leaves her comedy’s intended 
message up for interpretation, which reinforces the clichés about Turkish 
Germans rather than subverts them. 
Some YouTube users have picked up on a sense of ambiguity in her depiction 
of Jilet Ayse. What I describe in chapter two as a form of misunderstood pro-
social “shield” comedy is related to Turkish women as the butt of the joke and the 
target of her ridicule. Spielhaus picks up on this, too. She confirms in an analysis 
of a sketch on domestic abuse that Jilet is a smart, albeit not unproblematic 
pro-social ethnic comedy act, the kind which ultimately led to US comedian 
Dave Chappelle’s initial withdrawal from comedy and him walking away from a 
50 million dollar contract with Comedy Central (Haggins, 2009): “[h]ere [with 
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Jilet Ayse’s take on domestic abuse] hides a cathartically designed incongruity 
within the dominant image of the Muslim woman, whose aggressive and 
potentially threatening exterior may hardly want to fit the image of an oppressed 
victim” (Spielhaus: 127). Whereas many German newspapers and culture 
magazines lauded Baydar’s observational prowess and Jilet’s sharp-tongued wit 
for her routine Deutschland, wir müssen reden!-Germany, we have to have a talk!, 
some YouTube users expressed their dismay in the comment section of a short 
video entitled Ich bin voll sauer!!!-I am sooo mad!!!, maybe because it was not 
clear who Jilet was making fun of: 
We ask ourselves if you are a comedian who makes fun of Kanaks or of the 
Germans, who still think that that’s what Turks are like 
One could argue that this issue highlights the weak point of the comedic mode 
in popular culture. I described it in chapter one with reference to Göktürk’s 
interrogation of audience taste and comedic subjectivity. Online comedy 
entertainment’s simultaneous strength and weakness is contextual breadth, 
making for imprecise notions of certain members of the audience as an indistinct 
mass of subjects and/or objects of humour. It blurs the line between the sword 
and shield functions in ethnic comedy. The pro-feminist attitude of Baydar’s 
fantasy figure as Thilo Sarrazin’s worst nightmare illustrates this. Jielt Ayse is 
evil personified according to Sarrzin’s theses about Turkish Muslim migration 
to Germany. She is a model of female Turkish self-determination Baydar said 
was created in direct response to Sarrazin’s demagogic hallucinations of Turkish 
German Muslims as hostile, parasitical enemies to native German culture (Kloë, 
2016: 210). “At the same time, Jilet’s statements take Thilo Sarrazin’s points to 
the extreme” (Kloë: 210), which flies in the face of German idealism about 
feminist “multi-culti” sisterhood. In Germany, we have to have a talk!, Jilet calls 
her Turkish German sister an integration whore. Jilet also rejects any notion of 
German female independence in response to the question whether her boyfriend 
is allowed to hit her in the face. He is. “I does then so deserve this! After all, he 
[Ayak, Jilet’s boyfriend], buys me my clothes, all Adidas, and he’s also wanting 
some kiddos sometime, too. Eight or nine units, but, sometimes, you gotta put 
a woman in her place, ey, you get me, just like a dog” (Baydar, November 2017). 
It is hard to draw the line here between association and dissociation and pro-
social and anti-social. The ethnic identity Baydar performs and her goal to affirm 
Turkish clichés as an outlet for reactionary racism depend on the audience’s active 
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engagement in critical entertainment. Most viewers indicate on social media and 
in their YouTube comments that they align themselves with Baydar’s agenda. 
They laugh because they allow and fully buy into the comedian’s carnivalesque 
transgression, which is to depict Turkish women in an unflattering light. It is 
clearly a performative comedy mask, but a small number of viewers voice their 
concerns about criticising anti-Turkish bias in Germany with a carnevalesque 
line of counter-hegemonic humour. This has prompted YouTube users in 
support of Baydar’s content to engage more critically with the material and offer 
interpretations of her videos to other, more sceptical viewers. Some of those 
videos manage to get 1,500,000 views:5
This is critical social satire, I can still cannot believe that some would even think 
about taking this acting for real. It’s genius work ! Idil Baydar taekes on the role 
of Jilet Ayse and talks about things that are being stereotyped in public, the 
good think about all of this is, that one should also turn on their brains phps 
while watching, the whole thing serves not just to entertain, there’s a lot more 
in there by far.
Well if you take this too seriously and you feel like you’re being attached then 
you really missed out on what’s goin on big time xD
It is sad how many people didn’t read the small phrase “critical social satire”…
folx, when will you finally get it: This is NOT meant to be bone dead serious! 
“Satire is a form of poetic mockery, which bemoans societal issues or points 
to a lack of virtue. Historically, it has also been referred to as Mock Writing, 
Needling Words and Pasquill (a mocking social satire expressed in writing 
about a certain group of people)” When I read your (mostly misspelled) hate-
comments, it’s ME who gets mad!
And me just like: ulan is he a girl?! hahahahahahahaha laughflash oh maii god 
xD I am a lady Turk too :D you have to have a sense of humour about this ;D
From this perspective, Turkish German online comedy consumed through 
platforms like YouTube appears to be a powerful mainstream culture discourse in 
which to reframe anti-Muslim sentiments and Turkish bias. Yet, Critchley admits 
that one cannot attribute this critical effect to humour as such, since not all 
humour is the same and some jokes are quite reactionary or, at best, serve simply 
funny online kanakism 159
to reinforce social consensus (Critchley, 2013). Despite the intention that it work 
as a form of pro-social ethnic comedy, audiences may understand Baydar’s Jilet 
comedy act as a tool to reinforce dominant ideologies or to reproduce stereotypes. 
Therefore, it is vital to acknowledge that mass mediated humour always carries 
the potential to achieve its opposite in terms of consent and dissent, building 
in-group coherence and the formation of inter-communal alliances. 
It is important to consider Baydar’s wider comedy repertoire against this 
backdrop. Her line of characters shows that cases of well-received inter-ethnic 
and transcultural comedy mostly work because their incongruities reveal 
the stupidity of racists and the ineffectiveness of political correctness. Gerda 
Grischke, a German retiree and shameless blue-collar xenophobe, is a case in 
point. Baydar describes in an interview with RENK Magazine for Theatre and 
Stage Performance how she developed Grischke’s character at the same time as 
the figure of Jilet Ayse around Christmas 2011: “They were created at the same 
time. I had developed Gerda for a smaller theatre play and I just found Jilet on the 
street. Back then I was working in a few [Berlin] schools so I could observe a lot” 
(Karakus/RENK 2017). In the interview Baydar explains what some perceive as 
hurtful mockery in her characters and how they embody ethnic differences. Some 
viewers think of it as improper while others see it as a much-needed intervention 
in politically correct and hence futile discussions about how communities in 
German society relate to each other and why that is the case. 
Currently, Gerda is in Jilet’s shadow. [RENK]
True, but I think it has to be like that. They both tell the same story, actually. 
Maybe I can just convey it more authentically with Jilet. What many people 
don’t know is that the lives of the two figures overlap. Aside from the whole 
other stuff that she spouts off, Jilet also talks about her sister who has a 
boyfriend—the son of Gerda Grischke. [BAYDAR]
Can you describe Gerda and Jilet for us? [RENK]
The German Gerda hurts to listen to. The whole subtext that you hear from 
old grandmas: Should we be scared of foreigners now? Maybe we should 
just let the Indians in? Gerda expresses quite directly. “They don’t mean 
nothin’ bad by it. I ain’t got nothin’ against foreigners in foreign countries, 
you know. But you can’t ‘ave them here, too, innit? That’s why they call them 
foreigners, darlin’. Cos they ain’t here!” Jilet is angrier and is more associated 
with being funny. It’s a little like the small, always angry Frenchman Louis 
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de Funès. The angry tells a story that is so funny that you almost forget the 
pain in it.
You can find them both in the same socio-cultural milieu. Both are poor, 
both are losers of the system. On paper, Gerda did everything right: She 
worked hard her whole life but now receives such little pension that she 
has to turn tricks behind Bellevue Palace. And because someone has to get 
blamed, it’s the foreigner. [BAYDAR]
There is a paradoxical interplay of conflict and commonality between Jilet and 
Gerda. It is a remarkable complexity. Neither character contains the full truth 
about the lived realities of everyday life in Germany. Yet, both turn on the same 
overloaded popular comedy elements with trashy talk and nasty behaviour 
unbecoming of German middle-class women. One could argue that Baydar 
appropriates the best of both worlds, deliberately mixing a theatrical feminist 
performance logic with many “well-known features of German ethno-comedy: 
similar to characters of typical ‘culture-clash’-comedians such as Kayar Yanar or 
Bülent Ceylan” (Bens et al., 2019: 77):
Do Jilet and Gerda bother you sometimes? [RENK]
They’ve completely occupied me, and because Idil is such a wuss, it doesn’t 
bother her. In reality, Idil is a German hidden in the body of a Turk! 
[BAYDAR]
So you don’t separate them and say, “It’s six o’clock, Jilet’s clocking 
out!”? [RENK]
No way! It’s 24/7 craziness. Sometimes it gets on my nerves so much that 
I just play Farmville excessively and tell people I’m really busy. [BAYDAR]
The participatory online culture of YouTube has helped Baydar achieve what 
she set out to do. It is to construct a Turkish German comedy identity, which 
is meant to ask of both Turkish Germans and Germans a degree of reflective 
involvement in the consumption of her online comedy. The political dimensions 
of this effort seem obvious.
But to what extent does Jilet’s role benefit these people? Doesn’t it just 
stir up more prefabricated images in people’s minds, in this case of 
teachers? [RENK]
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If you are a teacher and claim that all your students are like Jilet and 
don’t reflect at all about what is being disassembled on stage, then that’s 
irresponsible. It is their job to question why Jilet is the way she is. [BAYDAR]
Baydar’s character inventory, and the dialogue she puts Gerda and Jilet in with 
each other and with the audience watching them and reacting to them, indicates 
how YouTube online content can be a space for collective critical comedy 
experiences. It refers to the ongoing distinctions and polemic projections within 
the general German public, who may connect the screen culture discourse to the 
dangers of a political right-wing upswing in actual reality. 
That means your wish is that people begin questioning things when you 
are on stage? [RENK]
People should think about whether or not it is actually reality. [BAYDAR]
Having countered the claim that Baydar’s online comedy could potentially 
facilitate a certain bourgeois intellectual superiority over a social class which 
allegedly never participates in anti-racist discourse, I move on to the comedy 
practice of another popular, contemporary Turkish German comedian. I discuss 
in the final section of this book how republished Turkish German comedy 
content on YouTube produces a kind of second-hand curation of ethnic comedy. 
I suggest that the question of how Turkish German comedy travels across media 
is indispensable from questions of social pragmatics of humour and the different 
spheres of popular entertainment culture and ethnic identity debates. 
 
Osan Yaran: Breaking Down Walls between  
TV Screening and YouTube Streaming
The online presence of Turkish German comedian Osan Yaran’s comedy 
performances on YouTube has surged over a very short period. Yaran’s most 
viewed live performance recordings to-date are live performances of televised 
stand-up comedy contests or appearances on German public television. The 
republished content on YouTube has been seen by millions of users. I discuss his 
most popular comedy content published since 2015. Bitches und Beispiele-Bitches 
and Examples went on YouTube in November 2015, followed by The Walking 
Rentner-The Walking Retiree in December 2017. Mein Sohn-My Son was posted 
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to YouTube in March 2018; Manchmal ist Deutschland ein bisschen zu Deutsch-
Sometimes, Germany is a bit too German went online in August 2019, then came 
Deutsche Pünktlichkeit auf türkischer Hochzeit-German Punctuality at a Turkish 
Wedding in October 2019. 
In 2010, Yaran had started to cut his teeth on “Kleinkunst” or local art 
performance at small-scale poetry slams in East Berlin’s migrant-heavy area 
of Spandau-Staaken. He had moved there with his family from Berlin’s West 
German Wedding district. Yaran mentions the consequences of this move for his 
Turkish German identity formation on his website: “[t]hat’s why one could say 
I’m basically an East-Turk, a Turkish Eastie Germanian, an Eastmanian!” (Yaran, 
2019). While a full-time employee at German grocery discount store LIDL, he 
managed to book paid comedy gigs in stand-up clubs in Berlin and appeared 
at the famed Quatsch, or Nonsense, Comedy Club. The Quatsch/Nonense 
Comedy Club became famous in the 1990s for televising stand-up comedy on 
the private German broadcasting channel, ProSieben. Thanks to the free-to-air 
broadcast screenings of the Comedy Club’s live performance acts, many German 
comedians managed to break into mainstream entertainment with Anglophile 
comedy formulas, as described in chapter three. 
Yaran talks about his career moves as part of the info copy on his personal 
website’s landing page: “I started working for LIDL when I was nineteen to pay 
for my wedding—Turkish weddings are not cheap! I started out as a cashier, 
then associate assistant manager, then deputy manager, and finally store manager. 
2014 was when the comedy thing began” (Yaran, 2019). He broke into larger 
regional and finally national comedy circuits shortly after that and began looking 
at comedy as a full-time career in 2016. 
The analysis of Yaran’s comedy requires what Bore calls an understanding 
of the current trend in mainstream comedy’s articulation as the “multi-
sited phenomenon” (Bore, 2019: 7), which is modern multi-screen comedy. 
Technologically mediated communication challenges traditional contexts of 
screen study. The separation between television screens and computer screens 
has been radically erased two decades into the new century. Hine notes that 
mainstream comedy and popular mass culture studies research need to move 
with the times, tastes and technologies to deliver relevant findings on what 
this means for comedy entertainment: “[i]n a contemporary society within 
which the concept of context appears to have spiralled beyond comprehension 
with the advent of diverse forms of technologically mediated communication, 
the challenge of choosing appropriate contexts to study, and reflecting on the 
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consequences of those choices for our ability to theorise adequately, seems greater 
than ever” (Hine, 2011: 567). It is for this reason that I consider the re-publishing 
of Yaran’s award-winning comedy content (Hamburg Comedy Award 2017, 
Northern Germany Comedy Broadcast Winner 2017, Stuttgart Comedy Clash 
Winner 2019) conducive to the question about how Turkish German comedy 
travels between audiences and across different media types. There is then also 
the question of what kind of original comedy content YouTube users decide to 
reshare and how they react to it. 
By resharing and commenting, the online community of YouTube users 
contributes actively to the anti-racist humour discourse of Turkish German 
Muslim artists such as Baydar and Yaran, who are the primary content producers. 
According to Haridakis and Hanson, this makes reshared Turkish German 
comedy part of an active social connection culture. Its participants are highly 
motivated to share, critique the content and connect with each other and 
even the primary producers. This is “consistent with uses and gratifications 
assumptions, motives and individual differences, differentially predicted viewing 
and sharing behaviors” in social media humour (Haridakis and Hanson, 2009: 
317). Unlike television audiences, however, YouTube viewers seek out and 
watch in self-designed order online comedy videos because of a distinctly social 
aspect. YouTube as a social networking platform rewards pro-social behaviour, 
as users connect to each other through comments on the streaming content in 
the comment section. All this aligns the viewers’ interpersonal motives such 
as inclusion, affection and control with Baydar’s and Yaran’s motivation for 
producing their ethnic comedy content in the first place. It is to include as many 
people as possible in the mainstream representation of cultural identities and 
belonging; to affect stability and positive developments in comedic genres; and 
to interrogate who controls the meanings, pleasures and displeasures one receives 
from transcultural comedy content.
Like Baydar’s work, Yaran’s comedy revolves around ethnic identity issues in 
contemporary German society. However, his focus on ethnicities in multicultural 
Germany is less antagonistic than Baydar’s. He performs as himself, talking in his 
routines about everyday situations and personal experiences in Berlin. Much like 
Murat Topal’s dick-lit comedy, he draws on his youth and upbringing and his 
work and personal life for content. Yaran’s comedy elicits amusement by shifting 
the perception of quotidian issues in Germany from native German to Turkish 
German perspectives or the viewpoints of ethnic Others. This harks back to a less 
complicated American comedy act. Limon described it in his seminal work on 
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stand-up comedy in the United States (Limon, 2000). It is driven by a form of 
relatability, in which meanings arise from nuanced though mostly light-hearted 
stances on current politics or debates about gender, racism and religious bias. 
Unlike Baydar, Yaran does not mobilise outrage or offence in the audience to put 
his message about cosmopolitan Germany to those attending his stand-up acts. 
One could call him more mainstream-minded. Jilet Ayse’s provocative character 
works by positing that there is a kind of pro-social ethnic comedy which is most 
effective if it produces an uneasy coproduction of humour between content and 
viewer. Yaran’s comedy reconciles that critical strand with more comfortable 
subjects without losing sight of enough reflexivity to point out that anti-Muslim 
bias and Turkish Othering have real implications for people’s lives. 
In The Walking Retiree, Yaran discusses slice-of-life observations in a sequence 
of loosely related events. He explores the intersection of multiple layers of daily 
life in Berlin. He moves from who-smelt-it-dealt-it fart jokes to welcoming a 
Dutch audience member by saying, “Ey, dude, this is such a relief ! You guys, you 
know, I’m a Turk! It’s so good to know that there’s an even more Kanak person 
than me here tonight!”. He then jumps immediately and without transition to a 
bit about Jehovah’s Witnesses, framing the set-up by saying, “Ey, you know folks, 
I live in Berlin and I respect every faith we have here. But: my favourite religion 
by far are Jehovah’s Witnesses. Ey, you must admit folks, it’s not easy to place 
yourself in front of somebody’s front door and then go: heyyyyy, you are wrong. 
WE are the chosen ones”. He closes the bit with a short punchline, “Try this in 
the Turkish Quarter in Berlin, won’t ya. Then you’ll see for how much longer 
you’re going to be the chosen one”. 
This bit, like other ethnic comedy bits in The Walking Retiree, puts recurring 
emphasis on cultural diversity rather than cultural difference. Yaran explains that 
he called the act The Walking Retiree to hint at the hit television series The Walking 
Dead, and for his love of watching zombieesque, shelf browsing senior citizens at 
LIDL. Yaran’s live audience appreciates all jokes with equal bravado. It cheers 
for toilet humour and jokes about mistaking a couple of Jehovah’s Witnesses as 
sex tourists. It cheers as loudly for his jokes about an imagined couple of Jihadi’s 
Witnesses or a transsexual friend of Yaran’s, calling herself Bayi-on-ceee after 
the sex change operation. “You know folks, so she says to me, ‘Oh, I was afraid 
how you’d react, you know, because you’re such a Muslim!’. And I go: Come on 
Bayi-on-ceee, where’s the problem? It’s all good—as long as you wear a headscarf 
now!”. 
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Yaran’s original performance intersperses the comedic thematisation of 
Muslim minority culture with somewhat critical goals. For one, there are efforts 
to correct misinformed views that he feels distort contemporary Turkish German 
identities. The audience laughs throughout his act, clapping and even whistling 
enthusiastically as he closes the act with an Other’s take on Germanness: “You 
know folks, I love Germany, it’s the best country ever, really. But sometimes it’s 
a bit, you know, too German. Like when you drive on the Autobahn, and all of 
a sudden, there’s a sign that says, CAREFUL! ROAD MARKINGS MISSING 
IN FOUR KILOMETRES! Dude, what’s that all about?? I mean, what?? Like, 
do even the deer and the wildlife know about this when they cross the street? 
Really?? Do they?! Are they German deer? You’ll have one tell another: ‘Hey, 
Rudolph, we cannot cross the street here, because: there are no markings!’”. The 
audience applauds loudly. 
Yaran promotes social cohesion while encouraging the enjoyment of situational 
humour in incongruous culture swap scenarios. He addresses cultural attitudes 
held about Muslims from the inside, and attitudes held about German majority 
society as part of their community from the inside, too. The live audience 
seems to welcome his critical social message, as do hundreds of thousands of 
YouTube viewers. Most viewers comments favourably on Yaran’s hybrid position 
as an equal-opportunity-butt-of-the-joke comedian. Users appear to like the 
fact that he defies the native-versus-Other logic of traditional ethnic comedy 
entertainment in favour of a non-regressive comedy to attack negative social 
attitudes rather than to reinforce them. The top post in the YouTube comment 
section of The Walking Retiree received 1,300 likes and zero dislikes or thumbs-
downs for referring to this aspect of Yaran’s work: 
This is the weapon which we can use to get rid of racism. If everybody could 
laugh like this about Muslims, Christians, Jews and all other religions, then we 
will all be closer to each other. We are all human and that should remain the 
most important thing. Just have some love for each other. :)
Other users continued their discussion of the re-published comedy act and the 
audience reactions in the live recording of The Walking Retiree by posting replies 
to the comment above as a meta-thread:
You are right! ♥
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The only weapon there is to bring those people together. Unite the true and 
goodhearted people and show the Dummies (Nazis, Antifas, criminal foreigners, 
religious extremists) that there is a peaceful way to live together!
Does he really work for a Lidl? 😅
Haha I (muslim) had two or so years ago 3 bearded muslim men standing in 
front of my door, who wanted to teach me on Islam, and I didn’t let them come 
inside 😂
Even Yaran participates in the second-hand curation of his content by posting to 
this sub-comment thread from his verified YouTube account: 
Yes, folks, I know, I got a little extra here in my act, but hey, the programme is 
really good!
Yaran takes on less of a burden than Baydar to situate his comedic meanings in 
relation to critical performance art or audience reception. Yet, he is still concerned 
primarily with owning racist attitudes in German society as an inclusive comedy 
act and having a diverse audience own them with him. This suggests that in large 
parts of his programmes there is a social cohesion element to his observational 
ethnic comedy. It is also present in the audience’s responses. 
My Son has Yaran tell the live audience what has happened to his life after 
becoming a father for the first time. His son, as the short routine is called, turns 
on Yaran’s life as a parent and on the stereotype of absent Turkish fathers. The 
plot of Kebab Connection picks up on this topic, too. Yaran goes from being a 
member of a Turkish heavy battle rap group to being part of an arts and crafts 
group with a German woman named “Gudrun”. “I used to bring weed, now I 
bring along cheese sandwiches (audience laughs) with weed (audience laughs 
louder and claps)”, he confesses in a self-deprecatory manner. He can even deal 
with self-censorship to avoid potty talk in front of his toddler, but cannot stand 
parent-teacher association meetings where he is being singled out by German 
teachers as the father of a Turkish boy named Burak: “[t]here’s only two foreign 
children in the whole of the kindergarten group. Two! My son Burak, and the 
little, black, African boy called Lokombo Ombo. Ey teacher dude, guess whose 
father you reckon I am, won’t you!”. And while “German parents are always 
waiting patiently to take notes and for the most proper ones to take the minutes of 
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the meeting (audience laughs again)”, “Turkish parents are ready to go, that’s why 
they’re always wearing their jackets. And you know how you can spot the Arab 
parents? Easy! They’re not there! (audience laughs and cheers intermittently)”. 
Here, Yaran appraises the conditions of his existence as a Turkish German 
male and as a dad. As a measure of social tolerance and light-hearted self-critique, 
he arranges German next to allegedly Arab and stereotyped Turkish parenting 
styles. He mocks them all and thus ensures that none is perceived as better or 
worse than the others or considered an actual representation of factual reality. It 
is, as Holms points out, a trend in contemporary mainstream stand-up comedy to 
cater to a liberal entertainment policy, affirming difference and the culture of “us” 
(Holm, 2017: 29). Again, YouTube’s video streaming audience seems to validate 
this interpretation. With unanimous consent, user feedback in the comment 
section supports the routine as a cool, funny or hilarious entertainment event.
heard this so many times but. thas dude isabsolutely awesome
really fresh due smooth humour :) Top 
I watched this so many times already, but I think it’s still so totally funny haha 
😂😂😂
Soooo nice
This is not to say that Yaran’s comedy strictly follows an inoffensive and easy 
multiculture comedy agenda to play solely on likeability. In Bitches and Examples, 
he goes straight to the issue of ethnic stereotyping without appearing too agreeable 
or well-mannered. Central to this routine is the opening joke to which Yaran 
leads up in a perceptively angry tone before getting to the actual joke: “[y]ou 
know I really can’t stand these prejudices.” He then goes on to tell the actual joke 
about the mismatched reality of Turkish German women and men and German 
perceptions of reductive visual appearances and behaviours. “All those people tell 
me, it’s like, with you Muslims, all the women are wearing a headscarf and all the 
mean have a beard. Yeah! Total nonsense, dude, just complete BULLSHIT!” It is 
a loaded attack against the essentialist representation of Turkishness in German 
society and the tension building up in the live audience is noticeable. There is 
some snickering and the recording picks up subdued laughs, but no claps or 
cheers. It is in this moment that Yaran reroutes a potentially anti-social ethnic 
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comedy moment in a pro-social one by adding a quick twist of relief humour 
at the expense of narrow-minded, racist subjects in German society: “I mean, 
yeah, well, ok, SOME women DO HAVE a beard, too! Ok, I’ll admit that. And, 
what’s more, in my family, most people wear a headscarf. Even my grandfather. 
Cool, I mean, he’s got dementia and thinks he’s actually a pirate: CAPTAIN 
SÜLAYMAN SPARROW!!”. 
The live audience breaks into a collective reaction of visible relief. Some laugh 
loudly and most members of the audience applaud. However, some can be seen 
turning around to other audience members, looking somewhat clueless or asking 
for clarification. It seems as if some of the audience members are checking in 
with each other about the intention of this sudden change. One could argue 
that they are reassuring themselves of the appropriateness of their laughter when 
the Turkish German comedian switches from accusatory tension to relaxed 
enjoyment. More jokes like this come up throughout the performance. Yaran 
addresses the issue of having to explain his need for a prayer room at work; or 
alleged Turkish sexism for adding “BITCH” at the end of sentences to make his 
speech more evocative: “[l]ike when I say at the bank counter ‘Hey, I need to 
make a payment…BIIIITCHHH!’, and then the guy working there gets it and 
straight away goes along with it when he says ‘Of course, I got you, SIIISSS!’”. 
There is a provocative opener, followed by a relief humour punchline. It takes 
the audience a couple of minutes to figure out this comedic strategy of raising 
sensitive political topics without accusing anyone in the room of being complicit 
in their hegemonic dominance. 
It is with this video that YouTube users are more actively and more critically 
involved than with other content of Yaran’s republished live stand-up 
performances. Some users who seem to identify in their profile names as Muslim 
or Turkish or Turkish German repeat some of the salient political messages about 
ethnic diversity and respect: 
How do you know if someone is a Muslim who actually practices their faith ? He 
will tell you at some point for sure. 
Other users pick up on specific audience members and their real-time reactions 
to the probing setups Yaran uses before diverting tension into funny punchlines: 
2:10 Emogirl is not amused
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Again, a larger number of users who either identify as Swabian or hint at their 
sympathies for this German community in south-western Germany relate their 
commentary to Yaran’s punchline about “German minorities having a go at each 
other”. The “Swabians being, oh dude, yeah, they are some of the most brutal 
ones”:
Osan: “Above all else, we have in Berlin…an ethnic minority, marginalised 
community, and it is much more strange and aggressive and dangerous than 
anything else.” Me: “Swabians?” Osan: “The Swabians!”
Heya, I am a lady from Swabia and we are not brutal at all 😂
who here is also Swabian😂✋
Ey no bashin Swabs best people ❤ 
Even YouTube viewers who critique, as distinct from criticise, Yaran for repeating 
some of his jokes in different performances, attest readily that this kind of ethnic 
comedy resonates with them. This is an important aspect of Yaran’s work, 
especially with him raising the issue of Jewishness and Turkishness in Sometimes, 
Germany is a bit too German in the cold opener to a recorded live performance 
on national public television: “[h]i Stuttgart, so I’m a practising and devoted 
Muslim, right, and you, I’m very cosmopolitan and very tolerant. One of my best 
friends is a Jew, and I will admit, Stuttgart, right, we do have lots of discussions, 
right? I say: ‘Mohammed is the best’, and he says: ‘Moses is the best’, ‘Mohammed 
is the best’, ‘Moses is the best’…I mean, oh well, now we agreed that Batman is the 
best”. 
Osan Yaran is really very funny! Shame he just always uses the same jokes…
Osan Yaran, I love the Jehovah’s Witnesses as Muslims?😀 Welldone. German 
sense of order and signs everywhere confuse foreigners. So funny. 💖
Religious diversity among non-Christian communities in Germany is a joke that 
comes up frequently in Yaran’s work. He has managed to sustain the topic by 
combining it with popular culture tropes as a comedy relief. Citing the comic 
character of Batman is part of an incongruous comedy strategy which allows 
the audience to admit that religious identities in Germany may conflict with 
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each other. Yaran thereby hints at the moral, cultural and political context of 
mainstream humour before directing the answer of which religion is the “best” 
to an apolitical topic of nerdish fandom for American comic books. Referring 
to transnational popular culture is, however, not an escape route. The joke about 
non-Christian religions’ hierarchy in Germany is an attempt to expound the 
politics of German culture. It does, quite literally, ask about the positioning of 
minority religion in mainstream society. This is a politicised and controversial 
topic. It highlights such contemporary issues as religion, Germany’s past dealings 
with Jewish Germans and present discrimination against Muslims, and the 
clash between Jews and Muslims on a geopolitical scale. For the most part, this 
reveals that the politics of Turkish German stand-up comedy are neither overly 
trivialising nor inherently subversive (Spielhaus, 2014: 322). 
Yaran, like Baydar, contributes to an energising of civic culture. He engages the 
audience with topics steeped in the political. The counter-hegemonic elements 
in his routines add to rather than drain German entertainment culture of serious 
content, as argued by Postman in his general critique of modern entertainment 
comedy culture (Postman, 2006). In terms of shared content and viewer 
networking around his streamed republished performances, Yaran’s viewers 
gravitate towards content which makes Turkishness and Turkish identities in 
Germany appear more ordinary than German attitudes and cultural values. That 
much becomes clear when one watches his stand-up routine, German Punctuality 
at a Turkish Wedding. The live performance attracted almost half a million views 
on YouTube within two months. Ten thousand viewers liked the video, whereas 
only 536 viewers gave it a thumbs down. The routine turns on commonplace 
rituals most audience members in the live recording event and YouTube users 
can relate to while watching. Its climax is the “Turkish wedding complex”: “Hey 
folks, I had a Turkish wedding myself ! You know about Turkish weddings? At 
my wedding, there were nine hundred Turks! Dude, nine hundred Turks in a big 
function room! That looked like the opening of a new job services office for the 
unemployed, dude, let me tell you that. And with my four German colleagues in 
there. I’ll tell you what, they looked like they were working there. And the best 
thing is, on the invitation for Turkish weddings, it always says 5pm. But, hey, they 
NEVER start at 5pm. Ey folks, my co-workers stood there at the door at five to 
five, trying to get in. I’m telling you, not even my parents were that early. And 
they were the hosts! So, then my mother comes up and asks them who they are 
for ten minutes and then, then she tells them to help her carry the chairs inside. 
HAAAAAAAA!”.
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Yaran closes this part of his routine with a description of how his German 
boss tried to dance at the wedding. Yet, for hours on end, the German only 
managed to stand there stationary and pump his hand up into the air. “This”, 
Yaran concludes, “looked like he was waving people goodbye, and then he started 
to turn in a circle, and it was like he was pointing to people, like, ‘You are all 
being deported, the boat is full now’”. Yaran conducts all his current routines in 
this jokingly subversive way. The live audience cheers for all the jokes, both those 
talking about how ordinary German rituals seem outlandish to Others and those 
making light of Turkish German culture. However, some of the online users 
whose names suggest that they identify as “bio-Deutsch” or historically German 
express negative viewpoints. Their comments on the specific nature of Yaran’s 
ethnic comedy jokes suggest that this specific performance reproduces reductive 
and event racist knowledge about ethnic identities instead of subverting them:
Not mean to be a downer, but I think it’s really surprising that since what feels 
like 30 years, Kaya Yanar and “Watcha Looking at?”etc, use the same jokes 
about “Germanness” and that people find them funny. 
This guy is so unfunny. And he crosses a line. He’s also a subtle racist. I know 
a lot of Turks who are like this. A lot of them don’t say things like that not just 
in jest. Folks, they hate us germans. They also vote in Germany for a Turkish 
President. I say everyone who does that should go back to turkey.
He makes fun of us, and none of those idiots [in the live audience] understands 
that this is not about jokes anymore…, I would have left. This stuff should be 
banned…these people should be banned and deported. For me this is hidden 
discrimination. 
Only one comment expresses a sense of gratitude for being taught about the ins 
and outs of a Muslim wedding and takes it with a sense of comedic mockery:
But the thing about the weddings is totally true in real life 😅😅😅 I have 
experienced this myself. I was invited to an Arab birthday party. Times was 
given, begin 14:00 o’clock. And well, what can I tell you…I was the first one to 
get there. The other guests only arrived after about 15:30 😅😅😅 From 14:00 
o’clock to 15:30 o’clock people changed their clothes, put on makeup, and put 
food on the tables… 😊 I’ll know better for next time now
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Staging stereotypes remains an ambivalent entertainment business despite 
recognisable progress. YouTube user reactions confirm the funny qualities of 
Yaran’s work as well as the serious reception and pessimistic views spelled out 
on the notion of standstill or cheap shots at the expense of one ethnic identity 
for the amusement of another. Idil Baydar has addressed this issue by staging 
her Turkishness and her Germanness as equally imaginary stage characters. 
Osan Yaran collapses his stage persona and personal identity. Seasoned Turkish 
German comedians and cabaret performers such as Serdar Somuncu welcome 
the former technique (Spielhaus: 332). Of the latter they grow increasingly weary 
as there is a danger of reproducing a Turkishness or Germanness beyond any 
reality, even that of the lived realities of the Turkish German comedy performers. 
 
CHAPTER VI
Settling into “Post-Migrant” 
Mainstream Culture
“Die Kunst aus der Hand zu lesen, war ein Angebot, das Wahrsagerinnen machen konnten. 
Dieses Angebot hat sich inzwischen erübrigt. Inzwischen kannst du selber aus der Hand 
lesen, mehr noch, du kannst aus deiner Hand sehen. Du kannst sehen, wie die Zukunft 
aussehen wird. Du kannst sie gestalten. Eine Möglichkeit deine Zukunft zu gestalten, wäre 
zum Beispiel in Stuttgart. Bei der Türkisch-Deutschen Kabarettwoche. Vom 12. bis zum 21. 
April läuft sie. Und da sind sie alle. Also, viele! Also, Jilet Ayse ist da. Und Özgür Cebe ist 
da. Und Serhat Doğan ist da. Muhsin Omurca ist da. Und Ozan Akhan und Jilet Ayse 
und ich, wir machen den Comedy Orient Express. Ich bin natürlich auch da, solo. Mein 
Programm, Fatih Morgana, kannst du kommen und dir das anschauen. Und jetzt, hast du 
die Möglichkeit, deine Zukunft zu gestalten. Oder anders gesagt: Du hast es in der Hand! 
Wir sehen uns!”
“Reading someone’s palm used to be an offer only fortune tellers could make. This offer 
is no longer needed. Today, you can read your own palm. In fact, you can actually “see” 
in your palm. You can see what the future will hold. You can shape it. In Stuttgart, there 
is a way to do just that. There is the Turkish German Comedy week. It runs from 12 to 21 
April. And everyone is going to be there. Well, really everyone! So, Jilet Ayse will be there. 
And Özgür Cebe will be there. And Serhat Doğan will be there. Muhsin Omurca will 
be there. And Ozan Akhan and Jilet Ayse and I, we are going to do the Comedy Orient 
Express. Of course, I will be there doing my solo programme, too. My programme, Fatih 
Morgana, you can come and watch it. And now you have the opportunity to shape your 
future. Or let’s say: it is in your hand! I’ll see you there!”
—Facebook video announcement posted by Turkish German comedian 
Fatih Çevikkollu on behalf of the organisers of German-Turkish Comedy 
Week in Stuttgart, Germany, to promote the event (Facebook, 2019)1
Summary
The final chapter of this book discusses some of the most current issues in Turkish 
German culture and comedy entertainment in the 21st century, especially in relation to 
its future in the third decade of the new millennium. I also offer very brief reflections 
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on the assessment of the idea of post-migrant culture production. This label has in 
recent years been attached to productions in contemporary Turkish German culture, 
serving to indicate the most current phase in its long history. I end by referring to three 
major trends associated with Turkish German comedy and German mainstream culture 
entertainment: 1) Islam and religion 2) women in Turkish German comedy 3) streaming 
and social media. This section features contributions from the field’s most prolific 
comedy performers, writers, actresses and other comedy artists, and new up-and-coming 
individuals, cultural production techniques, social media platforms and online video 
streaming channels. 
The 2020s: A (Post-) Migration Context for Turkish German 
Comedy Entertainment?
“More recently”, writes Göktürk (2020) in revisiting cultural paternalism in 
Turkish German Cinema in the updated and revised edition of The German 
Cinema Book, “Shermin Langhoff and her team at Ballhaus Naunynstraße 
and subsequently the Gorki Theatre in Berlin have popularized ‘post-migrant 
theatre,’ a term they see as countering ostracism with an insistence on settlement” 
(Göktürk, 2020: 502). Referring, however, to El-Tayeb’s caution against purely 
rhetorical claims to the overcoming of cultural bias against migrants much 
like the proclaimed post-racial era of post-Obama America, she adds, “I for 
my part am not convinced that ‘post-migrant’ is a productive label to add to 
our list of categories. It suggests a transcendence that does not fit the ongoing 
complex reality of migrations. The emphasis on having arrived and settled is 
surely an important point to make but categorizations need to remain flexible to 
accommodate those who keep coming—otherwise they will just perpetuate the 
logic of national containers where some can claim rights to belong and stay and 
other cannot” (Göktürk, 2020: 502). 
This resistance to supporting the notion of a post-migration Turkish German 
culture context points to its own distinct issue in the study of Turkish German 
Muslimness. The analysis of Turkish German cultural participation in German 
society has historically been focused on the logic of the national and of 
containment of ethnic Others and minority cultures, as I have detailed in the 
preceding chapters. And by bypassing their rigid borders, social boundaries and 
imaginary ethno-cultural restrictions, as I have explained in the main chapters, 
too, Turkish German comedy entertainment in the new century gestures towards 
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a project to expand Germanness. It seeks to complicate binary identity politics, 
which still pit Muslims against non-Muslims, and to entangle the history of 
Germany with that of other countries and cultures. It shows the continuities 
between flows of migration and identity as an organic, intergenerational 
whole, rather than a narrative of interrupted life stories and a perpetual state 
of disconnect with one’s culture(s) and sense(s) of belonging. This extols the 
actual gains of Turkish German migrant culture from the alleged post-migration 
stresses like culture shock and conflict, both of which may lead to a sense of 
cultural confusion, feelings of displacement and isolation. 
The creative work of Turkish Germans, and more specifically their gains 
around mainstream comedy as illustrated in the quotation at the beginning 
of this chapter are increasingly visible in German mainstream culture. More 
importantly, their easy availability and widespread popularity with Turkish-
speaking and German-speaking audiences suggests that they have created a 
plurality of opportunities from which to derive the pleasure of humour based 
on the lived realities of Turkish Germans in Germany: on cinema screens, on 
television and other small screens, in books, on stage, live or recorded, streamed 
and re-shared and framed para-textually by user comments on social media. In all 
of this, though, as Post and Schramm remark, ethnic humour does not reproduce 
the Euro-pudding logic of strongly national motifs of belonging, assuming them 
as pre-given homogenous communities which can be bonded in artifice only in 
overly simplistic integration fictions (Post and Schramm, 2019: 113-115). Instead, 
contemporary Turkish German comedy works to reappraise the meaning and 
roles of concepts like diversity, Othering and integration, which are changing 
as post-migrant perspectives and analyses beget new aesthetic redefinitions 
of the historically German “we” group’s claim to normativity. The latter, in El 
Tayeb’s assessment, is no longer perceived as a homogenous entity in which 
“an essentialisitically defined, white, Christian Europe always and necessarily 
remains the norm” (El Tayeb, 2016: 19). An while I do not label my work here 
as such, I do suggest that this book, like other current works on transnational 
Turkish German culture by scholars such as Ela Gezen and Elizabeth Stewart, 
takes some of its cues from the concept of “post-migrant”. The term has inspired 
me to discuss a distinctive phase in Turkish German cultural production and 
reception and reflect on its potential for future scholarship. 
However, and here I fully agree with Göktürk, this should not mean that one 
simply closes the book on the problematisation of Germany’s struggle to come to 
terms with its status as a migration nation by applying the term “post-migrant” 
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to the discussion of Turkish German culture and Muslimness in Germany in the 
new century. Spielhaus emphasises that the tensions between non-Muslim and 
Muslim Germany persist, as do certain clichés and long-rehearsed tropes related 
to Islam and Turkish Germanness (Spielhaus, 2017: 118-120). I made this clear in 
chapter two. As well, reductive knowledge about the Muslim and Turkish German 
Other has affected and certainly still does affect the conditions of production 
for contemporary Turkish German humour entertainment in the new century. 
Yet, as Spielhaus also concedes, it will be impractical, if not impossible, to keep 
up the categorisation and theoretical attribution of certain terms like Turkish 
German, Arab German or ethnic in the analysis of comedy in German-culture 
contexts. Even the most established German satire shows, television companies 
and cinema comedy productions, and cabaret and local stage play producers, are 
increasingly more open to all kinds of Germanness and collaborations among the 
producers of humour related to its attending themes: race, ethnicity, religion, 
class and gender.
Trends in Turkish German Comedy Entertainment
Turkish German comedy entertainment in German mainstream culture through 
the first two decades of the 21st century has increasingly exhibited voices and 
issues previously relegated to niche audiences and independent productions. 
Encouraged by the burgeoning of these voices and issues in recent years, and 
a growing awareness of certain innovations around consumer behaviour of 
mainstream comedy culture consumers and technology, I present here several 
trends which have, at least at this time, gained notable prominence and may 
attract more scholarly attention in future. 
Islam and Religion
The recent focus on European Islam and Muslimness has sparked renewed 
interest in both representatives and representations of Muslimness. In Germany’s 
case, the increased focus on a Muslim presence in the wake of the global 2015 
refugee crisis (see chapter two) has evolved as a question about the relationship 
between politics and religion. While secularism, as it has traditionally been seen 
in German culture as an issue of relations between church and state, has evolved 
to encompass a more generalised notion of religiosity itself, the discourse around 
Islam has re-initiated a debate about religious and political authority (Kahn, 
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2013: 216). Turkish German comedy in the 21st century, in this respect, provides 
a unique framework for the furthering of a conversation about Islam, religion 
and politics. However, as I have indicated as well throughout this book, this 
debate has proved to be a challenge in German society, not least due to the wider 
German public’s disinterest in national postulations of religious diversity and the 
notably diverse array of religious and political thought throughout the Muslim 
world. One can argue that this context makes it easier for Turkish German 
comedians like Fatih Çevikkollu to present in their comedy routines a more 
generalised version of Muslimness, which may seem somewhat reductive yet is 
not dominated by outsider-imposed categorisations of Islam (Kahn, 2013: 216). 
This is not to say that the topic of Islam in German society has flourished 
as a widespread theme in Turkish German comedy entertainment, informing 
audiences about idiosyncratic identity development processes of Muslim minority 
communities or making them aware of the cultural depths of Islamic traditions. 
Yet, insofar as it creates a very visible space for a certain level of discourse around 
these questions and the topic of Islam in German popular culture and arguments 
about a so-called moderate Islam, Turkish German comedians have been able 
to touch on recognisable reference points. Framed by 9/11, some of the most 
relevant examples here are to be found in the works of Fatih Çevikkollu. One 
of the most established Turkish German comedy artists, who rose to fame in 
German mainstream culture for his regular appearances as the character of Murat 
Günaydin in the popular sitcom, Alles Atze-That’s So Atze (RTL, 2000-2007), 
Çevikkollu’s comedy has a history of highlighting majority society attitudes to 
domesticating and securitising Muslimness in mainstream Germany. The opener 
to one of his most popular stand-up comedy routines, Moslem TÜV-German 
State Regulations Authority for Muslimness, is directed explicitly at the German 
notion of Islam as an anti-humorous and hence anti-secular religion and form of 
identity: 
Good evening. (audience applauds) Thank you. So, I hope you allow me 
to introduce myself: My name is Fatih Çevikkollu. Yes, that’s Turkish. If 
you wanted to translate that into German, it’d be something like … Fatih 
Çevikkollu. (audience laughs) Oh yes, I’m Muslim. (pauses for effect) Well, 
can you tell? Like, just now? I said Muslim and immediately the room got 
really tense. (Çevikkollu, 2008; see also Çevikkollu and Mysorekar, 2008)
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Here, as other Turkish German comedians who identify as Muslim and perform 
in Germany have been illustrating with their comedy performances (see chapter 
five), Turkish German comedy takes aim at the mechanism of how German 
mainstream news, press and other entertainment media mediate and represent 
Muslimness and Turkishness. Rather than claim to ridicule self-representations of 
their diverse community and its attitudes towards Islam, this kind of incongruity 
humour calls out German mainstream culture’s allegedly liberal understandings 
of Muslims in the country while grouping them into essentialist categories of 
“we” and “them”. Yet, as in the previous chapters, it is not always clear whether 
this kind of comedy revolving around Muslimness only straddles a larger critique 
of anti-essentialism in contemporary German identity politics, or whether it is 
more related to the anti-racist comedy agenda as exemplified in Mutlu Ergün-
Hamaz’s Kara Günlük: Die geheimen Tagebücher des Sesperado (2016). One could 
also argue that it actually seeks to move into an area of uncomfortable silence 
and even taboos around the repercussions faced by some Muslim comedians for 
joking about Islam in Muslim majority countries like Egypt.2
Women in Turkish German Comedy
A new wave of female Turkish German comedy artists, stand-up performers, 
writers, directors and YouTubers has gained attention over the past two decades 
for its creative innovations and artistic contributions. Among them are Yasemin 
Şamdereli (Alles getürkt!-Fake as a Turk!, 2002; Sextasy, 2004; Ich Chef Du Nix-Me 
Boss, You Not, 2007), who directed Almanya-Welcome to Germany (2011) in close 
collaboration with her sister, Nesrin Şamdereli. Scholars of Turkish German 
cinema, first and foremost Göktürk, attest to the Şamdereli sisters’ creative 
potential to give new energy to the representation of Turkish German history in 
film by comedically intervening in the fossilisation of Turkish labour migrants’ 
stories. “The opening sequence of Almanya”, Götürk writes, “is a good example 
of how popular comedy is breathing new life into the archives of migrant lives” 
(Göktürk, 2020: 502). By assembling collective memory through a collection of 
different kinds of footage, styles and works of earlier Turkish German generations, 
the Şamdereli sisters make a point about intergenerational relations, connections 
and the misguided assumption that Turkish labour migration is necessarily an 
exercise in historicisation of memory rather than making it porous and thus 
multi-temporal. 
There are also Turkish German actresses who have made a name for themselves 
by appearing repeatedly and to critical acclaim in Turkish German comedy 
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entertainment films. The most prominent among them are Aylin Tezel, Demet 
Gül, Mandala Tayde, İdil Üner and Sibel Kekilli, while actresses like Sesede 
Terziyan have also starred live on stage in plays such as Verrücktes Blut-Crazy 
Blood, an intense integration comedy play written by Jens Hillje and directed by 
Nurkan Erpulat. 
In the specific context of Turkish German stand-up comedy, Idil Baydar (see 
chapter five) has risen to considerable popularity in recent years (Spielhaus, 
2017). This is despite the fact that women in stand-up across the globe account 
for just 10 per cent of comedians and male comics continue to earn more than 
their female counterparts, with women of colour earning generally less than all 
others (Tomsett, 2017). Many of the female comedians also continue to battle 
against the idea that women are not funny, seeing that television comedy panel 
shows, comedy clubs and international comedy slam events overwhelmingly bill 
men. However, female comedians, and especially those with non-historically 
German identities, are beginning to explore other avenues to get their feet in 
the door, as I explain in the next section. In 2020, the relative absence of Turkish 
German women in mainstream entertainment comedy is blatantly obvious. To 
the small group of diverse female comedians booked more regularly and billed 
as primary acts in German mainstream culture comedy entertainment belong 
Senay Duzcu and Meltem Kaptan, both Turkish Germans, the Iranian German 
comedian Enissa Amani and the Russian German comedian Liza Kos. And 
while the overall number of female stand-up comedians in German-language 
entertainment has grown over the past 20 years, there is still little representation 
compared to the large number of male comedians dominating the profession, 
and even less when it comes to the representation of diverse German female, 
trans or LGBTQI identities, and women of colour. 
Perhaps the most female-driven field of cultural production to date, Turkish 
German comedy literature remains the stronghold of female writers. Next to 
the better-known names I have discussed here, namely those of Hatice Akyün, 
Lale Akgün and Hülya Özkan, there are Ayşegül Acevit (Was lebst Du?-Whatcha 
Livin’ At?, 2005; Zu Hause in Almanya-At Home in Almanya, 2008), Sibel 
Susann Teoman (Der Teufel ist blond-The Devil is a Blonde, 2006; Türkischer 
Mokka mit Schuss-Spiked Turkish Coffee, 2007; Der Teufel sieht rot-Mad as Hell, 
2008; Flitterwochen auf Türkisch-Turkish Honeymooning, 2008) and Meltem 
Kaptan (Verliebt, Verlobt, Verbockt-He Loves Me, He Loves Me Not, 2016). This 
comes as no surprise. Historically, female writers of Turkish German comedy 
fictions, specifically those dealing with transnational genres coded as female like 
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chick-lit (Yeşilada, 2009), travel writing (Benbow, 2019) and romantic comedy 
styled as “pop autobiographies (Weber, 2013), have always had a broader fan and 
female consumer base. 
Streaming and Social Media
Perhaps the most viable financial path for Turkish German comedians is to 
translate their acts into broader success and develop a larger fan base via rather 
new, digital formats and platforms. They allow in particular female Turkish 
German comedians like Baydar to have their material streamed and shared and 
downloaded directly by audiences onto personal computers and handheld screen 
and audio devices. According to Donian, many comedians could survive on 
the advertisement sold “for popular comedy podcasts such as WFT with Marc 
Maron, or Scott Aukerman’s Comedy Bang! Bang!” (Donian, 2019: 20). At a 
rough estimate, comedy podcasters with approximately 40,000 downloads per 
episode in the United States can make well over US$75,000 a year. Shows in 
the range of 100,000 downloads can gross somewhere between US$250,000 and 
500,000. Many comedians in America, Donian notes, “have also heralded a new 
trend—the podcast-turned-TV series—parlaying successful podcasts into larger 
earning (cable) TV shows. […] More recently, HBO’s adaptation of 2 Dope Queens 
(2018) featuring Jessica Williams and Phoebe Robinson” (Donian, 2019: 20) 
and the runaway success of the comedy series proved that female producers with 
ethnically diverse backgrounds stand to gain most from immediate producer-to-
audience mainstream productions. 
This is not an American comedy culture phenomenon. The creation of podcasts, 
websites devoted to ethnic comedy, social media apps like Twitter, Facebook and 
Instagram, and the instantaneous streaming services available for free or at low 
cost across television, internet (YouTube), tablets and other kinds of mobile or 
hand-held screen devices has also enabled Turkish German comedy to progress 
past physical venues and regulatory or other production limitations due to costs, 
in television and cinema. In fact, one can speak of a 21st century comedy wave, 
which signals a new, global digital period after the transnational Anglophone 
comedy culture boom of the 1980s/1990s. That first boom was sustained by 
physical comedy club scenes and international entertainment products being 
imported on the big and small screen across the world. The second renaissance 
of a much more inclusive mainstream comedy culture is fuelled by technology 
and more artistic and creative liberties compared to those of traditional venues. 
Never before has so much original material for comedy, both family friendly and 
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more edgy, come from a more extensive and diverse group of comedy artists, 
writers, directors and performers than today at the beginning of the third decade 
of the new millennium. Indeed, one does not have to look too far to find exciting 
new materials and Turkish German comedy routines online. Just a quick search 
on the most popular outlets like YouTube, Instagram and Twitter, as I indicated 
in chapter five, leads to a comedy which crosses over into different genres and 
forms, and in doing so is producing a new kind of cultural artifact. 

CONCLUSION
European Muslims’ Issues: Turkish German 
Comedy in a Global Entertainment 
and Identity Politics Framework 
This book appears in a series dedicated to Current Issues in Islam. That breadth 
is necessary to capture the global realities of Muslim identities and their lived 
experiences in relation to Islam and a surge in anti-Muslim sentiments. Also, it 
indicates that one cannot tell the story of Turkish German comedy entertainment 
in Germany without telling the story of popular Muslim comedy in the global 
West. It is a political narrative of crisis management, which was born from the 
need of Muslims to address the impact of 9/11 or Danish cartoons about the 
Prophet on non-Muslim majority cultures in America and Europe respectively. 
My scholarship on demographic changes in traditionally Christian majority 
countries, in tandem with popular culture studies, details how Turkish German 
interventions have taken shape around counter-discursive comedy cultures 
in different mass media types. In the 21st century these interventions serve to 
debunk neo-nationalist fantasies of Islamic separatism (Nielsen, 2014: 12). 
Evidence of this being a necessity rather than a choice for Muslim individuals 
and the community has emerged in the works of scholars such as Spielhaus and 
Hirzalla and van Zoonen. They argue that non-Muslim majority societies must 
spread the message: the Muslims are not coming. They are already here. They 
have been for quite some time. And they will not force you to eat halal, follow 
Sharia law, lose your foreskin or renounce Jesus (Spielhaus, 2014; Hirzalla and 
von Zoonen, 2015).
In 2020, Muslim entertainment comedy increasingly engages the anxiety 
around Islamic beliefs and the mere presence of Muslims as the reality of being 
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Other in non-Muslim majority countries. Whether a film or television comedy 
plays in Munich or New York, the “random” selection by airport security of 
passengers believed to be Muslim is a widespread plot point. The 2019 pilot for 
Aatif Nawaz’s British comedy sketch show on BBC Three, Muzlamic, drives this 
point home with visceral detail. Goofy and sometimes overtly reminiscent of Ali 
G-ish performances, British comedians Ali Shahalom and Aatif Nawaz propose 
to millions of viewers in the United Kingdom “a sketch show exploring life from 
the perspective of two Muslim comedians or, rather, two comedians who happen 
to be Muslim” (BBC “Muzlamic”, 2019). Muzlamic’s pilot episode opens with 
a sketch about a pair of Muslim holidaymakers, caps on backwards and beards 
neatly manicured, being questioned by airport security. When asked if they have 
ever had any trouble with the police, they offer PDFs and printed copies of their 
answers to standard questions such as: “Do you know ISIS?” When taking their 
leave and walking out of the interrogation room, they offer to send in “the next 
brown boys, yeah?” “I didn’t say brown. He said it,” the white security officer who 
had interrogated them says nervously, head turned to the CCTV cameras and 
tiny beads of sweat gathering on his forehead.
Muzlamic is one of numerous European Muslim comedies turning on the 
premise of hidden yet systemic racism against Muslims, especially Muslim men. 
Productions based on this premise first rose to popular culture acclaim in the 
early 2000s with Allah Made Me Funny, an American stand-up comedy troupe 
consisting of Bryant “Preacher” Moss, Azhar Usman and Azeem Muhammad. 
In Canada, the serial comedy Little Mosque on the Prairie was a hit with 
audiences from 2007 to 2012. It, too, deals with the framework of Muslim 
alienation despite Canada’s self-proclaimed identity as cosmopolitan multi-
culture. The longevity of certain themes in Muslim comedy around the world 
shows that Islam has become deeply entrenched in debates about securitisation 
in mainstream cultures across Europe and North America. In Australia and 
New Zealand, comedians Aamer Rahman and Nazeem Hussain tackle the 
tropes of Islamist terror in their 2007 sell-out comedy festival show, Fear of a 
Brown Planet. Body searches by customs officials and police also appear in the 
stand-up comedy of female European comedians such as Sadia Azmat, a British 
native, and Ellie Jokar, an Iranian-born Dane. While Jokar focuses on anti-
immigrant sentiments in continental Europe, Azmat works through the Brits’ 
public perception of Muslims as threats to everyone’s safety on stage and in 
her comedy podcast, No Country for Young Women. In part, one can argue, the 
female comedians do double duty. Azmat and Jokar also engage the gendered 
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cliché triad reserved exclusively for female Muslim comedy artists: headscarf, 
burka and domestic abuse.
Proponents of Islamophobia have been pushing for populist and state-
sanctioned rejections of Islam since the rise of Islamist terrorism in Europe over 
the past decade. US President Donald Trump proposed during his election 
campaign in 2016 a register of all Muslims in America. In 2018, the US Supreme 
Court upheld Trump’s so-called Muslim travel ban, while right-wing politicians 
in France and the United Kingdom as well as Sweden and Denmark discussed 
the sourcing of personal profile data on social media platforms as means to 
prevent acts of Muslim extremism. In Germany, the attacks of 2016 in Berlin 
have fuelled discussions about a halt to forced migration from Muslim majority 
countries such as Syria and Afghanistan. All the while, debates about the ban 
on or restriction of the hijab, headscarf and burka are still current across Europe 
and North America, with Austria’s controversial 2017 ban testing Western legal 
opinions on face-covering clothing in public spaces and official institutions. 
I write all of this as the focus of German politics has shifted more and more 
towards a vilification of Muslim men as potential perpetrators of acts of violence 
while the actual violent attacks on them by German neo-Nazis thrive seemingly 
unhindered. Fatih Akin’s film, In the Fade, warned of these issues two years before 
the East German city of Dresden declared a “Nazi emergency” in 2019. 
Since 2016, the new-fangled political party of the AfD, which promotes 
itself as an Alternative for Germany, has shaped the core of its political agenda 
around a rigorous plan to deport Muslim Asylum seekers, especially if they are 
young, unattended and male. The political arm of the anti-Muslim PEGIDA 
movement hit a protectionist nerve with German voters with this plan. This 
became apparent when AfD representatives entered German state governments 
in Eastern Germany in large numbers and gained more than 8 per cent of the vote 
in the 2017 federal elections. 
Summary of Findings and Outlook: Where Do We Go 
from Here?
I end Turkish German Muslims and Comedy Entertainment with an overview 
of current trends in German, Austrian, American, Canadian, Danish, Swedish, 
British and Australian comedy culture and real-life political contexts. I do this to 
highlight the argument I have made throughout this book: that the different types 
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of mainstream comedy entertainment (film, television, literature, online) react 
in unison and on a transnationally interconnected scale to Muslim stereotyping 
and the complex issues faced by minority communities in countries across the 
globe. These issues are real and require effective interventions on a global scale. 
I contend that current issues in Islam in the new century should be studied not 
solely through the national context of one country’s entertainment productions. 
Neither should we discuss only national inventories of creative, humour-driven 
messages about living in a Western majority society while Muslim. 
My study of Turkish German identity issues through the lens of the social 
pragmatics of humour has also led me to pay close attention to the many 
layers of understanding one requires to examine comedy. There are intended 
and unintended messages; there is the risk of reproducing negative, anti-social 
messages about ethnic identity and about who may belong to a group and 
who shall be excluded from it because of religion, gender, sexual orientation or 
citizenship status. It is very easy to turn “Shield” into “Sword”. 
The study of popular entertainment culture is also often criticised for neglecting 
the political dimensions of films, books, television series or content produced 
originally or republished for audience consumption via online platforms like 
YouTube. 
This is a short-sighted perspective. And it does not hold water. I have 
emphasised throughout this book and based on a socio-historical background 
provided in chapter one that Turkish German comedy culture is profoundly 
political. Its politics revolve around presence and persistence. The strategies it 
employs stem from a post-modern entertainment culture which has come to play 
a central role in our everyday lives. From how mainstream audiences consume 
their news through a new wave of political satire shows on television to late night 
comedy hosts making pleas for civic discourse to return to ideals of courtesy and 
respect, the rules have changed. At the beginning of the third decade of the 21st 
century, our information society no longer operates under the same linguistic 
or epistemological guidelines previous generations have accepted. They accepted 
them as the normative rule in discussing serious issues such as identity politics, 
ethnicity, racism, migration and national belonging. 
Instead, comedy culture has started to react to a post-truth world dominated 
by neo-nationalist forces. It has kicked in like an immune response. In German 
society it reacts to regressive identity discourses plaguing the country for 
centuries. Anti-semitism and ethnic Othering paved the way for an intricate bias 
against Muslimness to take a firm hold in German-speaking cultures and, later, 
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the German nation state. The alleged political truths about Muslim Germans, and 
Turkish Muslim Germans above all, are a systemic construct based on insidious 
cultural mechanisms: alienation, disassociation, minoritising, de-historicising 
and, finally, ghettoisation. Jewish German history is clear on where this leads to, 
namely termination. 
I demonstrated in chapter two that Turkish German culture clash comedy 
films are critical of social strata and identity labels imposed by majority society on 
minority Others. They contradict the widespread media buzz around Muslims 
as terrorist threats to Germany’s social stability and internal security. Laced 
with humour to offer the representation of personal culture clash experiences 
in romantic relationships and diasporic families as refreshingly amusing takes 
on social incongruity and hierarchical groupthink, they model common 
sense transformation as personal choices. They represent diverse characters 
and multiple ways of being Muslim, German, a woman, a man or queer. Their 
stimulating wit dismisses the idea of incongruous identity markers. There are 
impassioned mockeries of monolithic nationalism where Turks and other non-
native Germans intrude and usurp Germanness’ status as prime culture. In the 
end, their happy endings reveal that everybody is better off for letting go of an 
internalised spectrum of bias, from mean-spirited bigotry to micro-aggressions 
in daily interactions with different parts of German society.
I have studied comedy films representative of 20 years of Turkish German 
comedy cinema. And while certainly not all of them could be included here, I 
realised while working on Turkish German Muslims and Comedy Entertainment 
that more and more people outside the academy recognise films which I mention 
to them. They enjoy them for their humour and appreciate the issues they present 
to audiences. At public screenings, audience members enjoy these films for the 
levity they bring to conversations entrenched in Turkishness as problem and 
Islam as something too deviant ever truly to be part of the Western European 
identity complex. 
Chapter three outlined how an ethnic sitcom subverts skewed perceptions 
of multicultural co-existence as necessarily segregated. The narrowest of my 
case studies and discussions based on a close reading, I approached Turkish for 
Beginners as an exercise in specificity. I detailed the series’ specific production 
conditions, the transnational origins of the sitcom genre and its hybridisation 
when it became wedded to German highbrow broadcast. There is the history 
of public and private German television channels and a contextual reference 
to the Americanisation of German popular culture through the mass medium 
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of television. This approach frames my discussion of how a particular slice of 
television programming is a contributor to the overall political climate in 
German society. Again, detail and specificity reflect just how much creative 
ingenuity Turkish German comedy producers and screenwriters expend to enter 
the cultural arena of public television, which in Germany often comes after and 
not before consensus in the wider population on a political issue or the course of 
political action. 
I detailed in chapter four how Turkish German chick-lit and dick-lit authors 
explore the ethnicisation of their protagonists’ identities through mechanisms of 
gendering, so readers see that both are constructed under specific conditions and 
for certain purposes. That would be to overstate the importance of such books 
as narratives of critical value although a good number of critics dismiss them as 
entertainment fluff. However, they are part of a comedy wave of politically and 
socially aware popular culture books. They may directly invoke the popularity 
of Sex and the City, the mass-culture appeal of Bridget Jones or Nick Hornby’s 
dick-lit lads, but this is not the main reason they are successful.
Readers were hungry for alternative forms of gendered pop fiction. The 
Turkish German authors I discussed use their lived experiences to tell tales of 
love, life and family from an outsider position, which turns out to be not much 
of a cultural outside after all. The use of funny Turkish German men and women 
as protagonists counteracts the fact that they are under-represented in other 
entertainment and media sectors. Analysing the relationship between gender, 
humour and ethnicity more generally reveals that female and male Turkishness 
has long been considered incompatible with the power, and right, to be funny 
literarti in Germany’s cultural apparatus. Their arrival on the bookshelves of 
Germany and continuous ranking at the top of bestseller lists in the world’s 
largest literary economy constitute a turning point in the association of Turkish 
German male and female writers with humour. They use popularity gained 
from literary texts to tackle common gender stereotypes, which is a valid point 
in underlining the importance of their perception as culture professionals and, 
what is more, their proficiency in German culture. 
I suggested in chapter five that scripted online comedy content and the 
journey of republished performance acts from television to computer screens 
with global user audiences adds to an exciting and evolving geography of Turkish 
German identity in online worlds. Turkish German comedy available for free on 
YouTube is part of a social realignment trend in the production and consumption 
of ethnic comedy materials. For a long time, content producers have determined 
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the discursive framing of Turkishness and engaged viewers directly through live-
event screenings in the cinema and on television. However, now online audience 
users also play an active part in the second-hand curation of primary producers’ 
stand-up routines or their home-made videos. Digital screen streaming on sites 
like YouTube and social media platforms like Instagram takes Turkish German 
comedy entertainment and its humour to a place of both ultra-high visibility 
and interactivity. The comedic mode becomes a heightened commodity value, 
for humour and fun are the common elements underlying most of the popular 
content across several traditional and newer experimental channels on Google-
owned YouTube. 
Shareable, convenient, consumable pro-social ethnic comedy delivered to taste 
and with the ease of a click is the result of a long evolution of Turkish German 
comedy as described in the interlinked developments of cinema, television and 
literature. Its fuller dimensions, as I have pointed out with the examples of Idil 
Baydar and Osan Yaran, is an impactful Turkish German comedy world, where 
primary and secondary creators invoke, play with and mock national identity 
frames and what it is like to be Muslim and German in German society in 2020. 
It is a rich and promising field just waiting to be explored further. 
Finally, in chapter six, I reflected on the state of Turkish German comedy in 
the 21st century in a German-specific, national context, situating it in a possible 
(post-)migration world of humour in Germany’s mainstream entertainment 
culture and outlining current and potential future trends. 
All this makes mainstream comedy a productive locus for studying inter- and 
intra-communal identity negotiations and to ask why that appeals to millions 
of viewers, readers and online users at this time and in this global environment. 
One would also hope for more academic inquiry to take hold in an area, which 
requires further examination of the relationship between humour, comedy, 
entertainment and racism. New book series such as Islam of the Global West 
(Bloomsbury) and more established series such as Current Issues in Islam (KU 
Leuven University Press) suggest that supra-regional and multilingual studies 
into anti-Muslim sentiments are much needed. We need them, and more of them, 
to assess through multiple research models where we are headed in a millennium 
marked by xenophobic state governance and the devaluation of any identity we 




1 The Turkish German community is internally diverse and not all its members are Muslim, 
though the majority are. Approximately 2,000 of Germany’s 3,000 mosques are Turkish and 
a small number of them are financially supported by the Turkish government. According 
to the 2011 German Census’s very limited information on religion in German society, 
about 40 per cent of Turkish Germans described themselves as religiously unaffiliated, 
while 3 per cent were Christian and 44 per cent said they belonged to another religion, 
mainly Islam (Zensus, 211). Historically, “two thirds of Germany’s Muslims are of Turkish 
origin, and the rest come from countries in the Middle East, South Asia, the Balkans, 
and the former Soviet Union. Thus, Islam in Germany has a largely Turkish character” 
(Goldberg, 2002: 29). For a historical overview of the Turkish diaspora in Germany see 
Chapin (1996), and for a discussion of Turkish Muslims in Germany from a diasporic 
viewpoint see Pratt Ewing (2003) and Thomson Vierra (2018).
2  I use the terms majority and minority culture and community to indicate the demographic 
ratio between self-identified members of the Turkish German community and the 
dominant ethnic group in society. This follows a use of terminology of social majority and 
minority groups as applied in Enes Bayraklı’s and Farid Hafez’s edited volume, Islamophobia 
in Muslim Majority Societies (2018), and relates also to the origins of the terms as laid out 
by Richard Schaefer in Encyclopaedia of Race, Ethnicity, and Society – Volume 1 (2008) to 
denote inequalities in social, political and economic power.
Introduction: Finding a Voice of Their Own
1 This part of the Turkish German community is commonly referred to as the so-called 
second generation of Turkish German labour migrants. Mostly born in the 1970s in 
Germany or having come to the country as small children, these filmmakers, screenwriters 
and authors “reflect their own cultural background in a far more relaxed way than the 
generation before them did. […] And even despite the increased xenophobia of the post-
unification era, these young filmmakers [as well as screenwriters and authors] make a 
point of being German and Turkish at the same time. Yet in doing so, they do not operate 
with traditional binary oppositions, but with transcultural characters and storylines” 
(Yeşilada, 2008: 74). With a nod to internationalisation, globalism and the blurring of 
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national boundaries, they rely on the generic Hollywood conventions of a more universally 
accessible comedy and wave the serious discourse of German humour goodbye. The work 
of the new generation is different for Yeşilada in comparison to preceding films, television 
shows and novels. She typifies Turkish German comedy as a new genre in Turkish German 
cultural production, which has grown out of the cultural changes of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. In this genre, especially films and television series about bi-cultural identities 
playfully foreground inclusion instead of difference. Yeşilada points out that is simply a 
matter of “offering Turkish German stories without telling migrant tales” (Yeşilada: 78) of 
the ethnic stereotype staples of 1970s and 1980s Turkish German visual culture. Prominent 
examples of the latter are the aggressive Turkish macho and the veiled and domestically 
abused Muslima (Yeşilada: 74-78). 
2 It is easy to measure the commercial success, critical acclaim and popularity of Turkish 
German cinema, literature and online content via impact and reception metrics like views, 
clicks, downloads, licences granted or tickets and books sold, and awards received both 
in Germany and internationally. The films, books and online materials I have compiled 
here all received hundreds of thousands of views, awards or ticket sales. However, the 
notion of success requires some more nuance in relation to the television series I discuss 
in chapter three, Turkish for Beginners. Viewer numbers were relatively low when season 
one first aired. It was when German culture critics loaded season one with praise that a 
fan following started to build online with parts of the show playing on YouTube as fans 
pasted clips and sometimes complete episodes. By the time season two and, later, season 
three aired, and with DVD sales and re-runs of season one drawing in more prime-time 
audiences, the series had truly earned the status of mainstream success and was also sold 
internationally for broadcast.
3 The process of German culture products being Turked or re-formulated by Turkish 
German culture creatives through their specific perspectives has been well documented for 
its counter-discourse usage. Most visible as an example of this is the literary genre of chick-
lit a la Turka (Yeşilada, 2009) I discuss in chapter four. Turked is a pun to reflect on the 
German verb “to turk”, which implies that something is fake or inauthentic. Repurposing 
the term reflects a self-deprecatory attitude. It underpins the cultural strategies I present in 
this book. 
4 In chapter one, I put the social history of Jewish Germans in dialogue with Turkish 
Germans and East Germans. With a more differentiated scholarship on ethnic German 
identity discourse underway, I suggest here a productive continuance of Leslie Adelson’s 
groundbreaking work, which put 1990s tales of “Turks, German, and Jews” in touch with 
each other (Adelson, 2000: 93). While this book is not the place for a longer treatment 
of intersectional comedy culture discourse, it still informs my scholarship in the dialogic 
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interplay between genre, media and entertainment culture that constitutes transnational 
Turkish German entertainment comedy. 
5 Yeşilada describes the directors and screenwriters of Turkish German comedy as innovators 
of a new migrant aesthetic. They have moved to the other side of foreignness, changing 
from butts of stereotypical jokes about Turks to the ones who tell them. For instance, 
filmmakers such as Yasemin Şamdereli deconstruct the reductive image of the Turkish 
German migrant by reconstructing it with the gloves of publicly correct speech off and the 
hat of the ethno-cultural professional on (Yeşilada, 2008: 73-74). 
6 There is a long-running discussion about the danger inherent in ethnic comedy. Ethnic 
comedy can work to reinforce the clichés it seeks to subvert or reject. In the United States, 
Dave Chapelle’s stand-up comedy and his televised comedy series, which ran on Comedy 
Central from 2003 to 2006, have been heavily scrutinised for this reason. Ultimately, the 
controversy surrounding the ethnic comedy skits and characters prompted Chapelle to 
leave the show at its pinnacle of popularity in 2006 despite Comedy Central offering 
him US$50 million to continue. See more on this point in my discussion of ethno-racist 
humour and its potential social effects in chapter one.
7 Berghahn confirms that the Turkish German comedy phenomenon paved the way for 
such innovative feel-good integration comedies as Almanya – Welcome to Germany. About 
the film’s success she writes, “With 1.4 million admissions in Germany alone, is to date 
the commercially most successful Turkish German film, surpassing Fatih Akin’s critically 
acclaimed Gegen die Wand-Head-On (2004) and Auf der anderen Seite-The Edge of Heaven 
(2007), which boasted audiences between half a million and 700,000” (Berghahn, 
2013: 41).
8 I elaborate more on this concept in chapter one. 
9 I rely here on Northrop Frye’s broader classification of comedy and tragedy as thematic 
themes of fiction, and the classing of mass culture or popular entertainment comedy as “low 
social” or “popular mimetic” aspects of the “comedic mode” (Frye, 2002: 4). Frye’s essay 
collection, Anatomy of Criticism, was first published in 1957 and groups all manifestations 
of literature into one of four archetypes. The comic, the romantic, the tragic and the 
ironic, which he associates with the four seasons: spring, summer, autumn and winter, 
respectively. Alternatively, he also uses the idea of the three modes, the comic, the tragic 
and the thematic, to categorise fictions. Each of these modes, again, manifests itself in a 
variety of forms: mythic, romantic, ironic, high mimetic and low mimetic. Frye thought 
that the low mimetic would commonly follow the high mimetic in historical order, which 
again pits the national (historical Germanness) against the local (Turkish Germanness) 
and the elite (native, majority) against the ordinary (migrant, minority).
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10 See chapter one for more detailed definitions of the concept of pro-social and anti-social 
ethnic comedy. 
11 Humour artist Serdar Somuncu, a former Turkish and now German national, has become 
actively involved and decidedly vocal in widening the debate about how German culture has 
pushed migrants into a space of national silence. Somuncu has risen to fame in the German 
comedy scene as a racy stand-up comedian. He humorously attacks multiculturalism 
by asking the Federal Republic to let go of its utopian and unproductive belief in a 
homogenised society. His 2011 Hassprediger-Preaching Hate programme became famous 
for Somuncu’s public readings of Hitler’s Mein Kampf. Somuncu has stressed repeatedly in 
interviews and on his website that Germany needs to deal with its socio-ethnic problems 
by facing them head on and re-visioning integration as a process to include both majority 
and minority society (Bower, 2012: 195-197).
Chapter I: Germanness, Othering and Ethnic Comedy
1 On the rich and innovative scholarship related to German minority culture and the 
expansionist desires closely attached to the German Home see Tiffany Florvil’s and 
Vanessa Plumly’s excellent collection of curated essays, Rethinking German Studies (2018). 
While it is not the focus of this book, the close link between Turkish German and Black 
German Studies offers additional productive intersections to address Germany’s expansive 
and fluctuating colonial history and the consequences of it for West Germany and East 
Germany, and contemporary German society in the new century.
2 See my discussion in the introduction of how Günter Wallraff used this centuries-old trope 
of the lazy, dumb Turk in his sensationalist ethnic masquerade pieces. 
Chapter II: Clash Films
1 All translations are mine. 
2 See, for example, Leslie Howard’s and Anthony Asquith’s Pygmalion (1938), William 
Keighley’s The Man Who Came to Dinner (1942), Vincente Minnelli’s The Reluctant 
Debutante (1958), Jules Dassin’s Never on Sunday (1960), Arthur Penn’s Little Big Man 
(1970), Jamie Uys’ The Gods Must Be Crazy (1980), John Carpenter’s Big Trouble in Little 
China (1986), Peter Faiman’s Crocodile Dundee (1986), Spike Lee’s Do the Right Thing 
(1989) and Garry Marshall’s Pretty Woman (1990).
3 There are six major clash scenarios. There is the clash of socio-economic status, the clash of 
distinctive and seemingly incompatible personality types, the clash between a sub-culture 
and a mainstream culture or another sub-culture, the clash in geographically informed 
lifestyles, the clash involving a fantasy figure as the non-human counter-perspective, 
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and the switch films where characters walk in each other’s shoes for a while (Fuller and 
Loukides: 170).
4 The location is certainly not a coincidence. The Schanzenviertel, also called Sternschanze 
by Hamburg locals, was once famous for being a leftist hotspot for alternative art and 
experimental theatre in the 1980s. The area has transformed into one of Hamburg’s most 
cosmopolitan quarters and affluent neighbourhoods over the past four decades. There is 
now a wide variety of ethnic communities and different social classes.
5 See my discussion in the introduction of Fatih Akin’s work on cultural remixing through 
image and sound in film.
6 Döner kebab is a type of kebab meat sandwich, made of meat cooked on a vertical rotisserie 
spit. The Döner ranked high as a quintessential Turkish food in the 1980s. Originally 
served on a plate, it became a popular street food in Germany after Turkish immigrants 
invented a sandwich version in Berlin-Kreuzberg in the early 1970s. It is now considered 
a quintessential German food, which Turks in Germany created as a hybrid product for 
the German market. The Döner has become iconic for its success story of culinary culture 
mixing (Henderson, 2015). 
7 There is a realisation that true integration in German society and recognition of the 
differences in multi-ethnic coexistence are not as easy as the vision of multicultural 
togetherness promoted during the 1980s in Germany. This has been the topic of many 
political discussions about facing up to the reality of continued racism in German society 
and its cultural segregation between Muslim and other communities, as expressed by 
former German MP Mehment Gürcan Daimagüler in the foreword to his novel Kein 
schönes Land in dieser Zeit: Das Märchen von der gescheiterten Integration-No Nice Country 
At This Time: The Myth of Failed Integration: “[i]t starts with a kind of matter-of-fact 
attitude that this country uses when it talks about ‘We’ and ‘You’. ‘We’ Germans. ‘You’ 
foreigners. It’s been almost 50 years since my mother went on her way to Germany. I was 
born here, and I grew up here. I dream in German. I have no other Home and I don’t want 
any other. I like being German—well, mostly. … But I still get asked by well-intentioned 
Germans how my home country is doing and if I have ever thought about going back. 
By ‘Home’ they mean Turkey. And there are others, with less benevolent voices, who are 
happy by just yelling out: ‘All Turks out’. […] After 9/11, everything only got worse. These 
were some single shots fired before, but now I experience this kind of siege and heavy 
bombardment daily. The language has changed too: instead of you foreigners or you Turks, 
now it’s you Muslims. You oppress women, you are terrorists, you are anti-democratic. Back 
in the day I had to take the blame for Turkish extremists trying to topple the government; 
now it’s about Al-Qaida terrorism. A great development. Old racism dressed up in a new 
coat” (Daimagüler, 2011: 2). 
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8 “43. Adolf-Grimme-Preis 2007: Wettbewerb Fiktion – Begründung der Jury”. Grimme-
Institut, n.d. Web. 4 December 2014.
9 The satellite image is iconic. Deniz Göktürk, David Gramling and Anton Kaes write of 
it, “Every night, more than a. They allow migrants to view 24-hour programming in their 
native languages but cause anxiety among German media experts about the ostensible 
failure of national integration” (Göktürk, Gramling and Kaes, 2007: 332). 
10 As noted in the introduction, references to creative arts like film and music have become 
a popular inclusion in Turkish German culture clash comedy and romantic comedies. See 
Gueneli’s discussion of European sounds in Fatih Akin’s Im July-In July. They complement 
on the acoustic level our understanding of the spatial construction of a filmic multi-
cultural community (Gueneli, 2019).
11 The naming of Aylin’s Turkish fiancé is no coincidence. At the time the film was produced 
and released, the fame of Tarkan, a Turkish pop superstar, had reached German mainstream 
culture. One of Tarkan’s 1997 Turkish pop songs called Şımarık, also known as “Kiss Kiss”, 
entered the German top 100 radio charts in 2001 and was well known to German audiences.
12 Evet, I do explicitly addresses ethnic and religious diversity within the Turkish German 
community. The plot also features some wedding rituals and traditions alleged on the 
diegetic level of the film to be part of Turkish everyday culture. As Coşkun’s father tells 
his son, kidnapping the bride was part of the wedding ceremonies in his rural village 
in Turkey. This is somewhat unusual for a Turkish German comedy film with broader 
mainstream appeal. Overall, Turkish German comedy entertainment in the new century 
takes a more implicit approach to the problematisation of identity politics. Sometimes, as 
I discuss with the example of Kaya Yanar and his television sketch show in chapter three, 
these comedies reference the notion of the “political correctness gone mad” argument put 
forward by Dave Chappelle, Ricky Gervais and Steve Coogan (Brasset, 2019). Turkish 
German comedy entertainment does not support essentialism, but it does endorse it as 
the terrain on which its popular fictions can play out and are being seen by millions of 
viewers and audience members (Berghahn, 2020). This is important as some topics like 
gay Turkishness/Turkish homosexuality are less common in mainstream media, as is 
illustrated by the recent cancellation of the Turkish Netflix show If Only (2020). With the 
script produced by one of Turkey’s most successful screenwriters, Ece Yorenc, the show 
was cancelled by the Turkish government because it included a gay character. Yorenc told 
this to Turkish film website Altyazi Fasikul, which illustrates Berghahn’s argument that 
mainstream visibility is effective in bringing niche or less visible topics to the mainstream 
audience, albeit with reduced detail.
13 I revisit this ritual in chapter four. Hatice Akyün mentions it in her book for comedic 
effect. 
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Chapter III: Television Narratives of Ottoman Invasion and 
Cohabitation
1 “Bora Dagtekin über ‘Fack ju Göhte’: Ich arbeite für die Zuschauer.” Kino.de, 11 December 
2010.
2 My textual analysis of Turkish for Beginners is character-driven and based on the 
interactions between the different cultural poles and generations of the show, for example 
Turkish and German and first, second and third generations. The approach builds on a 
similar approach introduced by Erjavec and Kovacic (2009: 149-152). This chapter also 
owes much to one of the first structuralist readings of media texts in television and cultural 
communications studies, namely John Fiske’s dialectic approach to the British sci-fi sitcom 
Dr Who (Fiske, 1984: 165-189).
3 Sieg argues that Germans have a long and complex history regarding ethnic performance 
and especially Jewishness on the theatre stage and in German-language film. Her case 
study of the popularity of Karl May’s Winnetou adaptations for German television and 
cinema in the 1970s and 1980s suggests that German audiences saw in the appropriation 
of Native American culture a way to escape the debate about national guilt in the post-war 
discourse (Sieg, 2004: 23-24). Benbow contends that Germans consumed Afro-German 
and Turkish German ethnicity especially during the comedy wave of the 1990s as a way to 
prove to other nation states their society’s cultural progress (Benbow, 2007: 26-27). 
4 The increasing trend towards an internationalisation of German television since the late 
1960s is the subject of Hans Magnus Enzensberger’s continued critique of the medium. 
In “Das Nullmedium oder warum alle Klagen über das Fernsehen gegenstandslos sind-
The Zero-Sum Game Media or Why All Complaints about Television Are Immaterial”, 
Enzensberger outlines the increased “emptiness” of Germany’s television programming. 
From the perspective of a cultural pessimist he argues that the public channels have not 
met the pedagogic goals as laid out in the German federal government’s educational 
mandate, the so-called educational mandate [do we need this repetition?]. To follow that 
mandate, Alexander Kluge initially sought to install a certain level of political gravitas and 
art style in German broadcast via political talk shows and art magazines. However, Forrest 
describes how Kluge eventually conceded defeat in mainstreaming cultural niche products 
in the 1990s. His programmes did not attract enough viewers and Kluge later became a 
pronounced sceptic of mainstream television (Forrest, 2012: 21-39).
5 The series has won a great number of prestigious awards at national as well as international 
comedy festivals and award ceremonies. Apart from the German Adolf-Grimme-Preis 
for “Best Entertainment Show” in 2007, the show received the Italian Prix Italia for 
“Best Drama-Show or Serial” in 2006 and the French Nymphe d’Or at the Festival de 
Télévision de Monte-Carlo for “Best European Producer for a Comedy Show” in 2006. 
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Turkish for Beginners also received nominations for the Prix Europe in 2006 and the widely 
recognised Rose d’Or in the “Sitcom” and “Social Awareness” categories in the same year. 
A film version related to the series was released in 2012. It was popular with audiences as 
well. 
6 Struppert and Keding wrote the first monograph on Yanar’s Was Guckst Du?!-Whatcha 
Looking At?! They used an intercultural communications theory approach. Theirs is 
among the few but thorough engagements with ethnic comedy and mainstream humour 
in German television. Kotthoff (2004: 186-187) analyses Yanar’s show with a greater focus 
on cultural studies.
7 The sitcom had a total run of 52 episodes. Topics covered included typical problems of 
teenagers and parents. The series also focused on cross-cultural experiences. Due to 
popular demand, season three was continued on public television despite the producers’ 
plans to create a commercial film adaptation of the show. This happened in 2011, two years 
after the series’ finale. The third and final season consists of 16 episodes. All of them aired in 
the autumn of 2008. This was mostly due to the show’s popular reception, especially with 
younger audiences. The sitcom did, and still does, cause reaction in fan forums, fan sites 
and on the internet and in social media.
8 Peterson and Benbow argue that the series’ title, “Turkish for Beginners”, points to the 
idea of instructing the German audience in Turkishness. They derive from a close reading 
of the title a “multi-culti” agenda and that it would follow that Germans need to re-learn 
what they think they know about the majority of Turkish Germans with whom they share 
a country (Benbow: 238; Peterson: 97).
9 The Ekel or “Nasty” Alfred Tetzlaff is a commercial clerk. He was born as a Sudeten 
German, formerly known as Bohemian or German Bohemian. This was a community 
of approximately 3,000,000 ethnic Germans living the Czech lands of the Bohemian 
Crown, which later became part of Czechoslovakia. After the WWII, the remainder 
of the German-speaking community, mainly located in Czech Silesia, was expelled and 
forced to migrate to Germany and Austria. Alfred is the undeniable star of the West 
German comedy series, A Perfect Match. The series is characterised by its setting in 1970s 
Wattenscheid. Tetzlaff, a man in his late forties, is small in appearance. His physical stature, 
small black moustache and side-parted dark hair, along with his raging temper and loud 
manner of speaking, reference him as Adolf Hitler. A declared opponent of social reform 
and especially the Turkish German labour migration agreement, the reactionary patriarch 
could be seen as the earlier version of Grandfather Schneider, who also makes extensive use 
of historical references and political upheavals initiated by the German student movement 
era of 1968.
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Chapter IV: Bridget Jones’s Halal Diary
1 Hatice Akyün opens A Spicy Kraut with her clichéd self-description as a dark-haired, 
exotic beauty, who does not mind a good push-up bra (Akyün: 1). 
2 Göktürk has addressed the issue of culture-specific foods, which accompany individuals 
like ethnic signifiers across borders and cultures and never quite fade or lose their 
importance as reminders of cultural authenticity (Göktürk, 2003: 177-180).
Chapter V: Funny Online Kanakism
1 I omit identifiable YouTube user profile and/or channel names for data privacy reasons and 
out of concerns for ethical research practices, and because of impracticalities in seeking 
users’ informed consent for identifiable publication of their online comments. 
2 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zw5X3ACaThw.
3 “Wallah! Ich Hab Nix Gemacht”. One could also infer that “Wallah” is used to suggest a 
contraction, alluding to the German phrase “Wow, Alter! or “Whoa, dude!”. The phrase 
“Wallah” has been used by the two founders of a German clothing label, the so-called 
Wallah Bro’s, who are marketing it like a brand design. Wallah merchandise is available 
via their Facebook and other online marketplace platforms (https://wallahbros.bigcartel.
com/). The label is popular with younger consumers and the phrase is used more and more 
often in memes outside its original context, too. 
4 https://twitter.com/jiletayse?lang=en.
5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EkdO9bVL0hk.
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